| CVE |
Vendors |
Products |
Updated |
CVSS v3.1 |
| SAP NetWeaver AS Java allows an unauthenticated attacker to brute force the login functionality in order to identify the legitimate user IDs. This has an impact on confidentiality but not on integrity or availability. |
| Authelia is an open-source authentication and authorization server providing two-factor authentication and single sign-on (SSO) for applications via a web portal. If users are allowed to sign in via both username and email the regulation system treats these as separate login events. This leads to the regulation limitations being effectively doubled assuming an attacker using brute-force to find a user password. It's important to note that due to the effective operation of regulation where no user-facing sign of their regulation ban being visible either via timing or via API responses, it's effectively impossible to determine if a failure occurs due to a bad username password combination, or a effective ban blocking the attempt which heavily mitigates any form of brute-force. This occurs because the records and counting process for this system uses the method utilized for sign in rather than the effective username attribute. This has a minimal impact on account security, this impact is increased naturally in scenarios when there is no two-factor authentication required and weak passwords are used. This makes it a bit easier to brute-force a password. A patch for this issue has been applied to versions 4.38.19, and 4.39.0. Users are advised to upgrade. Users unable to upgrade should 1. Not heavily modify the default settings in a way that ends up with shorter or less frequent regulation bans. The default settings effectively mitigate any potential for this issue to be exploited. and 2. Disable the ability for users to login via an email address. |
| In affected versions, vulnerability-lookup did not track or limit failed
One-Time Password (OTP) attempts during Two-Factor Authentication (2FA)
verification. An attacker who already knew or guessed a valid username
and password could submit an arbitrary number of OTP codes without
causing the account to be locked or generating any specific alert for
administrators.
This lack of rate-limiting and lockout on OTP failures significantly
lowers the cost of online brute-force attacks against 2FA codes and
increases the risk of successful account takeover, especially if OTP
entropy is reduced (e.g. short numeric codes, user reuse, or predictable
tokens). Additionally, administrators had no direct visibility into
accounts experiencing repeated 2FA failures, making targeted attacks
harder to detect and investigate.
The patch introduces a persistent failed_otp_attempts counter on user
accounts, locks the user after 5 invalid OTP submissions, resets the
counter on successful verification, and surfaces failed 2FA attempts in
the admin user list. This enforces an account lockout policy for OTP
brute-force attempts and improves monitoring capabilities for suspicious
2FA activity.This issue affects Vulnerability-Lookup: before 2.18.0. |
| This vulnerability exists in Meon KYC solutions due to missing restrictions on the number of incorrect One-Time Password (OTP) attempts through certain API endpoints of login process. A remote attacker could exploit this vulnerability by performing a brute force attack on OTP, which could lead to gain unauthorized access to other user accounts. |
| A security vulnerability has been detected in VirtFusion up to 6.0.2. This vulnerability affects unknown code of the file /account/_settings of the component Email Change Handler. The manipulation leads to improper restriction of excessive authentication attempts. The attack can be initiated remotely. The exploit has been disclosed publicly and may be used. The vendor was contacted early about this disclosure but did not respond in any way. |
| A lack of rate limiting in the OTP validation component of Digitory Multi Channel Integrated POS v1.0 allows attackers to gain access to the ordering system and place an excessive amount of food orders. |
| Yealink RPS before 2025-06-04 lacks SN verification attempt limits, enabling brute-force enumeration (last five digits). |
| An insufficient entropy vulnerability in the SecuSUITE Secure Client Authentication (SCA) Server of SecuSUITE versions 5.0.420 and earlier could allow an attacker to potentially enroll an attacker-controlled device to the victim’s account and telephone number. |
| An issue was discovered in the Linux kernel 5.8.9. The WEP, WPA, WPA2, and WPA3 implementations reassemble fragments even though some of them were sent in plaintext. This vulnerability can be abused to inject packets and/or exfiltrate selected fragments when another device sends fragmented frames and the WEP, CCMP, or GCMP data-confidentiality protocol is used. |
| An issue was discovered on Samsung Galaxy S3 i9305 4.4.4 devices. The WEP, WPA, WPA2, and WPA3 implementations accept second (or subsequent) broadcast fragments even when sent in plaintext and process them as full unfragmented frames. An adversary can abuse this to inject arbitrary network packets independent of the network configuration. |
| JetKVM before 0.5.4 does not rate limit login requests, enabling brute-force attempts to guess credentials. |
| MinIO is a high-performance object storage system. Prior to RELEASE.2026-03-17T21-25-16Z, MinIO AIStor's STS (Security Token Service) AssumeRoleWithLDAPIdentity endpoint is vulnerable to LDAP credential brute-forcing due to two combined weaknesses: (1) distinguishable error responses that enable username enumeration, and (2) absence of rate limiting on authentication attempts. An unauthenticated network attacker can enumerate valid LDAP usernames and then perform unlimited password guessing to obtain temporary AWS-style STS credentials, gaining access to the victim's S3 buckets and objects. This issue has been patched in RELEASE.2026-03-17T21-25-16Z. |
| Federated Learning and Interoperability Platform (FLIP) is an open-source platform for federated training and evaluation of medical imaging AI models across healthcare institutions. The FLIP login page in versions 0.1.1 and prior has no rate limiting or CAPTCHA, enabling brute-force and credential-stuffing attacks. FLIP users are external to the organization, increasing credential reuse risk. As of time of publication, it is unclear if a patch is available. |
| OpenClaw before 2026.3.12 applies rate limiting only after successful webhook authentication, allowing attackers to bypass rate limits and brute-force webhook secrets. Attackers can submit repeated authentication requests with invalid secrets without triggering rate limit responses, enabling systematic secret guessing and subsequent forged webhook submission. |
| MyTube is a self-hosted downloader and player for several video websites Prior to version 1.8.72, an unauthenticated attacker can lock out administrator and visitor accounts from password-based authentication by triggering failed login attempts. The application exposes three password verification endpoints, all of which are publicly accessible. All three endpoints share a single file-backed login attempt state stored in `login-attempts.json`. When any endpoint records a failed authentication attempt via `recordFailedAttempt()`, the shared login attempt state is updated, increasing the `failedAttempts` counter and adjusting the associated timestamps and cooldown values. Before verifying a password, each endpoint calls `canAttemptLogin()`. This function checks the shared JSON file to determine whether a cooldown period is active. If the cooldown has not expired, the request is rejected before the password is validated. Because the failed attempt counter and cooldown timer are globally shared, failed authentication attempts against any endpoint affect all other endpoints. An attacker can exploit this by repeatedly sending invalid authentication requests to any of these endpoints, incrementing the shared counter and waiting for the cooldown period between attempts. By doing so, the attacker can progressively increase the lockout duration until it reaches 24 hours, effectively preventing legitimate users from authenticating. Once the maximum lockout is reached, the attacker can maintain the denial of service indefinitely by waiting for the cooldown to expire and sending another failed attempt, which immediately triggers another 24-hour lockout if no successful login occurred in the meantime. Version 1.8.72 fixes the vulnerability. |
| OpenClaw before 2026.3.28 contains a missing rate limiting vulnerability in the Nextcloud Talk webhook authentication that allows attackers to brute-force weak shared secrets. Attackers who can reach the webhook endpoint can exploit this to forge inbound webhook events by repeatedly attempting authentication without throttling. |
| Outline is a service that allows for collaborative documentation. Outline implements an Email OTP login flow for users not associated with an Identity Provider. Starting in version 0.86.0 and prior to version 1.6.0, Outline does not invalidate OTP codes based on amount or frequency of invalid submissions, rather it relies on the rate limiter to restrict attempts. Consequently, identified bypasses in the rate limiter permit unrestricted OTP code submissions within the codes lifetime. This allows attackers to perform brute force attacks which enable account takeover. Version 1.6.0 fixes the issue. |
| WWBN AVideo is an open source video platform. In versions up to and including 26.0, the `get_api_video_password_is_correct` API endpoint allows any unauthenticated user to verify whether a given password is correct for any password-protected video. The endpoint returns a boolean `passwordIsCorrect` field with no rate limiting, CAPTCHA, or authentication requirement, enabling efficient offline-speed brute-force attacks against video passwords. Commit 01a0614fedcdaee47832c0d913a0fb86d8c28135 contains a patch. |
| Tandoor Recipes is an application for managing recipes, planning meals, and building shopping lists. In versions prior to 2.6.0, Tandoor Recipes configures Django REST Framework with BasicAuthentication as one of the default authentication backends. The AllAuth rate limiting configuration (ACCOUNT_RATE_LIMITS: login: 5/m/ip) only applies to the HTML-based login endpoint at /accounts/login/. Any API endpoint that accepts authenticated requests can be targeted via Authorization: Basic headers with zero rate limiting, zero account lockout, and unlimited attempts. An attacker can perform high-speed password guessing against any known username. Version 2.6.0 patches the issue. |
| Raytha CMS does not have any brute force protection mechanism implemented. It allows an attacker to send multiple automated logon requests without triggering lockout, throttling, or step-up challenges.
This issue was fixed in version 1.4.6. |
