| CVE |
Vendors |
Products |
Updated |
CVSS v3.1 |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
netfilter: nf_tables: always walk all pending catchall elements
During transaction processing we might have more than one catchall element:
1 live catchall element and 1 pending element that is coming as part of the
new batch.
If the map holding the catchall elements is also going away, its
required to toggle all catchall elements and not just the first viable
candidate.
Otherwise, we get:
WARNING: ./include/net/netfilter/nf_tables.h:1281 at nft_data_release+0xb7/0xe0 [nf_tables], CPU#2: nft/1404
RIP: 0010:nft_data_release+0xb7/0xe0 [nf_tables]
[..]
__nft_set_elem_destroy+0x106/0x380 [nf_tables]
nf_tables_abort_release+0x348/0x8d0 [nf_tables]
nf_tables_abort+0xcf2/0x3ac0 [nf_tables]
nfnetlink_rcv_batch+0x9c9/0x20e0 [..] |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
netfilter: nf_tables: unconditionally bump set->nelems before insertion
In case that the set is full, a new element gets published then removed
without waiting for the RCU grace period, while RCU reader can be
walking over it already.
To address this issue, add the element transaction even if set is full,
but toggle the set_full flag to report -ENFILE so the abort path safely
unwinds the set to its previous state.
As for element updates, decrement set->nelems to restore it.
A simpler fix is to call synchronize_rcu() in the error path.
However, with a large batch adding elements to already maxed-out set,
this could cause noticeable slowdown of such batches. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net/sched: cls_u32: use skb_header_pointer_careful()
skb_header_pointer() does not fully validate negative @offset values.
Use skb_header_pointer_careful() instead.
GangMin Kim provided a report and a repro fooling u32_classify():
BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in u32_classify+0x1180/0x11b0
net/sched/cls_u32.c:221 |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ftrace: Do not over-allocate ftrace memory
The pg_remaining calculation in ftrace_process_locs() assumes that
ENTRIES_PER_PAGE multiplied by 2^order equals the actual capacity of the
allocated page group. However, ENTRIES_PER_PAGE is PAGE_SIZE / ENTRY_SIZE
(integer division). When PAGE_SIZE is not a multiple of ENTRY_SIZE (e.g.
4096 / 24 = 170 with remainder 16), high-order allocations (like 256 pages)
have significantly more capacity than 256 * 170. This leads to pg_remaining
being underestimated, which in turn makes skip (derived from skipped -
pg_remaining) larger than expected, causing the WARN(skip != remaining)
to trigger.
Extra allocated pages for ftrace: 2 with 654 skipped
WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 0 at kernel/trace/ftrace.c:7295 ftrace_process_locs+0x5bf/0x5e0
A similar problem in ftrace_allocate_records() can result in allocating
too many pages. This can trigger the second warning in
ftrace_process_locs().
Extra allocated pages for ftrace
WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 0 at kernel/trace/ftrace.c:7276 ftrace_process_locs+0x548/0x580
Use the actual capacity of a page group to determine the number of pages
to allocate. Have ftrace_allocate_pages() return the number of allocated
pages to avoid having to calculate it. Use the actual page group capacity
when validating the number of unused pages due to skipped entries.
Drop the definition of ENTRIES_PER_PAGE since it is no longer used. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
crypto: af_alg - Set merge to zero early in af_alg_sendmsg
If an error causes af_alg_sendmsg to abort, ctx->merge may contain
a garbage value from the previous loop. This may then trigger a
crash on the next entry into af_alg_sendmsg when it attempts to do
a merge that can't be done.
Fix this by setting ctx->merge to zero near the start of the loop. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
dlm: prevent NPD when writing a positive value to event_done
do_uevent returns the value written to event_done. In case it is a
positive value, new_lockspace would undo all the work, and lockspace
would not be set. __dlm_new_lockspace, however, would treat that
positive value as a success due to commit 8511a2728ab8 ("dlm: fix use
count with multiple joins").
Down the line, device_create_lockspace would pass that NULL lockspace to
dlm_find_lockspace_local, leading to a NULL pointer dereference.
Treating such positive values as successes prevents the problem. Given
this has been broken for so long, this is unlikely to break userspace
expectations. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net: 9p: fix refcount leak in p9_read_work() error handling
p9_req_put need to be called when m->rreq->rc.sdata is NULL to avoid
temporary refcount leak.
[Dominique: commit wording adjustments, p9_req_put argument fixes for rebase] |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
netdevsim: Fix memory leak of nsim_dev->fa_cookie
kmemleak reports this issue:
unreferenced object 0xffff8881bac872d0 (size 8):
comm "sh", pid 58603, jiffies 4481524462 (age 68.065s)
hex dump (first 8 bytes):
04 00 00 00 de ad be ef ........
backtrace:
[<00000000c80b8577>] __kmalloc+0x49/0x150
[<000000005292b8c6>] nsim_dev_trap_fa_cookie_write+0xc1/0x210 [netdevsim]
[<0000000093d78e77>] full_proxy_write+0xf3/0x180
[<000000005a662c16>] vfs_write+0x1c5/0xaf0
[<000000007aabf84a>] ksys_write+0xed/0x1c0
[<000000005f1d2e47>] do_syscall_64+0x3b/0x90
[<000000006001c6ec>] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xcd
The issue occurs in the following scenarios:
nsim_dev_trap_fa_cookie_write()
kmalloc() fa_cookie
nsim_dev->fa_cookie = fa_cookie
..
nsim_drv_remove()
The fa_cookie allocked in nsim_dev_trap_fa_cookie_write() is not freed. To
fix, add kfree(nsim_dev->fa_cookie) to nsim_drv_remove(). |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
nvmem: layouts: onie-tlv: fix hang on unknown types
The EEPROM on my board has a vendor specific entry of type 0x41. When
stumbling upon that, this driver hangs in an endless loop.
Fix it by keep incrementing the offset on unknown entries, so the loop
will eventually stop. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
rust: arm64: set uwtable llvm module flag for CONFIG_UNWIND_TABLES
Due to a rustc bug [1] the -Cforce-unwind-tables=y flag only emits the
uwtable annotation for functions, but not for the module. This means
that compiler-generated functions such as 'asan.module_ctor' do not
receive the uwtable annotation.
When CONFIG_UNWIND_PATCH_PAC_INTO_SCS is enabled, this leads to boot
failures because the dwarf information emitted for the kasan
constructors is wrong, which causes the SCS boot patching code to
patch the constructor in an illegal manner. Specifically, the paciasp
instruction is patched, but the autiasp instruction is not. This
mismatch leads to a crash when the constructor is called during boot.
==================================================================
BUG: KASAN: global-out-of-bounds in do_basic_setup+0x4c/0x90
Read of size 8 at addr ffffffe3cc7eb488 by task swapper/0/1
Specifically the faulting instruction is the (*fn)() to invoke the
constructor in do_ctors() of the init/main.c file.
Once the fix lands in rustc, this flag can be made conditional on the
rustc version. Note that passing the flag on a rustc with the fix
present has no effect.
[ The fix [1] has landed for Rust 1.98.0 (expected release on
2026-08-20).
Thus add a version check as discussed.
- Miguel ]
[ Adjusted link and comment. - Miguel ] |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
signal: clear JOBCTL_PENDING_MASK for caller in zap_other_threads()
When a multi-threaded process receives a stop signal (e.g., SIGSTOP),
do_signal_stop() sets JOBCTL_STOP_PENDING and JOBCTL_STOP_CONSUME on all
threads and sets signal->group_stop_count to the number of threads. If
one of the threads concurrently calls execve(), de_thread() invokes
zap_other_threads() to kill all other threads. zap_other_threads()
aborts the pending group stop by resetting signal->group_stop_count to 0
and clears the JOBCTL_PENDING_MASK for all other threads. However, it
fails to clear the job control flags for the calling thread.
When execve() completes, the calling thread returns to user mode and
checks for pending signals. Seeing the stale JOBCTL_STOP_PENDING flag,
it calls do_signal_stop(), which invokes task_participate_group_stop().
Since JOBCTL_STOP_CONSUME is still set, it attempts to decrement the
already-zero signal->group_stop_count, triggering a warning:
sig->group_stop_count == 0
WARNING: CPU: 1 PID: 6475 at kernel/signal.c:373
task_participate_group_stop+0x215/0x2d0
Call Trace:
<TASK>
do_signal_stop+0x3be/0x5c0 kernel/signal.c:2619
get_signal+0xa8c/0x1330 kernel/signal.c:2884
arch_do_signal_or_restart+0xbc/0x840 arch/x86/kernel/signal.c:337
exit_to_user_mode_loop+0x8c/0x4d0 kernel/entry/common.c:98
do_syscall_64+0x33e/0xf80 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:100
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f
</TASK>
Fix this race condition by clearing the JOBCTL_PENDING_MASK for the
calling thread in zap_other_threads(), ensuring it does not retain any
stale job control state after the thread group is destroyed. This aligns
with other functions that tear down a thread group and abort group
stops, such as zap_process() and complete_signal(), which correctly
clear these flags for all threads including the current one. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
arm64: mm: call pagetable dtor when freeing hot-removed page tables
Since 5e8eb9aeeda3 ("arm64: mm: always call PTE/PMD ctor in
__create_pgd_mapping()") page-table allocation on ARM64 always calls
pagetable_{pte,pmd,pud,p4d}_ctor(). This sets the page_type to
PGTY_table, increments NR_PAGETABLE and possible allocates a PTL. However
the matching pagetable_dtor() calls were never added.
With DEBUG_VM enabled on kernel versions prior to v6.17 without
2dfcd1608f3a9 ("mm/page_alloc: let page freeing clear any set page type")
this leads to the following warning when freeing these pages due to
page->page_type sharing page->_mapcount:
BUG: Bad page state in process ... pfn:284fbb
page: refcount:0 mapcount:0 mapping:0000000000000000 index:0x0 pfn:0x284fbb
flags: 0x17fffc000000000(node=0|zone=2|lastcpupid=0x1ffff)
page_type: f2(table)
page dumped because: nonzero mapcount
Call trace:
bad_page+0x13c/0x160
__free_frozen_pages+0x6cc/0x860
___free_pages+0xf4/0x180
free_pages+0x54/0x80
free_hotplug_page_range.part.0+0x58/0x90
free_empty_tables+0x438/0x500
__remove_pgd_mapping.constprop.0+0x60/0xa8
arch_remove_memory+0x48/0x80
try_remove_memory+0x158/0x1d8
offline_and_remove_memory+0x138/0x180
It can also lead to leaking the ptl allocation if ALLOC_SPLIT_PTLOCKS is
defined and incorrect NR_PAGETABLE stats. Fix this by calling
pagetable_dtor() in free_hotplug_pgtable_page() prior to freeing the page
to undo the effects of calling pagetable_*_ctor(). |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
mm/mincore: handle non-swap entries before !CONFIG_SWAP guard
mincore_swap() also fields migration/hwpoison entries (and shmem
swapin-error entries), which can exist on !CONFIG_SWAP builds when
CONFIG_MIGRATION or CONFIG_MEMORY_FAILURE is enabled. The
!IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SWAP) guard ran before the non-swap-entry early return,
so mincore_pte_range() can spuriously WARN and report these pages
nonresident on !CONFIG_SWAP kernels.
Move the guard below the non-swap-entry check so only true swap entries
trip the WARN, and migration/hwpoison entries take the existing "uptodate
/ non-shmem" path. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ARM: 9475/1: entry: use byte load for KASAN VMAP stack shadow
Commit 44e9a3bb76e5 ("ARM: 9430/1: entry: Do a dummy read from
VMAP shadow") added a dummy read from the KASAN VMAP stack shadow in
__switch_to(). The read uses ldr, but the KASAN shadow address is
byte-granular and is not guaranteed to be word aligned.
ARMv5 faults unaligned word loads. With CONFIG_KASAN_VMALLOC and
CONFIG_VMAP_STACK enabled, ARM926/VersatilePB crashes in __switch_to()
with an alignment exception before reaching init.
Use ldrb for the dummy shadow access. The code only needs to fault in the
shadow mapping if the stack shadow is missing, so a byte load is sufficient
and matches the granularity of KASAN shadow memory. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
drm/virtio: Fix driver removal with disabled KMS
DRM atomic and modesetting aren't initialized if virtio-gpu driver built
with disabled KMS, leading to access of uninitialized data on driver
removal/unbinding and crashing kernel. Fix it by skipping shutting down
atomic core with unavailable KMS. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
slimbus: qcom-ngd-ctrl: Avoid ABBA on tx_lock/ctrl->lock
During the SSR/PDR down notification the tx_lock is taken with the
intent to provide synchronization with active DMA transfers.
But during this period qcom_slim_ngd_down() is invoked, which ends up in
slim_report_absent(), which takes the slim_controller lock. In multiple
other codepaths these two locks are taken in the opposite order (i.e.
slim_controller then tx_lock).
The result is a lockdep splat, and a possible deadlock:
rprocctl/449 is trying to acquire lock:
ffff00009793e620 (&ctrl->lock){+.+.}-{4:4}, at: slim_report_absent (drivers/slimbus/core.c:322) slimbus
but task is already holding lock:
ffff00009793fb50 (&ctrl->tx_lock){+.+.}-{4:4}, at: qcom_slim_ngd_ssr_pdr_notify (drivers/slimbus/qcom-ngd-ctrl.c:1475) slim_qcom_ngd_ctrl
which lock already depends on the new lock.
Possible unsafe locking scenario:
CPU0 CPU1
---- ----
lock(&ctrl->tx_lock);
lock(&ctrl->lock);
lock(&ctrl->tx_lock);
lock(&ctrl->lock);
The assumption is that the comment refers to the desire to not call
qcom_slim_ngd_exit_dma() while we have an ongoing DMA TX transaction.
But any such transaction is initiated and completed within a single
qcom_slim_ngd_xfer_msg().
Prior to calling qcom_slim_ngd_exit_dma() the slim_controller is torn
down, all child devices are notified that the slimbus is gone and the
child devices are removed.
Stop taking the tx_lock in qcom_slim_ngd_ssr_pdr_notify() to avoid the
deadlock. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
riscv/ptrace: Use USER_REGSET_NOTE_TYPE for REGSET_CFI
Fixes a warning while dumping core:
[54983.546369][ C7] WARNING: [!note_name] fs/binfmt_elf.c:1771 at elf_core_dump+0x910/0xf68, CPU#7: abort01/31982 |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
sched_ext: Don't warn on NULL cgrp_moving_from in scx_cgroup_move_task()
A WARN fires when systemd's user manager writes "+cpu +memory +pids" to
its own subtree_control while a sched_ext scheduler is loaded:
WARNING: at kernel/sched/ext.c:3227 scx_cgroup_move_task+0xa8/0xb0
scx_cgroup_move_task+0xa8/0xb0
sched_move_task+0x134/0x290
cpu_cgroup_attach+0x39/0x70
cgroup_migrate_execute+0x37d/0x450
cgroup_update_dfl_csses+0x1e3/0x270
cgroup_subtree_control_write+0x3e7/0x440
scx_cgroup_can_attach() arms cgrp_moving_from only when a task's cpu
cgroup changes. It can still be NULL when scx_cgroup_move_task() runs,
through this sequence:
Step Result
--------------------------------- ----------------------------------
1. cpu enabled on cgroup G cpu css = A
2. cpu toggled off then on for G A killed, B created (same cgroup)
3. an exiting task keeps A alive migration skips it, A now stale
4. +memory migrates G stale A vs current B pulls cpu in
5. cpu attach runs for all tasks hits a live, cpu-unchanged task
6. scx_cgroup_move_task() on it cgrp_moving_from NULL -> WARN
The mismatch is that scx_cgroup_can_attach() keys on cgroup identity
while migration drives the move on css identity, so a NULL cgrp_moving_from
here is a legitimate css-only migration, not a missing prep.
The call is already gated on cgrp_moving_from, so just drop the warning.
ops.cgroup_prep_move() and ops.cgroup_move() stay paired. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
i2c: imx: fix clock and pinctrl state inconsistency in runtime PM
In i2c_imx_runtime_suspend(), the clock is disabled before switching
the pinctrl state to sleep. If pinctrl_pm_select_sleep_state() fails,
the runtime suspend is aborted but the clock remains disabled, causing
a system crash when the hardware is subsequently accessed.
Fix this by switching the pinctrl state before disabling the clock so
that a pinctrl failure leaves the clock enabled and the hardware
accessible.
In i2c_imx_runtime_resume(), restore the pinctrl state back to sleep
if clk_enable() fails to keep the consistent. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
KVM: Don't WARN if memory is dirtied without a vCPU when the VM is dying
When marking a page dirty, complain about not having a running/loaded vCPU
if and only if the VM is still alive, i.e. its refcount is non-zero. This
will allow fixing a memory leak for x86 SEV-ES guests without hitting what
is effectively a false positive on the WARN.
For some SEV-ES VM-Exits, KVM keeps a writable mapping of a guest page
across an exit to userspace, and typically unmaps the page on the next
KVM_RUN. But if userspace never calls KVM_RUN after such an exit, then KVM
needs to unmap the page when the vCPU is destroyed, which in turn triggers
the WARN about not having a running vCPU.
Alternatively, SEV-ES could temporarily load the vCPU to suppress the WARN,
as is done in nested_vmx_free_vcpu() (but for completely unrelated reasons;
suppressing WARN from nested_put_vmcs12_pages() is pure happenstance). But
loading a vCPU during destruction is gross (ideally nVMX code would be
cleaned up), risks complicating the SEV-ES code (KVM would need to ensure
the temporarily load()+put() only runs when the vCPU isn't already loaded),
and is ultimately pointless.
The motivation for the WARN is to guard against KVM dirtying guest memory
without pushing the corresponding GFN to the active vCPU's dirty ring, e.g.
to ensure userspace doesn't miss a dirty page. But for the VM's refcount
to reach zero, there can't be _any_ userspace mappings to the dirty ring,
as mapping the dirty ring requires doing mmap() on the vCPU FD. I.e. if
userspace had a valid mapping for the dirty ring, then the vCPU file and
thus the owning VM would still be alive. And so since userspace can't
possibly reach the dirty ring, whether or not KVM technically "misses" a
push to the dirty ring is irrelevant. |
