In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net/sched: act_ct: Only release RCU read lock after ct_ft
When looking up a flow table in act_ct in tcf_ct_flow_table_get(),
rhashtable_lookup_fast() internally opens and closes an RCU read critical
section before returning ct_ft.
The tcf_ct_flow_table_cleanup_work() can complete before refcount_inc_not_zero()
is invoked on the returned ct_ft resulting in a UAF on the already freed ct_ft
object. This vulnerability can lead to privilege escalation.
Analysis from [email protected]:
When initializing act_ct, tcf_ct_init() is called, which internally triggers
tcf_ct_flow_table_get().
static int tcf_ct_flow_table_get(struct net *net, struct tcf_ct_params *params)
{
struct zones_ht_key key = { .net = net, .zone = params->zone };
struct tcf_ct_flow_table *ct_ft;
int err = -ENOMEM;
mutex_lock(&zones_mutex);
ct_ft = rhashtable_lookup_fast(&zones_ht, &key, zones_params); // [1]
if (ct_ft && refcount_inc_not_zero(&ct_ft->ref)) // [2]
goto out_unlock;
...
}
static __always_inline void *rhashtable_lookup_fast(
struct rhashtable *ht, const void *key,
const struct rhashtable_params params)
{
void *obj;
rcu_read_lock();
obj = rhashtable_lookup(ht, key, params);
rcu_read_unlock();
return obj;
}
At [1], rhashtable_lookup_fast() looks up and returns the corresponding ct_ft
from zones_ht . The lookup is performed within an RCU read critical section
through rcu_read_lock() / rcu_read_unlock(), which prevents the object from
being freed. However, at the point of function return, rcu_read_unlock() has
already been called, and there is nothing preventing ct_ft from being freed
before reaching refcount_inc_not_zero(&ct_ft->ref) at [2]. This interval becomes
the race window, during which ct_ft can be freed.
Free Process:
tcf_ct_flow_table_put() is executed through the path tcf_ct_cleanup() call_rcu()
tcf_ct_params_free_rcu() tcf_ct_params_free() tcf_ct_flow_table_put().
static void tcf_ct_flow_table_put(struct tcf_ct_flow_table *ct_ft)
{
if (refcount_dec_and_test(&ct_ft->ref)) {
rhashtable_remove_fast(&zones_ht, &ct_ft->node, zones_params);
INIT_RCU_WORK(&ct_ft->rwork, tcf_ct_flow_table_cleanup_work); // [3]
queue_rcu_work(act_ct_wq, &ct_ft->rwork);
}
}
At [3], tcf_ct_flow_table_cleanup_work() is scheduled as RCU work
static void tcf_ct_flow_table_cleanup_work(struct work_struct *work)
{
struct tcf_ct_flow_table *ct_ft;
struct flow_block *block;
ct_ft = container_of(to_rcu_work(work), struct tcf_ct_flow_table,
rwork);
nf_flow_table_free(&ct_ft->nf_ft);
block = &ct_ft->nf_ft.flow_block;
down_write(&ct_ft->nf_ft.flow_block_lock);
WARN_ON(!list_empty(&block->cb_list));
up_write(&ct_ft->nf_ft.flow_block_lock);
kfree(ct_ft); // [4]
module_put(THIS_MODULE);
}
tcf_ct_flow_table_cleanup_work() frees ct_ft at [4]. When this function executes
between [1] and [2], UAF occurs.
This race condition has a very short race window, making it generally
difficult to trigger. Therefore, to trigger the vulnerability an msleep(100) was
inserted after[1]
Metrics
Affected Vendors & Products
| Vendors | Products |
|---|---|
| Linux |
|
No data.
No data.
OpenCVE Enrichment is a feature of OpenCVE that uses AI to automatically link vendors and products to CVEs. Learn more on GitHub.
| Vendors | Products |
|---|
References
History
Tue, 09 Jun 2026 13:45:00 +0000
| Type | Values Removed | Values Added |
|---|---|---|
| Weaknesses | CWE-416 |
Tue, 09 Jun 2026 12:30:00 +0000
| Type | Values Removed | Values Added |
|---|---|---|
| Description | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: net/sched: act_ct: Only release RCU read lock after ct_ft When looking up a flow table in act_ct in tcf_ct_flow_table_get(), rhashtable_lookup_fast() internally opens and closes an RCU read critical section before returning ct_ft. The tcf_ct_flow_table_cleanup_work() can complete before refcount_inc_not_zero() is invoked on the returned ct_ft resulting in a UAF on the already freed ct_ft object. This vulnerability can lead to privilege escalation. Analysis from [email protected]: When initializing act_ct, tcf_ct_init() is called, which internally triggers tcf_ct_flow_table_get(). static int tcf_ct_flow_table_get(struct net *net, struct tcf_ct_params *params) { struct zones_ht_key key = { .net = net, .zone = params->zone }; struct tcf_ct_flow_table *ct_ft; int err = -ENOMEM; mutex_lock(&zones_mutex); ct_ft = rhashtable_lookup_fast(&zones_ht, &key, zones_params); // [1] if (ct_ft && refcount_inc_not_zero(&ct_ft->ref)) // [2] goto out_unlock; ... } static __always_inline void *rhashtable_lookup_fast( struct rhashtable *ht, const void *key, const struct rhashtable_params params) { void *obj; rcu_read_lock(); obj = rhashtable_lookup(ht, key, params); rcu_read_unlock(); return obj; } At [1], rhashtable_lookup_fast() looks up and returns the corresponding ct_ft from zones_ht . The lookup is performed within an RCU read critical section through rcu_read_lock() / rcu_read_unlock(), which prevents the object from being freed. However, at the point of function return, rcu_read_unlock() has already been called, and there is nothing preventing ct_ft from being freed before reaching refcount_inc_not_zero(&ct_ft->ref) at [2]. This interval becomes the race window, during which ct_ft can be freed. Free Process: tcf_ct_flow_table_put() is executed through the path tcf_ct_cleanup() call_rcu() tcf_ct_params_free_rcu() tcf_ct_params_free() tcf_ct_flow_table_put(). static void tcf_ct_flow_table_put(struct tcf_ct_flow_table *ct_ft) { if (refcount_dec_and_test(&ct_ft->ref)) { rhashtable_remove_fast(&zones_ht, &ct_ft->node, zones_params); INIT_RCU_WORK(&ct_ft->rwork, tcf_ct_flow_table_cleanup_work); // [3] queue_rcu_work(act_ct_wq, &ct_ft->rwork); } } At [3], tcf_ct_flow_table_cleanup_work() is scheduled as RCU work static void tcf_ct_flow_table_cleanup_work(struct work_struct *work) { struct tcf_ct_flow_table *ct_ft; struct flow_block *block; ct_ft = container_of(to_rcu_work(work), struct tcf_ct_flow_table, rwork); nf_flow_table_free(&ct_ft->nf_ft); block = &ct_ft->nf_ft.flow_block; down_write(&ct_ft->nf_ft.flow_block_lock); WARN_ON(!list_empty(&block->cb_list)); up_write(&ct_ft->nf_ft.flow_block_lock); kfree(ct_ft); // [4] module_put(THIS_MODULE); } tcf_ct_flow_table_cleanup_work() frees ct_ft at [4]. When this function executes between [1] and [2], UAF occurs. This race condition has a very short race window, making it generally difficult to trigger. Therefore, to trigger the vulnerability an msleep(100) was inserted after[1] | |
| Title | net/sched: act_ct: Only release RCU read lock after ct_ft | |
| First Time appeared |
Linux
Linux linux Kernel |
|
| CPEs | cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:* | |
| Vendors & Products |
Linux
Linux linux Kernel |
|
| References |
|
|
MITRE
Status: PUBLISHED
Assigner: Linux
Published:
Updated: 2026-06-09T12:11:12.128Z
Reserved: 2026-05-13T15:03:33.112Z
Link: CVE-2026-46319
Vulnrichment
No data.
NVD
Status : Received
Published: 2026-06-09T13:16:37.210
Modified: 2026-06-09T13:16:37.210
Link: CVE-2026-46319
Redhat
No data.
OpenCVE Enrichment
Updated: 2026-06-09T13:30:04Z