In versions of the Datadog Android application prior to v554-5.9.4, two Room-backed SQLite databases store sensitive content in plaintext: LocalNotificationDatabase (notification title, message, recipient, service, tags, and on-call/incident deep links) and SearchRecentDatabase (the user's full in-app search history).
Impact: Any actor able to bypass the app sandbox can read these databases in plaintext.
Metrics
Affected Vendors & Products
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References
History
Sat, 08 Aug 2026 02:45:00 +0000
| Type | Values Removed | Values Added |
|---|---|---|
| Title | Datadog Android App Stores Sensitive Data in Cleartext SQLite Databases |
Sat, 08 Aug 2026 01:30:00 +0000
| Type | Values Removed | Values Added |
|---|---|---|
| Description | The Datadog Android application stores operationally sensitive content in plaintext SQLite databases via Room. Two databases were reviewed: LocalNotificationDatabase (table local_notifications, columns including title, message, recipient, service, tags, and on-call/incident deeplinks) and SearchRecentDatabase (table search_recents, storing every in-app search query the user typed). A repository-wide search for SQLCipher, SupportFactory, openHelperFactory, or any Room encryption configuration returns no matches. Databases are stored as cleartext SQLite files in /data/data/com.datadog.app/databases/. At-rest protection therefore depends solely on the Android application sandbox — the standard Android baseline, adequate for many applications but flagged here as a hardening recommendation because the stored content is operationally sensitive (customer infrastructure monitoring metadata, incident notification recipients, and free-text search queries that may reveal service names, dashboards, and queries of interest). Exploitation paths include rooted or jailbroken devices, adb backup if android:allowBackup is misconfigured for any build flavor, physical-device handover scenarios, and forensic acquisition. | In versions of the Datadog Android application prior to v554-5.9.4, two Room-backed SQLite databases store sensitive content in plaintext: LocalNotificationDatabase (notification title, message, recipient, service, tags, and on-call/incident deep links) and SearchRecentDatabase (the user's full in-app search history). Impact: Any actor able to bypass the app sandbox can read these databases in plaintext. |
Fri, 07 Aug 2026 20:00:00 +0000
| Type | Values Removed | Values Added |
|---|---|---|
| Title | Datadog Android App Stores Sensitive Data in Cleartext SQLite Databases |
Fri, 07 Aug 2026 19:30:00 +0000
| Type | Values Removed | Values Added |
|---|---|---|
| Metrics |
cvssV3_1
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Fri, 07 Aug 2026 18:15:00 +0000
| Type | Values Removed | Values Added |
|---|---|---|
| Description | The Datadog Android application stores operationally sensitive content in plaintext SQLite databases via Room. Two databases were reviewed: LocalNotificationDatabase (table local_notifications, columns including title, message, recipient, service, tags, and on-call/incident deeplinks) and SearchRecentDatabase (table search_recents, storing every in-app search query the user typed). A repository-wide search for SQLCipher, SupportFactory, openHelperFactory, or any Room encryption configuration returns no matches. Databases are stored as cleartext SQLite files in /data/data/com.datadog.app/databases/. At-rest protection therefore depends solely on the Android application sandbox — the standard Android baseline, adequate for many applications but flagged here as a hardening recommendation because the stored content is operationally sensitive (customer infrastructure monitoring metadata, incident notification recipients, and free-text search queries that may reveal service names, dashboards, and queries of interest). Exploitation paths include rooted or jailbroken devices, adb backup if android:allowBackup is misconfigured for any build flavor, physical-device handover scenarios, and forensic acquisition. | |
| Weaknesses | CWE-922 | |
| References |
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MITRE
Status: PUBLISHED
Assigner: hackerone
Published:
Updated: 2026-08-08T01:05:53.195Z
Reserved: 2026-05-19T15:00:09.319Z
Link: CVE-2026-47362
Vulnrichment
Updated: 2026-08-07T18:28:43.079Z
NVD
No data.
Redhat
No data.
OpenCVE Enrichment
Updated: 2026-08-08T02:30:04Z