| CVE |
Vendors |
Products |
Updated |
CVSS v3.1 |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
drm/v3d: Fix vaddr leak when indirect CSD has zeroed workgroups
v3d_rewrite_csd_job_wg_counts_from_indirect() maps both the indirect
buffer and the workgroup buffer and is expected to release them before
returning. When any of the workgroup counts read from the buffer is zero,
the function bailed out early and skipped the cleanup, leaking the vaddr
mappings of both BOs.
Jump to the cleanup path instead of returning directly, so the mappings
are always dropped. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
drm/xe/display: fix oops in suspend/shutdown without display
The xe driver keeps track of whether to probe display, and whether
display hardware is there, using xe->info.probe_display. It gets set to
false if there's no display after intel_display_device_probe(). However,
the display may also be disabled via fuses, detected at a later time in
intel_display_device_info_runtime_init().
In this case, the xe driver does for_each_intel_crtc() on uninitialized
mode config in xe_display_flush_cleanup_work(), leading to a NULL
pointer dereference, and generally calls display code with display info
cleared.
Check for intel_display_device_present() after
intel_display_device_info_runtime_init(), and reset
xe->info.probe_display as necessary. Also do unset_display_features()
for completeness, although display runtime init has already done
that. This will need to be unified across all cases later.
Move intel_display_device_info_runtime_init() call slightly earlier,
similar to i915, to avoid a bunch of unnecessary setup for no display
cases.
Note #1: The xe driver has no business doing low level display plumbing
like for_each_intel_crtc() to begin with. It all needs to happen in
display code.
Note #2: The actual bug is present already in commit 44e694958b95
("drm/xe/display: Implement display support"), but the oops was likely
introduced later at commit ddf6492e0e50 ("drm/xe/display: Make display
suspend/resume work on discrete").
(cherry picked from commit 7c3eb9f47533220888a67266448185fd0775d4da) |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
mm/hugetlb: restore reservation on error in hugetlb folio copy paths
Two sites in mm/hugetlb.c allocate a hugetlb folio via
alloc_hugetlb_folio() (consuming a VMA reservation) and then call
copy_user_large_folio(), which became int-returning in commit 1cb9dc4b475c
("mm: hwpoison: support recovery from HugePage copy-on-write faults") and
can now fail (e.g. -EHWPOISON on a hwpoisoned source page). On the
failure path, folio_put() restores the global hugetlb pool count through
free_huge_folio(), but the per-VMA reservation map entry is left marked
consumed:
- hugetlb_mfill_atomic_pte() resubmission path (UFFDIO_COPY)
- copy_hugetlb_page_range() fork-time CoW path when
hugetlb_try_dup_anon_rmap() fails (rare: pinned hugetlb anon
folio under fork)
User-visible effect: on UFFDIO_COPY into a private hugetlb VMA where the
resubmission copy fails, the reservation for that address is leaked from
the VMA's reserve map. A subsequent fault at the same address takes the
no-reservation path, and under hugetlb pool pressure the task is SIGBUSed
at an address it had previously reserved. The fork-time CoW path leaks
the same way in the child VMA's reserve map, though it requires the much
rarer combination of pinned hugetlb anon page + hwpoisoned source.
Add the missing restore_reserve_on_error() call before folio_put() on both
error paths. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
iommu/dma: Do not try to iommu_map a 0 length region in swiotlb
iommu_dma_iova_link_swiotlb() processes a mapping that is unaligned in three
parts, the head, middle and trailer. If the middle is empty because there
are no aligned pages it will call down to iommu_map() with a 0 size
which the iommupt implementation will fail as illegal.
It then tries to do an error unwind and starts from the wrong spot
corrupting the mapping so the eventual destruction triggers a WARN_ON.
Check for 0 length and avoid mapping and use offset not 0 as the starting
point to unlink.
This is frequently triggered by using some kinds of thunderbolt NVMe
drives that trigger forced SWIOTLB for unaligned memory. NVMe seems to
pass in oddly aligned buffers for the passthrough commands from smartctl
that hit this condition. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
fuse: limit FUSE_NOTIFY_RETRIEVE to uptodate folios
FUSE_NOTIFY_RETRIEVE must be limited to uptodate folios; !uptodate folios
can contain uninitialized data.
Since FUSE_NOTIFY_RETRIEVE is intended to only return data that is already
in the page cache and not wait for data from the FUSE daemon, treat
!uptodate folios as if they weren't present.
This only has security impact on systems that don't enable automatic
zero-initialization of all page allocations via
CONFIG_INIT_ON_ALLOC_DEFAULT_ON or init_on_alloc=1. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
fuse: reject fuse_notify() pagecache ops on directories
The operations FUSE_NOTIFY_STORE and FUSE_NOTIFY_RETRIEVE allow the
FUSE daemon to actively write/read pagecache contents.
For directories with FOPEN_CACHE_DIR, the pagecache is used as
kernel-internal cache storage, and userspace is not supposed to have
direct access to this cache - in particular, fuse_parse_cache() will hit
WARN_ON() if the cache contains bogus data.
Reject FUSE_NOTIFY_STORE and FUSE_NOTIFY_RETRIEVE on anything other than
regular files with -EINVAL. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
rseq: Fix using an uninitialized stack variable in rseq_exit_user_update()
There is an bug in which an uninitialized stack variable is used in
rseq_exit_user_update() as reported by syzbot:
BUG: KMSAN: kernel-infoleak in rseq_set_ids_get_csaddr include/linux/rseq_entry.h:502 [inline]
The local variable:
struct rseq_ids ids = {
.cpu_id = task_cpu(t),
.mm_cid = task_mm_cid(t),
.node_id = cpu_to_node(ids.cpu_id),
};
According to the C standard, the evaluation order of expressions in an
initializer list is indeterminately sequenced. The compiler (Clang, in
this KMSAN build) evaluates `cpu_to_node(ids.cpu_id)` *before*
`ids.cpu_id` is initialized with `task_cpu(t)`.
This is fixed by moving the assignment of ids.node_id outside the
structure initialization. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
dm cache metadata: fix memory leak on metadata abort retry
When failing to acquire the root_lock in dm_cache_metadata_abort because
the block_manager is read-only, the temporary block_manager created
outside the root_lock is not properly released, causing a memory leak.
Reproduce steps:
This can be reproduced by reloading a new table while the metadata
is read-only. While the second call to dm_cache_metadata_abort is
caused by lack of support for table preload in dm-cache, mentioned
in commit 9b1cc9f251af ("dm cache: share cache-metadata object across
inactive and active DM tables"), it exposes the memory leak in
dm_cache_metadata_abort when the function is called multiple times.
Specifically, dm-cache fails to sync the new cache object's mode during
preresume, creating the reproducer condition.
This issue could also occur through concurrent metadata_operation_failed
calls due to races in cache mode updates, but the table preload scenario
below provides a reliable reproducer.
1. Create a cache device with some faulty trailing metadata blocks
dmsetup create cmeta <<EOF
0 200 linear /dev/sdc 0
200 7992 error
EOF
dmsetup create cdata --table "0 131072 linear /dev/sdc 8192"
dmsetup create corig --table "0 262144 linear /dev/sdc 262144"
dd if=/dev/zero of=/dev/mapper/cmeta bs=4k count=1 oflag=direct
dmsetup create cache --table "0 131072 cache /dev/mapper/cmeta \
/dev/mapper/cdata /dev/mapper/corig 128 1 writethrough smq 0"
2. Suspend and resume the cache to start a new metadata transaction and
trigger metadata io errors on the next metadata commit.
dmsetup suspend cache
dmsetup resume cache
3. Write to the cache device to update metadata
fio --filename=/dev/mapper/cache --name test --rw=randwrite --bs=4k \
--randrepeat=0 --direct=1 --size 64k
4. Preload the same table
dmsetup reload cache --table "$(dmsetup table cache)"
5. Resume the new table. This triggers the memory leak.
dmsetup suspend cache
dmsetup resume cache
kmemleak logs:
<snip>
unreferenced object 0xffff8880080c2010 (size 16):
comm "dmsetup", pid 132, jiffies 4294982580
hex dump (first 16 bytes):
00 38 b9 07 80 88 ff ff 6a 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b a5 ...
backtrace (crc 3118f31c):
kmemleak_alloc+0x28/0x40
__kmalloc_cache_noprof+0x3d9/0x510
dm_block_manager_create+0x51/0x140
dm_cache_metadata_abort+0x85/0x320
metadata_operation_failed+0x103/0x1e0
cache_preresume+0xacd/0xe70
dm_table_resume_targets+0xd3/0x320
__dm_resume+0x1b/0xf0
dm_resume+0x127/0x170
<snip> |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
netfilter: nft_fib: fix stale stack leak via the OIFNAME register
For NFT_FIB_RESULT_OIFNAME the destination register is declared with
len = IFNAMSIZ (four 32-bit registers), but on the lookup-fail,
RTN_LOCAL and oif-mismatch paths nft_fib{4,6}_eval() only writes one
register via "*dest = 0". The remaining three registers are left as
whatever was on the stack in nft_do_chain()'s struct nft_regs, and a
downstream expression that loads the register span can leak that
uninitialised kernel stack to userspace.
The NFTA_FIB_F_PRESENT existence check has the same shape: it is only
meaningful for NFT_FIB_RESULT_OIF, yet it was accepted for any result type
while the eval stores a single byte via nft_reg_store8(), leaving the rest
of the declared span stale.
Fix both:
- replace the bare "*dest = 0" in the eval with nft_fib_store_result(),
which strscpy_pad()s the whole IFNAMSIZ for OIFNAME (and is already
used on the other early-return path), and
- restrict NFTA_FIB_F_PRESENT to NFT_FIB_RESULT_OIF and declare its
destination as a single u8, so the marked span matches the one byte
the eval writes. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
mm/memory-failure: fix hugetlb_lock AA deadlock in get_huge_page_for_hwpoison
Two concurrent madvise(MADV_HWPOISON) calls on the same hugetlb page can
trigger a recursive spinlock self-deadlock (AA deadlock) on hugetlb_lock
when racing with a concurrent unmap:
thread#0 thread#1
-------- --------
madvise(folio, MADV_HWPOISON)
-> poisons the folio successfully
madvise(folio, MADV_HWPOISON) unmap(folio)
try_memory_failure_hugetlb
get_huge_page_for_hwpoison
spin_lock_irq(&hugetlb_lock) <- held
__get_huge_page_for_hwpoison
hugetlb_update_hwpoison()
-> MF_HUGETLB_FOLIO_PRE_POISONED
goto out:
folio_put()
refcount: 1 -> 0
free_huge_folio()
spin_lock_irqsave(&hugetlb_lock)
-> AA DEADLOCK!
The out: path in __get_huge_page_for_hwpoison() calls folio_put() to drop
the GUP reference while the hugetlb_lock is still held by the hugetlb.c
wrapper get_huge_page_for_hwpoison(). If concurrent unmap has released
the page table mapping reference, folio_put() drops the folio refcount to
zero, triggering free_huge_folio() which attempts to re-acquire the
non-recursive hugetlb_lock.
Fix this by moving hugetlb_lock acquisition from the hugetlb.c wrapper
into get_huge_page_for_hwpoison(). Place spin_unlock_irq() before the
folio_put() at the out: label so the folio is always released outside the
lock.
[[email protected]: fix race, rename label per Miaohe] |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
Bluetooth: L2CAP: reject BR/EDR signaling packets over MTUsig
net/bluetooth/l2cap_core.c:l2cap_sig_channel() accepts BR/EDR
signaling packets up to the channel MTU and dispatches each command
without enforcing the signaling MTU (MTUsig). A Bluetooth BR/EDR peer
within radio range can send a fixed-channel CID 0x0001 packet that is
larger than MTUsig and contains many L2CAP_ECHO_REQ commands before
pairing. In a real-radio stock-kernel run, one 681-byte signaling
packet containing 168 zero-length ECHO_REQ commands made the target
transmit 168 ECHO_RSP frames over about 220 ms.
Impact: a Bluetooth BR/EDR peer within radio range, before pairing, can
force 168 ECHO_RSP frames from one 681-byte fixed-channel signaling
packet containing packed ECHO_REQ commands.
Define Linux's BR/EDR signaling MTU as the spec minimum of 48 bytes and
reject any larger signaling packet with one L2CAP_COMMAND_REJECT_RSP
carrying L2CAP_REJ_MTU_EXCEEDED before any command is dispatched.
The Bluetooth Core spec wording for MTUExceeded says the reject
identifier shall match the first request command in the packet, and
that packets containing only responses shall be silently discarded.
Linux intentionally deviates from that prescription: silently
discarding desynchronizes the peer because the remote stack never
learns its responses were dropped, and locating the first request
command requires walking command headers past MTUsig, i.e. processing
bytes from a packet we have already decided is too large to process.
We therefore always emit one reject and use the identifier from the
first command header, a single fixed-offset byte read.
The unrestricted BR/EDR signaling parser and ECHO_REQ response path both
trace to the initial git import; no later introducing commit is
available for a Fixes tag. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
netfilter: nft_meta_bridge: fix stale stack leak via IIFHWADDR register
NFT_META_BRI_IIFHWADDR declares its destination register with
len = ETH_ALEN (6 bytes), which the register-init tracking rounds up to
two 32-bit registers (8 bytes). nft_meta_bridge_get_eval() then does
memcpy(dest, br_dev->dev_addr, ETH_ALEN), writing only 6 bytes and
leaving the upper 2 bytes of the second register as uninitialised
nft_do_chain() stack. A downstream load of that register span leaks
those stale bytes to userspace.
Zero the second register before the memcpy so the full declared span is
written. |
| Cacti is an open source performance and fault management framework. Versions 1.2.30 and prior are vulnerable to Open Redirect through a substring check rather than a host check at str_contains($referer, CACTI_PATH_URL). When the user's login_opts == '1' (redirect to referer after login), the function used $_SERVER['HTTP_REFERER'] directly. An attacker could craft a referer such as https://evil.com/cacti/. Where CACTI_PATH_URL is /cacti/, the substring matches and the user is redirected to evil.com after login. The pre-existing validate_redirect_url() helper at lib/html_utility.php performed proper validation but was not invoked from auth_login_redirect(). This issue has been fixed in version 1.2.31. |
| The Mattermost Google Drive plugin before version 1.1.0 fails to validate channel membership in the file creation endpoint, allowing authenticated users with a connected Google account to share Google Drive files to unauthorized private channels and disclose private channel membership. |
| Bitwarden Server before 2026.5.0 contains a JSON injection vulnerability in IntegrationTemplateProcessor.ReplaceTokens(), which substitutes user-controlled values into event-integration templates without JSON encoding. When an organization has configured an event integration whose template references a user-controlled token (such as #ActingUserName# or #UserName#, populated from a member's display name), an authenticated member can set their display name to JSON metacharacters and inject arbitrary key-value pairs into the rendered payloads delivered to webhook, SIEM, Slack, Teams, or Datadog endpoints, making injected fields indistinguishable from legitimate template output. |
| Certificates with wildcard DNS SANs (e.g. *.example.com) bypassed CA name-constraint checks. A certificate with a wildcard DNS SAN that should be rejected by the issuing CA's permitted/excluded DNS name constraints could be accepted. |
| Vim is an open source, command line text editor. Prior to 9.2.0653, the tree_count_words() function in src/spellfile.c fills in the word-count fields of a spell-file word trie by walking it iteratively with a depth counter. The counter is bounded only by the trie structure itself; it is never checked against the size of the fixed MAXWLEN-element stack arrays it indexes (arridx[], curi[], wordcount[]). A crafted .spl/.sug file pair, loaded when the user invokes spell suggestion, can drive the descent arbitrarily deep, so the function writes past the end of those arrays. This is a stack out-of-bounds write that corrupts the call frame and crashes the editor. This vulnerability is fixed in 9.2.0653. |
| X.509 trust-chain bypass in the OpenSSL compatibility certificate verifier (wolfSSL_X509_verify_cert()). This affects only builds with --enable-opensslextra (OPENSSL_EXTRA) and whose application validates certificates by calling X509_verify_cert() with caller-supplied untrusted intermediate certificates; for those users it is critical, otherwise the library is unaffected. In particular, native wolfSSL TLS/DTLS usage is not impacted. wolfSSL's X509_verify_cert() temporarily loads each caller-supplied untrusted intermediate into the certificate manager but failed to drop them before the trusted-store check, so an untrusted intermediate could anchor the path itself. An attacker can present a chain that never reaches a configured trust anchor and have it accepted, resulting in acceptance of an attacker-controlled certificate. This is certificate verification independent of TLS (e.g. S/MIME/CMS, code/firmware signing, JWT/JWS x5c), is not specific to any key type or algorithm, and a single untrusted intermediate suffices. The default wolfSSL TLS handshake (WOLFSSL_VERIFY_PEER) is not affected; only TLS applications doing manual or deferred peer verification through this API are, which also requires --enable-sessioncerts. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
drm/v3d: Skip CSD when it has zeroed workgroups
A compute shader dispatch encodes its workgroup counts in the CFG0..CFG2
registers. Kicking off a dispatch with a zero count in any of the three
dimensions is invalid. First, the hardware will process 0 as 65536,
while the user-space driver exposes a maximum of 65535. Over that, a
submission with a zeroed workgroup dimension should be a no-op.
These zeroed counts can reach the dispatch path through an indirect CSD
job, whose workgroup counts are only known once the indirect buffer is
read and may legitimately be zero, but such scenario should only result in
a no-op.
Overwrite the indirect CSD job workgroup counts with the indirect BO
ones, even if they are zeroed, and don't submit the job to the hardware
when any of the workgroup counts is zero, so the job completes immediately
instead of running the shader. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
thunderbolt: Reject zero-length property entries in validator
tb_property_entry_valid() accepts entries with length == 0 for
DIRECTORY, DATA, and TEXT types. A zero-length TEXT entry passes
validation but causes an underflow in the null-termination logic:
property->value.text[property->length * 4 - 1] = '\0';
When property->length is 0 this writes to offset -1 relative to
the allocation.
Reject zero-length entries early in the validator since they have no
valid representation in the XDomain property protocol. |
