| CVE |
Vendors |
Products |
Updated |
CVSS v3.1 |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
dm cache: fix null-deref with concurrent writes in passthrough mode
In passthrough mode, when dm-cache starts to invalidate a cache
entry and bio prison cell lock fails due to concurrent write to
the same cached block, mg->cell remains NULL. The error path in
invalidate_complete() attempts to unlock and free the cell
unconditionally, causing a NULL pointer dereference:
KASAN: null-ptr-deref in range [0x0000000000000000-0x0000000000000007]
CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 134 Comm: fio Not tainted 6.19.0-rc7 #3 PREEMPT
RIP: 0010:dm_cell_unlock_v2+0x3f/0x210
<snip>
Call Trace:
invalidate_complete+0xef/0x430
map_bio+0x130f/0x1a10
cache_map+0x320/0x6b0
__map_bio+0x458/0x510
dm_submit_bio+0x40e/0x16d0
__submit_bio+0x419/0x870
<snip>
Reproduce steps:
1. Create a cache device
dmsetup create cmeta --table "0 8192 linear /dev/sdc 0"
dmsetup create cdata --table "0 131072 linear /dev/sdc 8192"
dmsetup create corig --table "0 262144 linear /dev/sdc 262144"
dd if=/dev/zero of=/dev/mapper/cmeta bs=4k count=1 oflag=direct
dmsetup create cache --table "0 262144 cache /dev/mapper/cmeta \
/dev/mapper/cdata /dev/mapper/corig 128 2 metadata2 writethrough smq 0"
2. Promote the first data block into cache
fio --filename=/dev/mapper/cache --name=populate --rw=write --bs=4k \
--direct=1 --size=64k
3. Reload the cache into passthrough mode
dmsetup suspend cache
dmsetup reload cache --table "0 262144 cache /dev/mapper/cmeta \
/dev/mapper/cdata /dev/mapper/corig 128 2 metadata2 passthrough smq 0"
dmsetup resume cache
4. Write to the first cached block concurrently
fio --filename=/dev/mapper/cache --name test --rw=randwrite --bs=4k \
--randrepeat=0 --direct=1 --numjobs=2 --size 64k
Fix by checking if mg->cell is valid before attempting to unlock it. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
drm/msm: Fix VM_BIND UNMAP locking
Wrong argument meant that the objs involved in UNMAP ops were not always
getting locked.
Since _NO_SHARE objs share a common resv with the VM (which is always
locked) this would only show up with non-_NO_SHARE BOs.
Patchwork: https://patchwork.freedesktop.org/patch/713898/ |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
netfilter: nfnetlink_osf: fix out-of-bounds read on option matching
In nf_osf_match(), the nf_osf_hdr_ctx structure is initialized once
and passed by reference to nf_osf_match_one() for each fingerprint
checked. During TCP option parsing, nf_osf_match_one() advances the
shared ctx->optp pointer.
If a fingerprint perfectly matches, the function returns early without
restoring ctx->optp to its initial state. If the user has configured
NF_OSF_LOGLEVEL_ALL, the loop continues to the next fingerprint.
However, because ctx->optp was not restored, the next call to
nf_osf_match_one() starts parsing from the end of the options buffer.
This causes subsequent matches to read garbage data and fail
immediately, making it impossible to log more than one match or logging
incorrect matches.
Instead of using a shared ctx->optp pointer, pass the context as a
constant pointer and use a local pointer (optp) for TCP option
traversal. This makes nf_osf_match_one() strictly stateless from the
caller's perspective, ensuring every fingerprint check starts at the
correct option offset. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
erofs: unify lcn as u64 for 32-bit platforms
As sashiko reported [1], `lcn` was typed as `unsigned long` (or
`unsigned int` sometimes), which is only 32 bits wide on 32-bit
platforms, which causes `(lcn << lclusterbits)` to be truncated
at 4 GiB.
In order to consolidate the logic, just use `u64` consistently
around the codebase.
[1] https://sashiko.dev/r/20260420034612.1899973-1-hsiangkao%40linux.alibaba.com |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
greybus: raw: fix use-after-free on cdev close
This addresses a use-after-free bug when a raw bundle is disconnected
but its chardev is still opened by an application. When the application
releases the cdev, it causes the following panic when init on free is
enabled (CONFIG_INIT_ON_FREE_DEFAULT_ON=y):
refcount_t: underflow; use-after-free.
WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 139 at lib/refcount.c:28 refcount_warn_saturate+0xd0/0x130
...
Call Trace:
<TASK>
cdev_put+0x18/0x30
__fput+0x255/0x2a0
__x64_sys_close+0x3d/0x80
do_syscall_64+0xa4/0x290
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f
The cdev is contained in the "gb_raw" structure, which is freed in the
disconnect operation. When the cdev is released at a later time,
cdev_put gets an address that points to freed memory.
To fix this use-after-free, convert the struct device from a pointer to
being embedded, that makes the lifetime of the cdev and of this device
the same. Then, use cdev_device_add, which guarantees that the device
won't be released until all references to the cdev have been released.
Finally, delegate the freeing of the structure to the device release
function, instead of freeing immediately in the disconnect callback. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ksmbd: fix use-after-free from async crypto on Qualcomm crypto engine
ksmbd_crypt_message() sets a NULL completion callback on AEAD requests
and does not handle the -EINPROGRESS return code from async hardware
crypto engines like the Qualcomm Crypto Engine (QCE). When QCE returns
-EINPROGRESS, ksmbd treats it as an error and immediately frees the
request while the hardware DMA operation is still in flight. The DMA
completion callback then dereferences freed memory, causing a NULL
pointer crash:
pc : qce_skcipher_done+0x24/0x174
lr : vchan_complete+0x230/0x27c
...
el1h_64_irq+0x68/0x6c
ksmbd_free_work_struct+0x20/0x118 [ksmbd]
ksmbd_exit_file_cache+0x694/0xa4c [ksmbd]
Use the standard crypto_wait_req() pattern with crypto_req_done() as
the completion callback, matching the approach used by the SMB client
in fs/smb/client/smb2ops.c. This properly handles both synchronous
engines (immediate return) and async engines (-EINPROGRESS followed
by callback notification). |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
nexthop: fix IPv6 route referencing IPv4 nexthop
syzbot reported a panic [1] [2].
When an IPv6 nexthop is replaced with an IPv4 nexthop, the has_v4 flag
of all groups containing this nexthop is not updated. This is because
nh_group_v4_update is only called when replacing AF_INET to AF_INET6,
but the reverse direction (AF_INET6 to AF_INET) is missed.
This allows a stale has_v4=false to bypass fib6_check_nexthop, causing
IPv6 routes to be attached to groups that effectively contain only AF_INET
members. Subsequent route lookups then call nexthop_fib6_nh() which
returns NULL for the AF_INET member, leading to a NULL pointer
dereference.
Fix by calling nh_group_v4_update whenever the family changes, not just
AF_INET to AF_INET6.
Reproducer:
# AF_INET6 blackhole
ip -6 nexthop add id 1 blackhole
# group with has_v4=false
ip nexthop add id 100 group 1
# replace with AF_INET (no -6), has_v4 stays false
ip nexthop replace id 1 blackhole
# pass stale has_v4 check
ip -6 route add 2001:db8::/64 nhid 100
# panic
ping -6 2001:db8::1
[1] https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?id=e17283eb2f8dcf3dd9b47fe6f67a95f71faadad0
[2] https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?id=8699b6ae54c9f35837d925686208402949e12ef3 |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net: psp: require admin permission for dev-set and key-rotate
The dev-set and key-rotate netlink operations modify shared device
state (PSP version configuration and cryptographic key material,
respectively) but do not require CAP_NET_ADMIN. The only access
control is psp_dev_check_access() which merely verifies netns
membership. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
nvmet-tcp: propagate nvmet_tcp_build_pdu_iovec() errors to its callers
Currently, when nvmet_tcp_build_pdu_iovec() detects an out-of-bounds
PDU length or offset, it triggers nvmet_tcp_fatal_error(cmd->queue)
and returns early. However, because the function returns void, the
callers are entirely unaware that a fatal error has occurred and
that the cmd->recv_msg.msg_iter was left uninitialized.
Callers such as nvmet_tcp_handle_h2c_data_pdu() proceed to blindly
overwrite the queue state with queue->rcv_state = NVMET_TCP_RECV_DATA
Consequently, the socket receiving loop may attempt to read incoming
network data into the uninitialized iterator.
Fix this by shifting the error handling responsibility to the callers. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
fsnotify: fix inode reference leak in fsnotify_recalc_mask()
fsnotify_recalc_mask() fails to handle the return value of
__fsnotify_recalc_mask(), which may return an inode pointer that needs
to be released via fsnotify_drop_object() when the connector's HAS_IREF
flag transitions from set to cleared.
This manifests as a hung task with the following call trace:
INFO: task umount:1234 blocked for more than 120 seconds.
Call Trace:
__schedule
schedule
fsnotify_sb_delete
generic_shutdown_super
kill_anon_super
cleanup_mnt
task_work_run
do_exit
do_group_exit
The race window that triggers the iref leak:
Thread A (adding mark) Thread B (removing mark)
────────────────────── ────────────────────────
fsnotify_add_mark_locked():
fsnotify_add_mark_list():
spin_lock(conn->lock)
add mark_B(evictable) to list
spin_unlock(conn->lock)
return
/* ---- gap: no lock held ---- */
fsnotify_detach_mark(mark_A):
spin_lock(mark_A->lock)
clear ATTACHED flag on mark_A
spin_unlock(mark_A->lock)
fsnotify_put_mark(mark_A)
fsnotify_recalc_mask():
spin_lock(conn->lock)
__fsnotify_recalc_mask():
/* mark_A skipped: ATTACHED cleared */
/* only mark_B(evictable) remains */
want_iref = false
has_iref = true /* not yet cleared */
-> HAS_IREF transitions true -> false
-> returns inode pointer
spin_unlock(conn->lock)
/* BUG: return value discarded!
* iput() and fsnotify_put_sb_watched_objects()
* are never called */
Fix this by deferring the transition true -> false of HAS_IREF flag from
fsnotify_recalc_mask() (Thread A) to fsnotify_put_mark() (thread B). |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
HID: usbhid: fix deadlock in hid_post_reset()
You can build a USB device that includes a HID component
and a storage or UAS component. The components can be reset
only together. That means that hid_pre_reset() and hid_post_reset()
are in the block IO error handling. Hence no memory allocation
used in them may do block IO because the IO can deadlock
on the mutex held while resetting a device and calling the
interface drivers.
Use GFP_NOIO for all allocations in them. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ima_fs: Correctly create securityfs files for unsupported hash algos
ima_tpm_chip->allocated_banks[i].crypto_id is initialized to
HASH_ALGO__LAST if the TPM algorithm is not supported. However there
are places relying on the algorithm to be valid because it is accessed
by hash_algo_name[].
On 6.12.40 I observe the following read out-of-bounds in hash_algo_name:
==================================================================
BUG: KASAN: global-out-of-bounds in create_securityfs_measurement_lists+0x396/0x440
Read of size 8 at addr ffffffff83e18138 by task swapper/0/1
CPU: 4 UID: 0 PID: 1 Comm: swapper/0 Not tainted 6.12.40 #3
Call Trace:
<TASK>
dump_stack_lvl+0x61/0x90
print_report+0xc4/0x580
? kasan_addr_to_slab+0x26/0x80
? create_securityfs_measurement_lists+0x396/0x440
kasan_report+0xc2/0x100
? create_securityfs_measurement_lists+0x396/0x440
create_securityfs_measurement_lists+0x396/0x440
ima_fs_init+0xa3/0x300
ima_init+0x7d/0xd0
init_ima+0x28/0x100
do_one_initcall+0xa6/0x3e0
kernel_init_freeable+0x455/0x740
kernel_init+0x24/0x1d0
ret_from_fork+0x38/0x80
ret_from_fork_asm+0x11/0x20
</TASK>
The buggy address belongs to the variable:
hash_algo_name+0xb8/0x420
Memory state around the buggy address:
ffffffff83e18000: 00 01 f9 f9 f9 f9 f9 f9 00 01 f9 f9 f9 f9 f9 f9
ffffffff83e18080: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
>ffffffff83e18100: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 f9 f9 f9 f9 f9 00 05 f9 f9
^
ffffffff83e18180: f9 f9 f9 f9 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 04 f9 f9 f9 f9
ffffffff83e18200: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 04 f9 f9 f9 f9 f9 f9 f9
==================================================================
Seems like the TPM chip supports sha3_256, which isn't yet in
tpm_algorithms:
tpm tpm0: TPM with unsupported bank algorithm 0x0027
That's TPM_ALG_SHA3_256 == 0x0027 from "Trusted Platform Module 2.0
Library Part 2: Structures", page 51 [1].
See also the related U-Boot algorithms update [2].
Thus solve the problem by creating a file name with "_tpm_alg_<ID>"
postfix if the crypto algorithm isn't initialized.
This is how it looks on the test machine (patch ported to v6.12 release):
# ls -1 /sys/kernel/security/ima/
ascii_runtime_measurements
ascii_runtime_measurements_tpm_alg_27
ascii_runtime_measurements_sha1
ascii_runtime_measurements_sha256
binary_runtime_measurements
binary_runtime_measurements_tpm_alg_27
binary_runtime_measurements_sha1
binary_runtime_measurements_sha256
policy
runtime_measurements_count
violations
[1]: https://trustedcomputinggroup.org/wp-content/uploads/Trusted-Platform-Module-2.0-Library-Part-2-Version-184_pub.pdf
[2]: https://lists.denx.de/pipermail/u-boot/2024-July/558835.html |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ocfs2: validate group add input before caching
[BUG]
OCFS2_IOC_GROUP_ADD can trigger a BUG_ON in
ocfs2_set_new_buffer_uptodate():
kernel BUG at fs/ocfs2/uptodate.c:509!
Oops: invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] SMP KASAN NOPTI
RIP: 0010:ocfs2_set_new_buffer_uptodate+0x194/0x1e0 fs/ocfs2/uptodate.c:509
Code: ffffe88f 42b9fe4c 89e64889 dfe8b4df
Call Trace:
ocfs2_group_add+0x3f1/0x1510 fs/ocfs2/resize.c:507
ocfs2_ioctl+0x309/0x6e0 fs/ocfs2/ioctl.c:887
vfs_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:51 [inline]
__do_sys_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:597 [inline]
__se_sys_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:583 [inline]
__x64_sys_ioctl+0x197/0x1e0 fs/ioctl.c:583
x64_sys_call+0x1144/0x26a0 arch/x86/include/generated/asm/syscalls_64.h:17
do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:63 [inline]
do_syscall_64+0x93/0xf80 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:94
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e
RIP: 0033:0x7bbfb55a966d
[CAUSE]
ocfs2_group_add() calls ocfs2_set_new_buffer_uptodate() on a
user-controlled group block before ocfs2_verify_group_and_input()
validates that block number. That helper is only valid for newly
allocated metadata and asserts that the block is not already present in
the chosen metadata cache. The code also uses INODE_CACHE(inode) even
though the group descriptor belongs to main_bm_inode and later journal
accesses use that cache context instead.
[FIX]
Validate the on-disk group descriptor before caching it, then add it to
the metadata cache tracked by INODE_CACHE(main_bm_inode). Keep the
validation failure path separate from the later cleanup path so we only
remove the buffer from that cache after it has actually been inserted.
This keeps the group buffer lifetime consistent across validation,
journaling, and cleanup. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
usb: typec: Fix error pointer dereference
The variable tps->partner is checked for an error pointer and then if it
is, it sends an error message but does not return and then immediately
dereferenced a few lines below:
tps->partner = typec_register_partner(tps->port, &desc);
if (IS_ERR(tps->partner))
dev_warn(tps->dev, "%s: failed to register partnet\n", __func__);
if (desc.identity) {
typec_partner_set_identity(tps->partner);
cd321x->cur_partner_identity = st.partner_identity;
}
Add early return and fix spelling mistake in error message.
Detected by Smatch:
drivers/usb/typec/tipd/core.c:827 cd321x_update_work() error:
'tps->partner' dereferencing possible ERR_PTR() |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
fs/ntfs3: prevent uninitialized lcn caused by zero len
syzbot reported a uninit-value in ntfs_iomap_begin [1].
Since runs was not touched yet, run_lookup_entry() immediately fails
and returns false, which makes the value of "*len" 0.
Simultaneously, the new value and err value are also 0, causing the
logic in attr_data_get_block_locked() to jump directly to ok, ultimately
resulting in *lcn being triggered before it is set [1].
In ntfs_iomap_begin(), the check for a 0 value in clen is moved forward
to before updating lcn to avoid this [1].
[1]
BUG: KMSAN: uninit-value in ntfs_iomap_begin+0x8c0/0x1460 fs/ntfs3/inode.c:825
ntfs_iomap_begin+0x8c0/0x1460 fs/ntfs3/inode.c:825
iomap_iter+0x9b7/0x1540 fs/iomap/iter.c:110
Local variable lcn created at:
ntfs_iomap_begin+0x15d/0x1460 fs/ntfs3/inode.c:786 |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
bpf: Fix NULL deref in map_kptr_match_type for scalar regs
Commit ab6c637ad027 ("bpf: Fix a bpf_kptr_xchg() issue with local
kptr") refactored map_kptr_match_type() to branch on btf_is_kernel()
before checking base_type(). A scalar register stored into a kptr
slot has no btf, so the btf_is_kernel(reg->btf) call dereferences
NULL.
Move the base_type() != PTR_TO_BTF_ID guard before any reg->btf
access. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
netfilter: nat: use kfree_rcu to release ops
Florian Westphal says:
"Historically this is not an issue, even for normal base hooks: the data
path doesn't use the original nf_hook_ops that are used to register the
callbacks.
However, in v5.14 I added the ability to dump the active netfilter
hooks from userspace.
This code will peek back into the nf_hook_ops that are available
at the tail of the pointer-array blob used by the datapath.
The nat hooks are special, because they are called indirectly from
the central nat dispatcher hook. They are currently invisible to
the nfnl hook dump subsystem though.
But once that changes the nat ops structures have to be deferred too."
Update nf_nat_register_fn() to deal with partial exposition of the hooks
from error path which can be also an issue for nfnetlink_hook. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
NFSD: fix nfs4_file access extra count in nfsd4_add_rdaccess_to_wrdeleg
In nfsd4_add_rdaccess_to_wrdeleg, if fp->fi_fds[O_RDONLY] is already
set by another thread, __nfs4_file_get_access should not be called
to increment the nfs4_file access count since that was already done
by the thread that added READ access to the file. The extra fi_access
count in nfs4_file can prevent the corresponding nfsd_file from being
freed.
When stopping nfs-server service, these extra access counts trigger a
BUG in kmem_cache_destroy() that shows nfsd_file object remaining on
__kmem_cache_shutdown.
This problem can be reproduced by running the Git project's test
suite over NFS. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
crypto: ccp - copy IV using skcipher ivsize
AF_ALG rfc3686-ctr-aes-ccp requests pass an 8-byte IV to the driver.
ccp_aes_complete() restores AES_BLOCK_SIZE bytes into the caller's IV
buffer while RFC3686 skciphers expose an 8-byte IV, so the restore
overruns the provided buffer.
Use crypto_skcipher_ivsize() to copy only the algorithm's IV length. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
pppoe: drop PFC frames
RFC 2516 Section 7 states that Protocol Field Compression (PFC) is NOT
RECOMMENDED for PPPoE. In practice, pppd does not support negotiating
PFC for PPPoE sessions, and the current PPPoE driver assumes an
uncompressed (2-byte) protocol field. However, the generic PPP layer
function ppp_input() is not aware of the negotiation result, and still
accepts PFC frames.
If a peer with a broken implementation or an attacker sends a frame with
a compressed (1-byte) protocol field, the subsequent PPP payload is
shifted by one byte. This causes the network header to be 4-byte
misaligned, which may trigger unaligned access exceptions on some
architectures.
To reduce the attack surface, drop PPPoE PFC frames. Introduce
ppp_skb_is_compressed_proto() helper function to be used in both
ppp_generic.c and pppoe.c to avoid open-coding. |
