{"dataType": "CVE_RECORD", "dataVersion": "5.2", "cveMetadata": {"cveId": "CVE-2026-71294", "assignerOrgId": "309f9ea4-e3e9-4c6c-b79d-e8eb01244f2c", "state": "PUBLISHED", "assignerShortName": "TuranSec", "dateReserved": "2026-08-05T12:37:57.358Z", "datePublished": "2026-08-05T12:38:48.025Z", "dateUpdated": "2026-08-05T15:35:10.378Z"}, "containers": {"cna": {"title": "Cotonti CMS Comments Plugin PHP Object Injection via Unrestricted unserialize() in Create/Edit Actions", "descriptions": [{"lang": "en", "value": "Cotonti CMS's Comments plugin deserializes user-supplied data without restricting the classes that may be instantiated. In plugins/comments/controllers/actions/CreateAction.php, a `ci` POST parameter obtained via `cot_import('ci', 'P', 'TXT')` (trim-only sanitization) is passed to `unserialize(base64_decode($ci))` with no `allowed_classes` restriction, reachable by any member with write access to comments (the default `Auth_members => 'RW'` setting in plugins/comments/comments.setup.php). In plugins/comments/controllers/actions/EditAction.php, a `cb` parameter is similarly deserialized via `unserialize(base64_decode($this->comeback))` in prepareComeBack(), reachable by any member editing their own comment. Because unserialize() is called without allowed_classes, an attacker can construct a serialized PHP object of any class loaded by Cotonti (a PHP Object Injection primitive). This was demonstrated in practice using Cotonti's own MySQL_cache class: a crafted serialized MySQL_cache object, once deserialized and later garbage-collected, triggers its __destruct()->flush() chain, causing an attacker-controlled INSERT INTO cot_cache with attacker-chosen row values \u2014 confirming genuine POP-chain exploitation, with further impact (including potential RCE) contingent on other gadget chains available in a given Cotonti installation's loaded classes. A third sink in DeleteAction.php contains the identical unserialize() pattern but is gated behind an admin-only authorization check and is not reachable by ordinary members."}], "problemTypes": [{"descriptions": [{"lang": "en", "description": "CWE-502", "cweId": "CWE-502", "type": "CWE"}]}], "affected": [{"vendor": "Cotonti", "product": "Cotonti", "programFiles": ["plugins/comments/controllers/actions/CreateAction.php", "plugins/comments/controllers/actions/EditAction.php"], "versions": [{"version": "0", "lessThanOrEqual": "*", "status": "affected", "versionType": "custom"}], "defaultStatus": "unaffected"}], "metrics": [{"cvssV3_1": {"version": "3.1", "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:L/A:L", "baseScore": 7.7, "baseSeverity": "HIGH"}}], "references": [{"url": "https://github.com/Cotonti/Cotonti"}, {"url": "https://github.com/Cotonti/Cotonti/blob/master/plugins/comments/controllers/actions/CreateAction.php"}], "credits": [{"lang": "en", "value": "Saidakbarxon Maxsudxonov", "type": "finder"}], "providerMetadata": {"orgId": "309f9ea4-e3e9-4c6c-b79d-e8eb01244f2c", "shortName": "TuranSec", "dateUpdated": "2026-08-05T12:38:48.025Z"}}, "adp": [{"metrics": [{"other": {"type": "ssvc", "content": {"timestamp": "2026-08-05T15:35:00.816320Z", "id": "CVE-2026-71294", "options": [{"Exploitation": "none"}, {"Automatable": "no"}, {"Technical Impact": "partial"}], "role": "CISA Coordinator", "version": "2.0.3"}}}], "title": "CISA ADP Vulnrichment", "providerMetadata": {"orgId": "134c704f-9b21-4f2e-91b3-4a467353bcc0", "shortName": "CISA-ADP", "dateUpdated": "2026-08-05T15:35:10.378Z"}}]}}

{"dataType": "CVE_RECORD", "containers": {"adp": [{"title": "CISA ADP Vulnrichment", "metrics": [{"other": {"type": "ssvc", "content": {"id": "CVE-2026-71294", "role": "CISA Coordinator", "options": [{"Exploitation": "none"}, {"Automatable": "no"}, {"Technical Impact": "partial"}], "version": "2.0.3", "timestamp": "2026-08-05T15:35:00.816320Z"}}}], "providerMetadata": {"orgId": "134c704f-9b21-4f2e-91b3-4a467353bcc0", "shortName": "CISA-ADP", "dateUpdated": "2026-08-05T15:35:05.787Z"}}], "cna": {"title": "Cotonti CMS Comments Plugin PHP Object Injection via Unrestricted unserialize() in Create/Edit Actions", "credits": [{"lang": "en", "type": "finder", "value": "Saidakbarxon Maxsudxonov"}], "metrics": [{"cvssV3_1": {"version": "3.1", "baseScore": 7.7, "baseSeverity": "HIGH", "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:L/A:L"}}], "affected": [{"vendor": "Cotonti", "product": "Cotonti", "versions": [{"status": "affected", "version": "0", "versionType": "custom", "lessThanOrEqual": "*"}], "programFiles": ["plugins/comments/controllers/actions/CreateAction.php", "plugins/comments/controllers/actions/EditAction.php"], "defaultStatus": "unaffected"}], "references": [{"url": "https://github.com/Cotonti/Cotonti"}, {"url": "https://github.com/Cotonti/Cotonti/blob/master/plugins/comments/controllers/actions/CreateAction.php"}], "descriptions": [{"lang": "en", "value": "Cotonti CMS's Comments plugin deserializes user-supplied data without restricting the classes that may be instantiated. In plugins/comments/controllers/actions/CreateAction.php, a `ci` POST parameter obtained via `cot_import('ci', 'P', 'TXT')` (trim-only sanitization) is passed to `unserialize(base64_decode($ci))` with no `allowed_classes` restriction, reachable by any member with write access to comments (the default `Auth_members => 'RW'` setting in plugins/comments/comments.setup.php). In plugins/comments/controllers/actions/EditAction.php, a `cb` parameter is similarly deserialized via `unserialize(base64_decode($this->comeback))` in prepareComeBack(), reachable by any member editing their own comment. Because unserialize() is called without allowed_classes, an attacker can construct a serialized PHP object of any class loaded by Cotonti (a PHP Object Injection primitive). This was demonstrated in practice using Cotonti's own MySQL_cache class: a crafted serialized MySQL_cache object, once deserialized and later garbage-collected, triggers its __destruct()->flush() chain, causing an attacker-controlled INSERT INTO cot_cache with attacker-chosen row values \u2014 confirming genuine POP-chain exploitation, with further impact (including potential RCE) contingent on other gadget chains available in a given Cotonti installation's loaded classes. A third sink in DeleteAction.php contains the identical unserialize() pattern but is gated behind an admin-only authorization check and is not reachable by ordinary members."}], "problemTypes": [{"descriptions": [{"lang": "en", "type": "CWE", "cweId": "CWE-502", "description": "CWE-502"}]}], "providerMetadata": {"orgId": "309f9ea4-e3e9-4c6c-b79d-e8eb01244f2c", "shortName": "TuranSec", "dateUpdated": "2026-08-05T12:38:48.025Z"}}}, "cveMetadata": {"cveId": "CVE-2026-71294", "state": "PUBLISHED", "dateUpdated": "2026-08-05T15:35:10.378Z", "dateReserved": "2026-08-05T12:37:57.358Z", "assignerOrgId": "309f9ea4-e3e9-4c6c-b79d-e8eb01244f2c", "datePublished": "2026-08-05T12:38:48.025Z", "assignerShortName": "TuranSec"}, "dataVersion": "5.2"}

{}

{}

{"affected": [{"configurations": [{"platform": null, "status": "affected", "versions": {"scheme": "generic", "value": "[0,*]"}}], "enrichment": {"confidence": 100.0, "confidence_source": "matching", "scores": [{"score": 100.0, "source": "matching"}]}, "original": {"product": "Cotonti", "source": "cna", "vendor": "Cotonti"}, "product": "cotonti", "vendor": "cotonti"}], "created": "2026-08-05T15:00:05.311535+00:00", "updated": "2026-08-05T15:45:16.664348+00:00", "vendors": ["cotonti", "cotonti$PRODUCT$cotonti"]}