| CVE |
Vendors |
Products |
Updated |
CVSS v3.1 |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
IB/mad: Drop unmatched RMPP responses before reassembly
Kernel-handled RMPP receive processing starts reassembly for active
DATA responses before the response is matched to an outstanding send.
The normal match happens later, after ib_process_rmpp_recv_wc() has
either assembled a complete message or consumed the segment.
That ordering lets an unsolicited response that routes to a kernel
RMPP agent by the high TID bits allocate or extend RMPP receive state
before the full TID and source address are checked against a real
request. A reordered burst can therefore reach the receive-side
insertion path even though the response would not match any send.
For kernel-handled RMPP DATA responses, require the existing
ib_find_send_mad() match before entering RMPP reassembly. The matcher
already checks the full TID, management class and source address/GID
against the agent wait, backlog and in-flight send lists. If there is
no match, drop the response without creating RMPP state.
This leaves the RMPP window behavior unchanged and only rejects
responses that have no corresponding request. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
xfrm: reject optional IPTFS templates in outbound policies
syzbot reported a stack-out-of-bounds read in xfrm_state_find()
which flows from xfrm_tmpl_resolve_one().
Commit 3d776e31c841 ("xfrm: Reject optional tunnel/BEET mode
templates in outbound policies") disallowed optional tunnel and
BEET in outbound policies to prevent this. Later when IPTFS
added, it was not covered by that fix and can still trigger
the out-of-bounds read;
Extend the check to disallow optional IPTFS in outbound policies
as well. IPTFS should be identical to tunnel mode.
IN and FWD policies are not affected: xfrm_tmpl_resolve_one()
is only reachable via the outbound path.
Reproducer, before:
ip link add dummy0 type dummy
ip link set dummy0 up
ip addr add 10.1.1.1/24 dev dummy0
ip xfrm policy add src 10.1.1.1/32 dst 10.1.1.2/32 dir out tmpl
src fc00::dead:1 dst fc00::dead:2 proto esp reqid 1 mode iptfs
level use tmpl src fc00::dead:1 dst fc00::dead:2 proto esp reqid
2 mode transport
ping -W 1 -c 1 10.1.1.2
PING 10.1.1.2 (10.1.1.2) 56(84) bytes of data.
[ 64.168420] ==================================================================
[ 64.169977] BUG: KASAN: stack-out-of-bounds in __xfrm6_addr_hash+0x11e/0x170
[ 64.169977] Read of size 4 at addr ffff88800e1ffd20 by task ping/2844
[ 64.169977] CPU: 2 UID: 0 PID: 2844 Comm: ping Not tainted 7.1.0-rc7-00180-geb23b588430a #98 PREEMPT(full)
[ 64.169977] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.16.3-debian-1.16.3-2 04/01/2014
[ 64.169977] Call Trace:
[ 64.169977] <TASK>
[ 64.169977] dump_stack_lvl+0x47/0x70
[ 64.169977] ? __xfrm6_addr_hash+0x11e/0x170
[ 64.169977] print_report+0x152/0x4b0
[ 64.169977] ? ksys_mmap_pgoff+0x6d/0xa0
[ 64.169977] ? entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e
[ 64.169977] ? rcu_read_unlock_sched+0xa/0x20
[ 64.169977] ? __virt_addr_valid+0x21b/0x230
[ 64.169977] ? __xfrm6_addr_hash+0x11e/0x170
[ 64.169977] kasan_report+0xa8/0xd0
[ 64.169977] ? __xfrm6_addr_hash+0x11e/0x170
[ 64.169977] __xfrm6_addr_hash+0x11e/0x170
[ 64.169977] __xfrm_dst_hash+0x24/0xc0
[ 64.169977] xfrm_state_find+0xa2d/0x2f90
[ 64.169977] ? __pfx_xfrm_state_find+0x10/0x10
[ 64.169977] ? __pfx_ftrace_graph_ret_addr+0x10/0x10
[ 64.169977] ? __pfx_ftrace_graph_ret_addr+0x10/0x10
[ 64.169977] xfrm_tmpl_resolve_one+0x210/0x570
[ 64.169977] ? __pfx_xfrm_tmpl_resolve_one+0x10/0x10
[ 64.169977] ? __pfx_stack_trace_consume_entry+0x10/0x10
[ 64.169977] ? kernel_text_address+0x5b/0x80
[ 64.169977] ? __kernel_text_address+0xe/0x30
[ 64.169977] ? unwind_get_return_address+0x5e/0x90
[ 64.169977] ? arch_stack_walk+0x8c/0xe0
[ 64.169977] xfrm_tmpl_resolve+0x130/0x200
[ 64.169977] ? __pfx_xfrm_tmpl_resolve+0x10/0x10
[ 64.169977] ? __pfx_xfrm_policy_inexact_lookup_rcu+0x10/0x10
[ 64.169977] ? __refcount_add_not_zero.constprop.0+0xb2/0x110
[ 64.169977] ? __pfx___refcount_add_not_zero.constprop.0+0x10/0x10
[ 64.169977] xfrm_resolve_and_create_bundle+0xd5/0x310
[ 64.169977] ? __pfx_xfrm_resolve_and_create_bundle+0x10/0x10
[ 64.169977] ? __pfx_xfrm_policy_lookup_bytype+0x10/0x10
[ 64.169977] ? __pfx_xfrm_policy_lookup_bytype+0x10/0x10
[ 64.169977] xfrm_lookup_with_ifid+0x3d8/0xb80
[ 64.169977] ? __pfx_xfrm_lookup_with_ifid+0x10/0x10
[ 64.169977] ? ip_route_output_key_hash+0xc6/0x110
[ 64.169977] ? kasan_save_track+0x10/0x30
[ 64.169977] xfrm_lookup_route+0x18/0xe0
[ 64.169977] ip4_datagram_release_cb+0x4c9/0x530
[ 64.169977] ? __pfx_ip4_datagram_release_cb+0x10/0x10
[ 64.169977] ? do_raw_spin_lock+0x71/0xc0
[ 64.169977] ? __pfx_do_raw_spin_lock+0x10/0x10
[ 64.169977] release_sock+0xb0/0x170
[ 64.169977] udp_connect+0x43/0x50
[ 64.169977] __sys_connect+0xa6/0x100
[ 64.169977] ? alloc_fd+0x2e9/0x300
[ 64.169977] ? __pfx___sys_connect+0x10/0x10
[ 64.169977] ? preempt_latency
---truncated--- |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
RDMA/irdma: Prevent rereg_mr for non-mem regions
When a QP/CQ/SRQ is created, a two step process is used
where the buffer is allocated in userspace and explicitly
registered with the normal reg_mr mechanism prior to creating
the actual QP/CQ/SRQ object.
These special registrations are indicated via an ABI field
so the driver knows that they do not have a valid mkey and
to skip the actual CQP command submission.
Since these are real MR objects from the core's perspective,
it is possible for a user application to invoke rereg_mr on them
and cause a real CQP op to be emitted with the zero-initialized
mkey value of 0.
Fix this by preventing rereg_mr on these special regions. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
RDMA/siw: publish QP after initialization
siw_create_qp() currently calls siw_qp_add() before the queues, CQ
pointers, state, completion, and device list entry are ready. A QPN
lookup can therefore reach a QP that is still being constructed.
Move siw_qp_add() to the end of siw_create_qp(), after QP
initialization and before adding the QP to the siw device list. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
xfrm: clear mode callbacks after failed mode setup
xfrm_state_gc_task can run long after a failed IPTFS state setup. In the
reproduced case, __xfrm_init_state() cached x->mode_cbs, IPTFS setup
returned -ENOMEM before publishing mode_data, and the temporary module
reference from xfrm_get_mode_cbs() was dropped immediately. The dead state
then kept x->mode_cbs until deferred GC ran after xfrm_iptfs had been
unloaded.
Clear x->mode_cbs when mode init or clone fails before publishing
mode_data. Those states never installed mode-specific state or the
long-term IPTFS module pin, so deferred GC has nothing mode-specific to
destroy and must not retain a callback table pointer past the temporary
lookup reference.
The buggy scenario involves two paths, with each column showing the order
within that path:
failed setup path:
1. cache x->mode_cbs
2. mode setup fails before mode_data
3. drop the temporary module ref
4. dead state keeps x->mode_cbs cached
GC/unload path:
1. xfrm_state_put() queues GC work
2. xfrm_iptfs unloads later
3. xfrm_state_gc_task runs
4. GC dereferences stale x->mode_cbs
This also covers the failed clone path where clone_state() returns before
publishing mode_data.
Validation reproduced this kernel report:
Kernel panic - not syncing: Fatal exception
CONFIG_FAULT_INJECTION_STACKTRACE_FILTER=y
failslab_stacktrace_filter matched xfrm_iptfs frames
ack_error=-12
FAULT_INJECTION: forcing a failure
BUG: unable to handle page fault
Workqueue: events xfrm_state_gc_task
RIP: xfrm_state_gc_task+0x142/0x650
Modules linked in: esp4_offload xfrm_user [last unloaded: xfrm_iptfs]
Kernel panic - not syncing: Fatal exception |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
wifi: cfg80211: cancel sched scan results work on unregister
cfg80211_sched_scan_results() can queue rdev->sched_scan_res_wk from a
driver result notification while a scheduled scan request is present. The
work callback recovers the containing cfg80211_registered_device and then
locks the wiphy and walks the scheduled-scan request list.
wiphy_unregister() already makes the wiphy unreachable and drains rdev work
items before cfg80211_dev_free() can release the object, but it does not
drain sched_scan_res_wk. A queued or running result work item can therefore
cross the unregister/free boundary and access freed rdev state.
The buggy scenario involves two paths, with each column showing the order
within that path:
scheduled-scan result path: unregister/free path:
1. cfg80211_sched_scan_results() 1. interface teardown stops and
queues rdev->sched_scan_res_wk. removes the scheduled scan request.
2. cfg80211_wq starts the work 2. wiphy_unregister() drains other
item and recovers rdev. rdev work items.
3. The worker locks rdev->wiphy 3. cfg80211_dev_free() destroys and
and walks rdev state. frees rdev.
Cancel sched_scan_res_wk in wiphy_unregister() alongside the other rdev
work items. cancel_work_sync() removes a pending result notification and
waits for an already running callback, so cfg80211_dev_free() cannot free
rdev while this work item is still active.
Validation reproduced this kernel report:
BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in cfg80211_sched_scan_results_wk+0x4a6/0x530
Workqueue: cfg80211 cfg80211_sched_scan_results_wk [cfg80211]
Read of size 8
Call trace:
dump_stack_lvl+0x66/0xa0
print_report+0xce/0x630
cfg80211_sched_scan_results_wk+0x4a6/0x530
srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5
__virt_addr_valid+0x224/0x430
kasan_report+0xac/0xe0
lockdep_hardirqs_on_prepare+0xea/0x1a0
process_one_work+0x8d0/0x18f0 (kernel/workqueue.c:3212)
lock_is_held_type+0x8f/0x100
worker_thread+0x5ad/0xfd0
__kthread_parkme+0xc6/0x200
kthread+0x31e/0x410
trace_hardirqs_on+0x1a/0x170
ret_from_fork+0x576/0x810
__switch_to+0x57e/0xe20
__switch_to_asm+0x33/0x70
ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
wifi: mac80211: defer link RX stats percpu free to RCU
sta_remove_link() frees a removed MLO link's RX stats percpu buffer right
away, but defers only the link container to RCU:
sta_info_free_link(&alloc->info);
kfree_rcu(alloc, rcu_head);
The RX fast path reads link_sta under rcu_read_lock and writes the percpu
stats. A reader that resolved link_sta before the removal keeps the
pointer. The container stays alive from the kfree_rcu, so the read still
works. But the percpu block it points to is already freed. This needs
uses_rss. That is when pcpu_rx_stats exists.
The full STA teardown frees the deflink stats only after
synchronize_net(). The link removal path had no such barrier. The race is
hard to win in practice, but the free should still wait for RCU.
Free the link together with its data from a single RCU callback, so the
percpu block is reclaimed only after readers drain. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
wifi: cfg80211: use wiphy work for socket owner autodisconnect
nl80211_netlink_notify() walks the cfg80211 wireless device list when a
NETLINK_GENERIC socket is released. If the socket owns a connection, the
notifier queues the embedded wdev->disconnect_wk work item.
That work is a plain work_struct today. NETDEV_GOING_DOWN cancels it, but a
NETLINK_URELEASE notifier that already observed conn_owner_nlportid can
queue it after that cancel returns. _cfg80211_unregister_wdev() then
removes the wdev from the list and waits for RCU readers, but
synchronize_net() does not drain work queued by such a reader.
Make the autodisconnect work a wiphy_work instead. The callback already
needs the wiphy mutex, and wiphy_work runs under that mutex. This lets
teardown cancel pending autodisconnect work while holding the mutex,
without a cancel_work_sync() vs. worker locking concern.
Also cancel the wiphy work after list_del_rcu() and synchronize_net(). Any
NETLINK_URELEASE notifier that had already reached the wdev list has then
either queued the work and it is removed, or can no longer find the wdev. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
wifi: cfg80211: bound element ID read when checking non-inheritance
cfg80211_is_element_inherited() reads the first data octet of the
candidate element (id = elem->data[0]) to look it up in an extension
non-inheritance list. It does so after testing elem->id, but without
verifying that the element actually has a data octet. A zero-length
extension element (WLAN_EID_EXTENSION with length 0) therefore makes it
read one octet past the end of the element.
_ieee802_11_parse_elems_full() runs this check for every element of a
frame once a non-inheritance context exists -- e.g. while parsing a
per-STA profile of a Multi-Link element in a (re)association response,
or a non-transmitted BSS profile -- so a crafted frame from an AP can
trigger a one-octet slab-out-of-bounds read during element parsing:
BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in cfg80211_is_element_inherited
Read of size 1 ... in net/wireless/scan.c
Return early (treat the element as inherited) when an extension element
carries no data, mirroring the existing handling of empty ID lists.
The bug was found by fuzzing ieee802_11_parse_elems_full() under KASAN. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
firmware: arm_ffa: Fix out-of-bound writes in ffa_setup_and_transmit()
Sashiko (locally) reports multiple out-of-bound issues in
ffa_setup_and_transmit:
1) Writing ep_mem_access->reserved can write out of bounds for FFA
versions < 1.2 as ffa_emad_size_get() returns 16 bytes in that case
while reserved has an offset of 24.
Instead of zeroing fields, memset the struct to zero first based on
the FFA version.
2) Make sure there is enough size to write constituents.
While at it, convert the only sizeof() in the driver that uses a
type instead of variable. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
firmware: arm_ffa: Fix Endpoint Memory Access Descriptor offset calculation
Use the descriptor's `ep_mem_offset` to calculate the start of the endpoint
memory access array and to comply with the FF-A spec instead of defaulting
to `sizeof(struct ffa_mem_region)`.
This requires moving `ffa_mem_region_additional_setup()` earlier in the setup
flow.
Also, add sanity checks to ensure the calculated descriptor offsets do not
exceed `max_fragsize`. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
bpf: Fix UAF in sock clone early bailouts
Similar to recent commit 9b51a6155d14 ("bpf,fork: wipe ->bpf_storage
before bailouts that access it"), sk_clone() performs an initial
shallow copy of the socket field ->sk_bpf_storage via sock_copy()
for the cloned socket newsk.
If sk_clone() bails out early (e.g. if sk_filter_charge() fails) prior
to calling bpf_sk_storage_clone(), newsk->sk_bpf_storage still points
to the parent socket's BPF local storage. When newsk is subsequently
freed via sk_free(), the deallocation path (__sk_destruct() ->
bpf_sk_storage_free()) destroys the parent socket's BPF local storage,
leading to a use-after-free (UAF) on the parent socket.
Fix this by resetting newsk->sk_bpf_storage to NULL immediately after
sock_copy() in sk_clone(), and remove the now redundant initialization
from bpf_sk_storage_clone(). |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ppp: defer channel free to an RCU grace period to fix pppol2tp RX UAF
pppol2tp_recv() runs in the L2TP UDP-encap softirq RX path:
l2tp_udp_encap_recv() -> l2tp_recv_common() -> pppol2tp_recv()
-> ppp_input(&po->chan)
It runs under rcu_read_lock() holding only an l2tp_session reference and
takes NO reference on the internal PPP channel (struct channel,
chan->ppp) that ppp_input() dereferences.
The pppox socket is SOCK_RCU_FREE, so 'po' and the embedded ppp_channel
are RCU-safe. But the internal struct channel is a separate allocation
that ppp_release_channel() frees with a plain kfree():
close(data socket) -> pppol2tp_release() -> pppox_unbind_sock()
-> ppp_unregister_channel() -> ppp_release_channel() -> kfree(pch)
For a channel that is bound (PPPIOCGCHAN) but not attached to a ppp unit
(no PPPIOCCONNECT, pch->ppp == NULL) and not bridged, teardown skips
both ppp_disconnect_channel()'s synchronize_net() and
ppp_unbridge_channels()'s synchronize_rcu(), so the kfree() has no grace
period. rcu_read_lock() in pppol2tp_recv() does not protect against a
plain kfree(), so an in-flight ppp_input() on one CPU can dereference
the channel just freed by close() on another CPU.
The bug is reachable by an unprivileged user.
Defer the channel free to an RCU callback via call_rcu() so the grace
period fences any in-flight ppp_input(). The disconnect and unbridge
teardown paths already fence with synchronize_net()/synchronize_rcu();
call_rcu() does the same here without stalling the close() path. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net/iucv: take a reference on the socket found in afiucv_hs_rcv()
afiucv_hs_rcv() looks up the destination socket under iucv_sk_list.lock,
drops the lock, and then passes the socket to the afiucv_hs_callback_*()
handlers without holding a reference. AF_IUCV sockets are not
RCU-protected and are freed synchronously by iucv_sock_kill() ->
sock_put(), so a concurrent close can free the socket in the window
between read_unlock() and the handler, which then dereferences freed
memory (for example sk->sk_data_ready() in afiucv_hs_callback_syn()).
Take a reference with sock_hold() while the socket is still on the list
and release it with sock_put() once the handler has run. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
Bluetooth: MGMT: revalidate LOAD_CONN_PARAM queued update
MGMT_OP_LOAD_CONN_PARAM queues conn_update_sync() when a single parameter
update changes an existing LE central connection. The queued work currently
stores a borrowed hci_conn_params entry from hdev->le_conn_params. A later
LOAD_CONN_PARAM request can clear disabled parameters and free that entry
before hci_cmd_sync_work() runs the queued callback.
Do not keep the borrowed hci_conn_params pointer in queued work. Queue the
hci_conn instead and hold a reference until the queued callback completes.
When the work runs, revalidate that the connection is still present, look
up the current hci_conn_params entry, and cancel the update if userspace
removed that entry while the work was pending.
Copy the interval values from the current params entry under hdev->lock,
then drop the lock and keep using hci_le_conn_update_sync() to issue the
update.
Validation reproduced this kernel report:
BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in conn_update_sync+0x2a/0xf0 [bluetooth]
Read of size 1 at addr ffff88810c697126 by task kworker/u17:0/377
Workqueue: hci0 hci_cmd_sync_work [bluetooth]
Call Trace:
<TASK>
dump_stack_lvl+0x66/0xa0
print_report+0xce/0x5f0
kasan_report+0xe0/0x110
conn_update_sync+0x2a/0xf0 [bluetooth]
hci_cmd_sync_work+0x187/0x210 [bluetooth]
process_one_work+0x4fd/0xbc0
worker_thread+0x2d8/0x570
kthread+0x1ad/0x1f0
ret_from_fork+0x3c9/0x540
ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30
Allocated by task 466:
hci_conn_params_add+0xa6/0x240 [bluetooth]
load_conn_param+0x4e1/0x850 [bluetooth]
hci_sock_sendmsg+0x96b/0xf80 [bluetooth]
Freed by task 474:
kfree+0x313/0x590
hci_conn_params_clear_disabled+0x9b/0xc0 [bluetooth]
load_conn_param+0x4bf/0x850 [bluetooth]
hci_sock_sendmsg+0x96b/0xf80 [bluetooth] |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
Bluetooth: hci_sync: extend conn_hash lookup critical sections
Using RCU-protected pointers outside the critical sections without
refcount is incorrect and may result to UAF.
Extend critical section to cover both hci_conn_hash lookup and use of
the returned conn.
Add surrounding rcu_read_lock() also when return value is not used, in
preparation for RCU lockdep requirement to hci_lookup_le_connect().
This avoids concurrent deletion of the conn before we are done
dereferencing it.
Also, make sure to hold hdev->lock when accessing hdev->accept_list. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
Bluetooth: mgmt: fix locking in unpair_device/disconnect_sync
Dereferencing RCU-protected pointers outside critical sections is
invalid and may lead to UAF.
Take hdev->lock for hci_conn lookup and hci_abort_conn(). Don't use RCU
to ensure the conn is fully initialized at this point. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
Bluetooth: mgmt: hold reference for hci_conn in mgmt_pending_cmds
Dereferencing RCU-protected pointers outside critical sections is
invalid and may lead to UAF. Use of hci_conn in hci_sync callbacks also
needs to hold refcount to avoid UAF.
Take appropriate locks for hci_conn lookups, and take refcount for
hci_conn pointers stored in mgmt_pending_cmd so that the pointer stays
valid.
When accessing conn->state, ensure hdev->lock is held to avoid data
race. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
Bluetooth: hci_sync: hold hdev->lock for hci_conn_params lookups
hci_conn_params_lookup requires hdev->lock be held, otherwise the list
iteration or param access is not safe.
Hold hdev->lock for params lookups in hci_sync. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
Bluetooth: hci_qca: Clear memdump state on invalid dump size
qca_controller_memdump() allocates qca->qca_memdump before processing
the first dump packet. For a sequence-zero packet it then disables IBS,
marks memdump collection active, and reads the advertised dump size.
If the controller reports a zero dump size, the error path frees the
local qca_memdump object and returns without clearing qca->qca_memdump
or undoing the collection state. A later memdump work item initializes
its local pointer from qca->qca_memdump and skips allocation when that
pointer is non-NULL, so it can operate on freed memory. The stale
collection and IBS-disabled flags can also leave waiters or later
transmit handling blocked behind an aborted dump.
Clear the saved pointer and memdump state before returning from the
invalid-size path, matching the cleanup used when hci_devcd_init() fails.
A static analysis checker reported the stale memdump state, and manual
source review confirmed the invalid-size failure path. |