| CVE |
Vendors |
Products |
Updated |
CVSS v3.1 |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
binder: fix UAF in binder_free_transaction()
In binder_free_transaction(), the t->to_proc is read under the t->lock.
However, once the t->lock is dropped, the to_proc can die in parallel.
This leads to a use-after-free error when we attempt to acquire its
inner lock right afterwards:
==================================================================
BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in _raw_spin_lock+0xe4/0x1a0
Write of size 4 at addr ffff00001125da70 by task B/672
CPU: 20 UID: 0 PID: 672 Comm: B Not tainted 7.1.0-rc6-00284-g8e65320d91cd #4 PREEMPT
Hardware name: linux,dummy-virt (DT)
Call trace:
_raw_spin_lock+0xe4/0x1a0
binder_free_transaction+0x8c/0x320
binder_send_failed_reply+0x21c/0x2f8
binder_thread_release+0x488/0x7e0
binder_ioctl+0x12c0/0x29a0
[...]
Allocated by task 675:
__kmalloc_cache_noprof+0x174/0x444
binder_open+0x118/0xb70
do_dentry_open+0x374/0x1040
vfs_open+0x58/0x3bc
[...]
Freed by task 212:
__kasan_slab_free+0x58/0x80
kfree+0x1a0/0x4a4
binder_proc_dec_tmpref+0x32c/0x5e0
binder_deferred_func+0xc48/0x104c
process_one_work+0x53c/0xbc0
[...]
==================================================================
To prevent this, pin the target thread (t->to_thread) to guarantee the
target process remains alive. Undelivered transactions without a target
thread are already safe, as the target process can only be the current
context in those paths. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ALSA: usb-audio: avoid kobject path lookup in DualSense match
The DualSense jack-detection input handler verifies that a matching input
device belongs to the same physical controller by building kobject path
strings for both the input device and the USB audio device, then comparing
the path prefix.
This was observed when a weak physical connection caused the controller
to rapidly disconnect and reconnect. During that repeated hotplug,
snd_dualsense_ih_match() can run while the controller's USB device is
being disconnected. kobject_get_path() walks ancestor kobjects and
dereferences their names; if the USB device kobject name is no longer
valid, this can fault in strlen():
RIP: 0010:strlen+0x10/0x30
Call Trace:
kobject_get_path+0x34/0x150
snd_dualsense_ih_match+0x49/0xd0 [snd_usb_audio]
input_register_device+0x566/0x6a0
ps_probe+0xb89/0x1590 [hid_playstation]
The same ownership check can be done without building kobject path
strings. The input device is parented below the HID device, USB interface
and USB device, so walking the input device parent chain and comparing
against the mixer USB device preserves the check without dereferencing
kobject names during disconnect. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ALSA: seq: Fix uninitialised heap leak in snd_seq_event_dup()
snd_seq_event_dup() copies an incoming event into a pool cell and, in
the UMP-enabled build, clears the trailing cell->ump.raw.extra word that
the memcpy() did not cover. The guard deciding whether to clear it
compares the copied size against sizeof(cell->event):
memcpy(&cell->ump, event, size);
if (size < sizeof(cell->event))
cell->ump.raw.extra = 0;
For a legacy (non-UMP) event, size == sizeof(struct snd_seq_event) ==
sizeof(cell->event), so the condition is false and the extra word keeps
stale data. The cell pool is allocated with kvmalloc() (not zeroed) and
cells are reused via a free list, so that word holds uninitialised heap
or leftover event data.
When such a cell is delivered to a UMP client (client->midi_version > 0)
that set SNDRV_SEQ_FILTER_NO_CONVERT -- so the legacy event reaches it
unconverted -- snd_seq_read() reads it out as the larger struct
snd_seq_ump_event and copies the stale word to user space, a 4-byte
kernel heap infoleak to an unprivileged /dev/snd/seq client.
Compare against sizeof(cell->ump) instead, so the trailing word is zeroed
for every event shorter than the UMP cell. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ALSA: ice1712: check snd_ctl_new1() return value
snd_ctl_new1() can return NULL when memory allocation fails. The
ice1712 driver calls snd_ctl_new1() without checking the return value
before dereferencing the pointer in multiple places (ice1712.c,
ice1724.c, aureon.c), which can lead to NULL pointer dereferences.
Add NULL checks after snd_ctl_new1() calls and return -ENOMEM if any
fails. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ALSA: es1938: check snd_ctl_new1() return value
snd_ctl_new1() can return NULL when memory allocation fails.
snd_es1938_mixer() does not check the return value before dereferencing
the pointer, which can lead to a NULL pointer dereference.
Add a NULL check after snd_ctl_new1() and return -ENOMEM if it fails. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ALSA: caiaq: fix out-of-bounds read in the Traktor Kontrol S4 input parser
snd_usb_caiaq_tks4_dispatch() decodes the Traktor Kontrol S4 input
stream in fixed 16-byte (TKS4_MSGBLOCK_SIZE) message blocks. On every
iteration it advances buf and subtracts the block size while looping on
"while (len)".
len is urb->actual_length. That value is supplied by the device and is
not guaranteed to be a multiple of 16. When a final short block leaves
len between 1 and 15, the loop runs once more, reads up to buf[15], and
then does "len -= TKS4_MSGBLOCK_SIZE". As len is unsigned this underflows
to a huge value. The loop then keeps iterating and walking buf far past
the end of the 512-byte ep4_in_buf, reading out of bounds until a bogus
block id happens to be hit.
Iterate only while a full message block is available. This stops the
unsigned underflow and silently drops any trailing partial block, which
carries no complete control value anyway.
The sibling endpoint-4 parsers are not affected. The Traktor Kontrol X1
and Maschine arms in snd_usb_caiaq_ep4_reply_dispatch() floor
urb->actual_length before dispatching. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ALSA: ymfpci: check snd_ctl_new1() return value
snd_ctl_new1() can return NULL when memory allocation fails.
snd_ymfpci_create_spdif_controls() does not check the return value
before dereferencing kctl->id.device, which can lead to a NULL pointer
dereference.
Add NULL checks after snd_ctl_new1() calls and return -ENOMEM if any
fails. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ALSA: usx2y: us144mkii: fix work UAF on disconnect
tascam_disconnect() cancels capture_work and midi_in_work before
usb_kill_anchored_urbs() kills the capture/MIDI-in URBs. Those URBs
self-resubmit, and their completion handlers reschedule the work.
A URB that completes in the small window between cancel_work_sync() and
usb_kill_anchored_urbs() therefore re-arms the work after its only
cancel. Nothing cancels it again before snd_card_free() frees the
card-private tascam structure, so the work handler then runs on freed
memory.
Kill the anchored URBs before cancelling the work; once the work is
cancelled no remaining URB can complete to re-arm it. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
iio: temperature: tmp006: use devm_iio_trigger_register
tmp006_probe() allocates the DRDY trigger with devm_iio_trigger_alloc()
but registers it with plain iio_trigger_register(). The driver has no
.remove() callback, so on module unload the trigger stays in the global
trigger list while its memory is freed by devm, leaving a dangling
entry.
Switch to devm_iio_trigger_register() so the registration is undone in
the same devm scope as the allocation. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
iio: pressure: mpl115: fix runtime PM leak on read error
mpl115_read_raw() takes a runtime PM reference with pm_runtime_get_sync()
before reading the processed pressure or raw temperature, but on the read
error path it returns without calling pm_runtime_put_autosuspend(). Each
failed read therefore leaks a runtime PM reference and prevents the device
from autosuspending.
Drop the reference before checking the return value so both the success
and error paths are balanced. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
iio: event: Fix event FIFO reset race
`iio_event_getfd()` creates the event file descriptor with
`anon_inode_getfd()`, which allocates a new fd, creates the anonymous
file and installs it in the process fd table before returning to the
caller.
The IIO code resets the event FIFO after `anon_inode_getfd()` has returned,
but before `IIO_GET_EVENT_FD_IOCTL` has copied the fd number to userspace.
But since fd tables are shared between threads, another thread can guess
the newly allocated fd number and issue a `read()` on it as soon as the fd
has been installed.
This means the `kfifo_to_user()` in `iio_event_chrdev_read()` can run in
parallel with the `kfifo_reset_out()` in `iio_event_getfd()`.
The kfifo documentation says that `kfifo_reset_out()` is only safe when it
is called from the reader thread and there is only one concurrent reader.
Otherwise it is dangerous and must be handled in the same way as
`kfifo_reset()`.
If that happens, `kfifo_to_user()` can advance the FIFO `out` index based
on state from before the reset, after the reset has already moved the `out`
index to the current `in` index. That can leave the FIFO with an `out`
index past the `in` index. A later `read()` can then see an underflowed
FIFO length and copy more data than the event FIFO buffer contains. This
can result in an out-of-bounds read and leak adjacent kernel memory to
userspace.
Move the FIFO reset before `anon_inode_getfd()`. At that point the event fd is
marked busy, but the new fd has not been installed yet, so userspace cannot
access it while the FIFO is reset. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
iio: chemical: scd30: Cleanup initializations and fix sign-extension bug
Include linux/bitfield.h for FIELD_GET().
Create new macros for bit manipulation in combination with manual bit
manipulation being replaced with FIELD_GET().
The current variable declaration and initializations are barely readable
and use comma separations across multiple lines. Refactor the
initializations so that mantissa and exp have separate declarations and
sign gets initialized later.
In addition (and due to the nature of the cleanup), fix a sign-extension
bug where, float32 would get bitwise anded with ~BIT(31)
(which is 0xFFFFFFFF7FFFFFFF) which corrupted the exponent. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
iio: buffer: hw-consumer: free scan_mask on buffer release
The scan_mask lifetime changed in commit 9a2e1233d38c ("iio: buffer:
hw-consumer: remove redundant scan_mask flexible array").
Before that change, the scan mask storage was embedded in struct
hw_consumer_buffer, so iio_hw_buf_release() could free the whole
allocation with a single kfree(hw_buf).
That commit moved the scan mask to a separate bitmap_zalloc() allocation
stored in buffer.scan_mask, but left iio_hw_buf_release() unchanged.
Free the scan mask in iio_hw_buf_release() before freeing the buffer
wrapper. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
iio: adc: ad_sigma_delta: fix CS held asserted and state leaks
In ad_sigma_delta_single_conversion(), set_mode(AD_SD_MODE_IDLE) and
disable_one() were called from the out: block while keep_cs_asserted
was still true. This caused any SPI transfer issued by those callbacks
to carry cs_change=1, leaving CS permanently asserted after the
conversion. Fix by moving both calls into the out_unlock: block, after
keep_cs_asserted is cleared, matching the pattern already used in
ad_sd_calibrate().
In the error path of ad_sd_buffer_postenable(), if an operation fails
after set_mode(AD_SD_MODE_CONTINUOUS) has already succeeded (e.g.
spi_offload_trigger_enable()), the device is left in continuous
conversion mode with CS physically asserted. Additionally,
bus_locked remaining true after spi_bus_unlock() causes subsequent
SPI operations to call spi_sync_locked() without the bus lock actually
held, allowing concurrent SPI access.
Fix the error path by clearing keep_cs_asserted first, then calling
set_mode(AD_SD_MODE_IDLE) to revert the device mode and deassert CS,
then clearing bus_locked before releasing the bus.
For devices that implement neither set_mode nor disable_one (such as
MAX11205, which has no physical CS pin), no SPI transfer is issued
during cleanup and the cs_change flag has no effect on any physical
line. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
iio: adc: ad_sigma_delta: fix clear_pending_event for registerless devices
ad_sigma_delta_clear_pending_event() falls through to the status register
read path for devices with has_registers = false and no rdy_gpiod. For
such devices, ad_sd_read_reg() skips the address byte entirely and clocks
raw MISO bytes with no address phase — making it byte-for-byte identical
to reading conversion data. If a pending conversion result is present,
this partially consumes it and corrupts the data stream for the subsequent
ad_sd_read_reg() call in ad_sigma_delta_single_conversion().
Furthermore, with num_resetclks = 0 on these devices, data_read_len
evaluates to 0. If the clocked byte has bit 7 clear, pending_event is set
and the code attempts memset(data + 2, 0xff, 0 - 1), overflowing to
SIZE_MAX and corrupting the heap.
Fix by returning 0 immediately when neither rdy_gpiod nor has_registers
is set. This is safe for all current registerless devices: ad7191 and
ad7780 (with powerdown GPIO) are reset between conversions by CS
deassertion, so there is no stale result to drain; ad7780 (without
powerdown GPIO) and max11205 are continuously-converting and cycle ~DRDY
at the output data rate regardless of whether the previous result was
read, so the next falling edge fires naturally.
A future registerless device that holds ~DRDY asserted until data is read
would be broken by this early return and would require either
num_resetclks set or a rdy-gpio.
The same heap corruption is reachable on any device with rdy_gpiod set
but num_resetclks = 0: if the GPIO indicates a pending event, the drain
path executes memset(data + 2, 0xff, 0 - 1) regardless of has_registers.
Add an explicit data_read_len == 0 guard after the pending event check;
the stale result is then consumed by the first ad_sd_read_reg() call in
ad_sigma_delta_single_conversion(). |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
iio: accel: bmc150: clamp the device-reported FIFO frame count
__bmc150_accel_fifo_flush() copies the number of samples the device
reports in its hardware FIFO into an on-stack buffer
u16 buffer[BMC150_ACCEL_FIFO_LENGTH * 3];
which is sized for at most BMC150_ACCEL_FIFO_LENGTH (32) samples. The
frame count is read from the FIFO_STATUS register and only masked to its
7 valid bits:
count = val & 0x7F;
so it can be 0..127. The only other limit applied to it is the optional
caller-supplied sample budget:
if (samples && count > samples)
count = samples;
which does not constrain count on the flush-all path (samples == 0), and
leaves it well above 32 whenever samples is larger. count samples are
then transferred into buffer[]:
bmc150_accel_fifo_transfer(data, (u8 *)buffer, count);
bmc150_accel_fifo_transfer() reads count * 6 bytes through regmap, so a
malfunctioning, malicious or counterfeit accelerometer (or an attacker
tampering with the I2C/SPI bus) that reports up to 127 frames writes up
to 762 bytes into the 192-byte buffer: a stack out-of-bounds write of up
to 570 bytes that clobbers the stack canary, saved registers and the
return address.
Clamp count to BMC150_ACCEL_FIFO_LENGTH, the number of samples buffer[]
is sized for, before the transfer, mirroring the watermark clamp already
done in bmc150_accel_set_watermark(). A well-formed flush reports at most
BMC150_ACCEL_FIFO_LENGTH frames, so legitimate devices are unaffected. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
bpf: Support for hardening against JIT spraying
The BPF JIT allocator packs many small programs into larger executable
allocations and reuses space within those allocations as programs are
loaded and freed. When fresh code is written into space that a previous
program occupied, an indirect jump into the new program can reuse a branch
prediction left behind by the old one.
Flush the indirect branch predictors before reusing JIT memory so that
indirect jumps into a newly written program don't reuse predictions from an
old program that occupied the same space.
Introduce bpf_arch_pred_flush_enabled static key and bpf_arch_pred_flush
static call for flushing the branch predictors on JIT memory reuse.
Architectures that need a flush, can update it to a predictor flush
function. By default, its a NOP and does not emit any CALL.
Allocations larger than a pack are not covered by this flush. That is safe
because cBPF programs (the unprivileged attack surface) are bounded well
below a pack size. Issue a warning if this assumption is ever violated
while the flush is active. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ACPI: NFIT: core: Fix possible NULL pointer dereference
After commit 9b311b7313d6 ("ACPI: NFIT: Install Notify() handler before
getting NFIT table"), acpi_nfit_probe() installs an ACPI notify handler
for the NFIT device before checking the presence of the NFIT table. If
that table is not there, 0 is returned without allocating the acpi_desc
object and setting the driver data pointer of the NFIT device. If the
platform firmware triggers an NFIT_NOTIFY_UC_MEMORY_ERROR notification
on the NFIT device at that point, acpi_nfit_uc_error_notify() will
dereference a NULL pointer.
Prevent that from occurring by adding an acpi_desc check against NULL
to acpi_nfit_uc_error_notify(). |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
KVM: x86: Unconditionally recompute CR8 intercept on PPR update
The TPR_THRESHOLD field in the VMCS is used by VMX to induce VM exits
when the guest's virtual TPR falls under the specified threshold,
allowing KVM to inject previously masked interrupts.
KVM handles these VM exits in handle_tpr_below_threshold().
Commit eb90f3417a0c ("KVM: vmx: speed up TPR below threshold vmexits")
optimized this function by calling apic_update_ppr() instead of raising
KVM_REQ_EVENT. apic_update_ppr() then raises KVM_REQ_EVENT if there is
a pending, deliverable interrupt.
However, if there are no new interrupts pending, apic_update_ppr() does
not issue the request. Thus, kvm_lapic_update_cr8_intercept() and
vmx_update_cr8_intercept() are not called before VM entry, which results
in a high, stale TPR_THRESHOLD. This is problematic due to the following
sentence in 28.2.1.1 "VM-Execution Control Fields" in the SDM:
The following check is performed if the “use TPR shadow” VM-execution
control is 1 and the “virtualize APIC accesses” and “virtual-interrupt
delivery” VM-execution controls are both 0: the value of bits 3:0 of
the TPR threshold VM-execution control field should not be greater
than the value of bits 7:4 of VTPR.
This error condition is typically not observed when KVM runs on a bare
metal system because modern processors support APICv, which enables
virtual-interrupt delivery, and which KVM uses when possible. This
causes the processor to no longer generate TPR-below-threshold exits
and to no longer check TPR_THRESHOLD on entry. However, when running
on older platforms, or under nested virtualization on a hypervisor that
does not support virtual-interrupt delivery and enforces this check
(like Hyper-V) this can cause a VM entry failure with hardware error
0x7, as seen in [1].
Call kvm_lapic_update_cr8_intercept() if apic_update_ppr() does not
find a deliverable interrupt (and thus does not raise KVM_REQ_EVENT).
Remove calls to kvm_lapic_update_cr8_intercept() on paths that end up in
apic_update_ppr(), as they now become redundant. This ensures that any
path that updates the guest's PPR also figures out if KVM needs to wait
for a TPR change (using TPR_THRESHOLD on VMX or CR8 intercepts on SVM). |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
NFSD: Fix infinite loop in layout state revocation
find_one_sb_stid() skips stids whose sc_status is non-zero, but the
SC_TYPE_LAYOUT case in nfsd4_revoke_states() never sets sc_status
before calling nfsd4_close_layout(). The retry loop therefore finds
the same layout stid on every iteration, hanging the revoker
indefinitely. |
