Metrics
Affected Vendors & Products
Sat, 19 Apr 2025 01:45:00 +0000
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Thu, 17 Apr 2025 15:45:00 +0000
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Tue, 18 Mar 2025 08:00:00 +0000
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Description | Issue summary: A timing side-channel which could potentially allow recovering the private key exists in the ECDSA signature computation. Impact summary: A timing side-channel in ECDSA signature computations could allow recovering the private key by an attacker. However, measuring the timing would require either local access to the signing application or a very fast network connection with low latency. There is a timing signal of around 300 nanoseconds when the top word of the inverted ECDSA nonce value is zero. This can happen with significant probability only for some of the supported elliptic curves. In particular the NIST P-521 curve is affected. To be able to measure this leak, the attacker process must either be located in the same physical computer or must have a very fast network connection with low latency. For that reason the severity of this vulnerability is Low. | Issue summary: A timing side-channel which could potentially allow recovering the private key exists in the ECDSA signature computation. Impact summary: A timing side-channel in ECDSA signature computations could allow recovering the private key by an attacker. However, measuring the timing would require either local access to the signing application or a very fast network connection with low latency. There is a timing signal of around 300 nanoseconds when the top word of the inverted ECDSA nonce value is zero. This can happen with significant probability only for some of the supported elliptic curves. In particular the NIST P-521 curve is affected. To be able to measure this leak, the attacker process must either be located in the same physical computer or must have a very fast network connection with low latency. For that reason the severity of this vulnerability is Low. The FIPS modules in 3.4, 3.3, 3.2, 3.1 and 3.0 are affected by this issue. |
Mon, 27 Jan 2025 21:15:00 +0000
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cvssV3_1
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ssvc
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Fri, 24 Jan 2025 20:45:00 +0000
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Tue, 21 Jan 2025 02:30:00 +0000
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threat_severity
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cvssV3_1
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Mon, 20 Jan 2025 17:45:00 +0000
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Mon, 20 Jan 2025 13:45:00 +0000
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Description | Issue summary: A timing side-channel which could potentially allow recovering the private key exists in the ECDSA signature computation. Impact summary: A timing side-channel in ECDSA signature computations could allow recovering the private key by an attacker. However, measuring the timing would require either local access to the signing application or a very fast network connection with low latency. There is a timing signal of around 300 nanoseconds when the top word of the inverted ECDSA nonce value is zero. This can happen with significant probability only for some of the supported elliptic curves. In particular the NIST P-521 curve is affected. To be able to measure this leak, the attacker process must either be located in the same physical computer or must have a very fast network connection with low latency. For that reason the severity of this vulnerability is Low. | |
Title | Timing side-channel in ECDSA signature computation | |
Weaknesses | CWE-385 | |
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Status: PUBLISHED
Assigner: openssl
Published:
Updated: 2025-04-19T00:11:03.767Z
Reserved: 2025-01-07T09:34:54.572Z
Link: CVE-2024-13176

Updated: 2025-04-19T00:11:03.767Z

Status : Awaiting Analysis
Published: 2025-01-20T14:15:26.247
Modified: 2025-04-19T01:15:43.007
Link: CVE-2024-13176
