Netty is a network application framework for development of protocol servers and clients. NoQuicTokenHandler is the tokenHandler used when the application does not set one. Prior to version 4.2.15.Final, its writeToken() returns false (server will not send Retry — acceptable), but validateToken() unconditionally `return 0`. In QuicheQuicServerCodec.handlePacket(), a non-negative return from validateToken() is interpreted as 'token is valid, ODCID starts at offset 0', causing the server to call quiche_accept as if the client's address had been validated by a Retry round-trip. Per RFC 9000 §8.1, a validated address lifts the 3× anti-amplification send limit. Thus any attacker who includes ANY non-empty token bytes in an Initial packet — with a spoofed victim source IP — causes the Netty server to treat the victim as validated and reflect full-size handshake flights (certificates, etc.) toward it without the 3× cap. The correct 'no token handler' semantics would be to return -1 (invalid) so the normal un-validated path and amplification limit apply. Version 4.2.15.Final patches the issue.
Metrics
Affected Vendors & Products
References
History
Fri, 12 Jun 2026 15:45:00 +0000
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Netty
Netty netty |
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Netty
Netty netty |
Fri, 12 Jun 2026 14:30:00 +0000
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| Description | Netty is a network application framework for development of protocol servers and clients. NoQuicTokenHandler is the tokenHandler used when the application does not set one. Prior to version 4.2.15.Final, its writeToken() returns false (server will not send Retry — acceptable), but validateToken() unconditionally `return 0`. In QuicheQuicServerCodec.handlePacket(), a non-negative return from validateToken() is interpreted as 'token is valid, ODCID starts at offset 0', causing the server to call quiche_accept as if the client's address had been validated by a Retry round-trip. Per RFC 9000 §8.1, a validated address lifts the 3× anti-amplification send limit. Thus any attacker who includes ANY non-empty token bytes in an Initial packet — with a spoofed victim source IP — causes the Netty server to treat the victim as validated and reflect full-size handshake flights (certificates, etc.) toward it without the 3× cap. The correct 'no token handler' semantics would be to return -1 (invalid) so the normal un-validated path and amplification limit apply. Version 4.2.15.Final patches the issue. | |
| Title | Netty's Default QUIC token handler accepts any client-supplied token | |
| Weaknesses | CWE-940 | |
| References |
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| Metrics |
cvssV3_1
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Status: PUBLISHED
Assigner: GitHub_M
Published:
Updated: 2026-06-12T14:06:54.213Z
Reserved: 2026-05-07T21:50:33.545Z
Link: CVE-2026-44894
No data.
Status : Received
Published: 2026-06-12T15:16:26.240
Modified: 2026-06-12T15:16:26.240
Link: CVE-2026-44894
No data.
OpenCVE Enrichment
Updated: 2026-06-12T15:30:31Z