{"dataType": "CVE_RECORD", "dataVersion": "5.2", "cveMetadata": {"cveId": "CVE-2026-48086", "assignerOrgId": "a0819718-46f1-4df5-94e2-005712e83aaa", "state": "PUBLISHED", "assignerShortName": "GitHub_M", "dateReserved": "2026-05-20T18:40:45.833Z", "datePublished": "2026-08-06T21:30:32.142Z", "dateUpdated": "2026-08-06T21:30:32.142Z"}, "containers": {"cna": {"title": "OpenReception: Tenant admin self-promotes to GLOBAL_ADMIN", "problemTypes": [{"descriptions": [{"cweId": "CWE-269", "lang": "en", "description": "CWE-269: Improper Privilege Management", "type": "CWE"}]}], "metrics": [{"cvssV3_1": {"attackComplexity": "LOW", "attackVector": "NETWORK", "availabilityImpact": "HIGH", "baseScore": 9.9, "baseSeverity": "CRITICAL", "confidentialityImpact": "HIGH", "integrityImpact": "HIGH", "privilegesRequired": "LOW", "scope": "CHANGED", "userInteraction": "NONE", "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H", "version": "3.1"}}], "references": [{"name": "https://github.com/open-reception/appointment-booking-software/security/advisories/GHSA-5qfr-7q4g-3469", "tags": ["x_refsource_CONFIRM"], "url": "https://github.com/open-reception/appointment-booking-software/security/advisories/GHSA-5qfr-7q4g-3469"}, {"name": "https://github.com/open-reception/appointment-booking-software/commit/8525d35a41c31078d9f01c62e9687e653cf1a494", "tags": ["x_refsource_MISC"], "url": "https://github.com/open-reception/appointment-booking-software/commit/8525d35a41c31078d9f01c62e9687e653cf1a494"}], "affected": [{"vendor": "open-reception", "product": "appointment-booking-software", "versions": [{"version": "< 1.0.2", "status": "affected"}]}], "providerMetadata": {"orgId": "a0819718-46f1-4df5-94e2-005712e83aaa", "shortName": "GitHub_M", "dateUpdated": "2026-08-06T21:30:32.142Z"}, "descriptions": [{"lang": "en", "value": "OpenReception's appointment booking software provides an end-to-end encrypted appointment booking platform. Prior to version 1.0.2, a TENANT_ADMIN promotes themselves to platform-wide GLOBAL_ADMIN through a single PUT request. The role-update handler accepts the `GLOBAL_ADMIN` enum value from any tenant admin updating their own tenant's staff. No policy check enforces that \"only an existing GLOBAL_ADMIN may grant GLOBAL_ADMIN\", so the schema validation IS the authorization decision. After re-login, the JWT contains the new role and the formerly-tenant-scoped admin reaches every other tenant on the platform. On the hosted OpenReception service this is a scope-changed escalation: a single customer-side tenant administrator gains full platform-wide administrative control over all other tenants' configuration, users, staff records, operational metadata, and tenant lifecycle. Plaintext appointment contents remain subject to the E2E model unless chained with the staff-crypto poisoning issue (V-4) or with staff-passkey hijacking (V-1). On a single-tenant self-hosted deployment it is still a privilege escalation because TENANT_ADMIN should not be able to create new tenants, modify global configuration, or manage other administrators. The same handler also accepts updates targeted at any colleague within the tenant. A tenant admin can promote a separate collaborator account instead of themselves, leaving their own audit trail clean while the platform-wide breach happens through a separate identity. Version 1.0.2 fixes the issue."}], "source": {"advisory": "GHSA-5qfr-7q4g-3469", "discovery": "UNKNOWN"}}}}

{}

{}

{}

{"affected": [{"configurations": [{"platform": null, "status": "affected", "versions": {"scheme": "semver", "value": "[0,1.0.2)"}}], "enrichment": {"confidence": 100.0, "confidence_source": "cna", "scores": [{"score": 100.0, "source": "cna"}]}, "original": {"product": "appointment-booking-software", "source": "cna", "vendor": "open-reception"}, "product": "appointment-booking-software", "vendor": "open-reception"}], "created": "2026-08-07T00:30:06.734061+00:00", "updated": "2026-08-07T09:58:49.149972+00:00", "vendors": ["open-reception", "open-reception$PRODUCT$appointment-booking-software"]}