NextAuth.js provides authentication for Next.js. Prior to@auth/core 0.41.3 and next-auth 4.24.15 and 5.0.0-beta.32, Auth.js stores the OAuth/OIDC anti-CSRF checks state, nonce, and the PKCE verifier in global cookies that are not bound to the provider that created them. On callback, a check value minted during a sign-in started with one provider can satisfy the callback for a different provider because the stored cookie is not verified against the callback provider's identity, including the provider ID, issuer, client ID, or redirect URI. In a multi-provider application that permits account linking while logged in, when one provider's authorization request is observable and a target provider callback can be satisfied without a PKCE verifier, an attacker can lure a victim into starting a legitimate same-origin flow and link the attacker's target-provider account to the victim's Auth.js user. The linked provider grants the attacker persistent sign-in to the victim's account, while cross-site request forgery alone is insufficient. This issue is fixed in @auth/core 0.41.3 and next-auth 4.24.15 and 5.0.0-beta.32.
History

Wed, 12 Aug 2026 20:45:00 +0000

Type Values Removed Values Added
Description NextAuth.js provides authentication for Next.js. Prior to@auth/core 0.41.3 and next-auth 4.24.15 and 5.0.0-beta.32, Auth.js stores the OAuth/OIDC anti-CSRF checks state, nonce, and the PKCE verifier in global cookies that are not bound to the provider that created them. On callback, a check value minted during a sign-in started with one provider can satisfy the callback for a different provider because the stored cookie is not verified against the callback provider's identity, including the provider ID, issuer, client ID, or redirect URI. In a multi-provider application that permits account linking while logged in, when one provider's authorization request is observable and a target provider callback can be satisfied without a PKCE verifier, an attacker can lure a victim into starting a legitimate same-origin flow and link the attacker's target-provider account to the victim's Auth.js user. The linked provider grants the attacker persistent sign-in to the victim's account, while cross-site request forgery alone is insufficient. This issue is fixed in @auth/core 0.41.3 and next-auth 4.24.15 and 5.0.0-beta.32.
Title NextAuth.js: OAuth state, nonce, and PKCE check cookies are not bound to the provider that created them
Weaknesses CWE-345
CWE-346
CWE-940
References
Metrics cvssV3_1

{'score': 6.8, 'vector': 'CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N'}


cve-icon MITRE

Status: PUBLISHED

Assigner: GitHub_M

Published:

Updated: 2026-08-12T20:23:39.174Z

Reserved: 2026-08-12T14:32:11.795Z

Link: CVE-2026-73419

cve-icon Vulnrichment

No data.

cve-icon NVD

Status : Received

Published: 2026-08-12T21:17:41.033

Modified: 2026-08-12T21:17:41.033

Link: CVE-2026-73419

cve-icon Redhat

No data.

cve-icon OpenCVE Enrichment

Updated: 2026-08-12T22:15:06Z