| CVE |
Vendors |
Products |
Updated |
CVSS v3.1 |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
sock_map: avoid race between sock_map_close and sk_psock_put
sk_psock_get will return NULL if the refcount of psock has gone to 0, which
will happen when the last call of sk_psock_put is done. However,
sk_psock_drop may not have finished yet, so the close callback will still
point to sock_map_close despite psock being NULL.
This can be reproduced with a thread deleting an element from the sock map,
while the second one creates a socket, adds it to the map and closes it.
That will trigger the WARN_ON_ONCE:
------------[ cut here ]------------
WARNING: CPU: 1 PID: 7220 at net/core/sock_map.c:1701 sock_map_close+0x2a2/0x2d0 net/core/sock_map.c:1701
Modules linked in:
CPU: 1 PID: 7220 Comm: syz-executor380 Not tainted 6.9.0-syzkaller-07726-g3c999d1ae3c7 #0
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 04/02/2024
RIP: 0010:sock_map_close+0x2a2/0x2d0 net/core/sock_map.c:1701
Code: df e8 92 29 88 f8 48 8b 1b 48 89 d8 48 c1 e8 03 42 80 3c 20 00 74 08 48 89 df e8 79 29 88 f8 4c 8b 23 eb 89 e8 4f 15 23 f8 90 <0f> 0b 90 48 83 c4 08 5b 41 5c 41 5d 41 5e 41 5f 5d e9 13 26 3d 02
RSP: 0018:ffffc9000441fda8 EFLAGS: 00010293
RAX: ffffffff89731ae1 RBX: ffffffff94b87540 RCX: ffff888029470000
RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: ffffffff8bcab5c0 RDI: ffffffff8c1faba0
RBP: 0000000000000000 R08: ffffffff92f9b61f R09: 1ffffffff25f36c3
R10: dffffc0000000000 R11: fffffbfff25f36c4 R12: ffffffff89731840
R13: ffff88804b587000 R14: ffff88804b587000 R15: ffffffff89731870
FS: 000055555e080380(0000) GS:ffff8880b9500000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 0000000000000000 CR3: 00000000207d4000 CR4: 0000000000350ef0
Call Trace:
<TASK>
unix_release+0x87/0xc0 net/unix/af_unix.c:1048
__sock_release net/socket.c:659 [inline]
sock_close+0xbe/0x240 net/socket.c:1421
__fput+0x42b/0x8a0 fs/file_table.c:422
__do_sys_close fs/open.c:1556 [inline]
__se_sys_close fs/open.c:1541 [inline]
__x64_sys_close+0x7f/0x110 fs/open.c:1541
do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:52 [inline]
do_syscall_64+0xf5/0x240 arch/x86/entry/common.c:83
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f
RIP: 0033:0x7fb37d618070
Code: 00 00 48 c7 c2 b8 ff ff ff f7 d8 64 89 02 b8 ff ff ff ff eb d4 e8 10 2c 00 00 80 3d 31 f0 07 00 00 74 17 b8 03 00 00 00 0f 05 <48> 3d 00 f0 ff ff 77 48 c3 0f 1f 80 00 00 00 00 48 83 ec 18 89 7c
RSP: 002b:00007ffcd4a525d8 EFLAGS: 00000202 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000003
RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000000005 RCX: 00007fb37d618070
RDX: 0000000000000010 RSI: 00000000200001c0 RDI: 0000000000000004
RBP: 0000000000000000 R08: 0000000100000000 R09: 0000000100000000
R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000202 R12: 0000000000000000
R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000000
</TASK>
Use sk_psock, which will only check that the pointer is not been set to
NULL yet, which should only happen after the callbacks are restored. If,
then, a reference can still be gotten, we may call sk_psock_stop and cancel
psock->work.
As suggested by Paolo Abeni, reorder the condition so the control flow is
less convoluted.
After that change, the reproducer does not trigger the WARN_ON_ONCE
anymore. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
drm/drm_file: Fix pid refcounting race
<[email protected]>, Maxime Ripard
<[email protected]>, Thomas Zimmermann <[email protected]>
filp->pid is supposed to be a refcounted pointer; however, before this
patch, drm_file_update_pid() only increments the refcount of a struct
pid after storing a pointer to it in filp->pid and dropping the
dev->filelist_mutex, making the following race possible:
process A process B
========= =========
begin drm_file_update_pid
mutex_lock(&dev->filelist_mutex)
rcu_replace_pointer(filp->pid, <pid B>, 1)
mutex_unlock(&dev->filelist_mutex)
begin drm_file_update_pid
mutex_lock(&dev->filelist_mutex)
rcu_replace_pointer(filp->pid, <pid A>, 1)
mutex_unlock(&dev->filelist_mutex)
get_pid(<pid A>)
synchronize_rcu()
put_pid(<pid B>) *** pid B reaches refcount 0 and is freed here ***
get_pid(<pid B>) *** UAF ***
synchronize_rcu()
put_pid(<pid A>)
As far as I know, this race can only occur with CONFIG_PREEMPT_RCU=y
because it requires RCU to detect a quiescent state in code that is not
explicitly calling into the scheduler.
This race leads to use-after-free of a "struct pid".
It is probably somewhat hard to hit because process A has to pass
through a synchronize_rcu() operation while process B is between
mutex_unlock() and get_pid().
Fix it by ensuring that by the time a pointer to the current task's pid
is stored in the file, an extra reference to the pid has been taken.
This fix also removes the condition for synchronize_rcu(); I think
that optimization is unnecessary complexity, since in that case we
would usually have bailed out on the lockless check above. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
KVM: SVM: WARN on vNMI + NMI window iff NMIs are outright masked
When requesting an NMI window, WARN on vNMI support being enabled if and
only if NMIs are actually masked, i.e. if the vCPU is already handling an
NMI. KVM's ABI for NMIs that arrive simultanesouly (from KVM's point of
view) is to inject one NMI and pend the other. When using vNMI, KVM pends
the second NMI simply by setting V_NMI_PENDING, and lets the CPU do the
rest (hardware automatically sets V_NMI_BLOCKING when an NMI is injected).
However, if KVM can't immediately inject an NMI, e.g. because the vCPU is
in an STI shadow or is running with GIF=0, then KVM will request an NMI
window and trigger the WARN (but still function correctly).
Whether or not the GIF=0 case makes sense is debatable, as the intent of
KVM's behavior is to provide functionality that is as close to real
hardware as possible. E.g. if two NMIs are sent in quick succession, the
probability of both NMIs arriving in an STI shadow is infinitesimally low
on real hardware, but significantly larger in a virtual environment, e.g.
if the vCPU is preempted in the STI shadow. For GIF=0, the argument isn't
as clear cut, because the window where two NMIs can collide is much larger
in bare metal (though still small).
That said, KVM should not have divergent behavior for the GIF=0 case based
on whether or not vNMI support is enabled. And KVM has allowed
simultaneous NMIs with GIF=0 for over a decade, since commit 7460fb4a3400
("KVM: Fix simultaneous NMIs"). I.e. KVM's GIF=0 handling shouldn't be
modified without a *really* good reason to do so, and if KVM's behavior
were to be modified, it should be done irrespective of vNMI support. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
bcache: fix variable length array abuse in btree_iter
btree_iter is used in two ways: either allocated on the stack with a
fixed size MAX_BSETS, or from a mempool with a dynamic size based on the
specific cache set. Previously, the struct had a fixed-length array of
size MAX_BSETS which was indexed out-of-bounds for the dynamically-sized
iterators, which causes UBSAN to complain.
This patch uses the same approach as in bcachefs's sort_iter and splits
the iterator into a btree_iter with a flexible array member and a
btree_iter_stack which embeds a btree_iter as well as a fixed-length
data array. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
media: mc: Fix graph walk in media_pipeline_start
The graph walk tries to follow all links, even if they are not between
pads. This causes a crash with, e.g. a MEDIA_LNK_FL_ANCILLARY_LINK link.
Fix this by allowing the walk to proceed only for MEDIA_LNK_FL_DATA_LINK
links. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
kdb: Fix buffer overflow during tab-complete
Currently, when the user attempts symbol completion with the Tab key, kdb
will use strncpy() to insert the completed symbol into the command buffer.
Unfortunately it passes the size of the source buffer rather than the
destination to strncpy() with predictably horrible results. Most obviously
if the command buffer is already full but cp, the cursor position, is in
the middle of the buffer, then we will write past the end of the supplied
buffer.
Fix this by replacing the dubious strncpy() calls with memmove()/memcpy()
calls plus explicit boundary checks to make sure we have enough space
before we start moving characters around. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
crypto: starfive - Do not free stack buffer
RSA text data uses variable length buffer allocated in software stack.
Calling kfree on it causes undefined behaviour in subsequent operations. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
mm/hugetlb: do not call vma_add_reservation upon ENOMEM
sysbot reported a splat [1] on __unmap_hugepage_range(). This is because
vma_needs_reservation() can return -ENOMEM if
allocate_file_region_entries() fails to allocate the file_region struct
for the reservation.
Check for that and do not call vma_add_reservation() if that is the case,
otherwise region_abort() and region_del() will see that we do not have any
file_regions.
If we detect that vma_needs_reservation() returned -ENOMEM, we clear the
hugetlb_restore_reserve flag as if this reservation was still consumed, so
free_huge_folio() will not increment the resv count.
[1] https://lore.kernel.org/linux-mm/[email protected]/T/#ma5983bc1ab18a54910da83416b3f89f3c7ee43aa |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
xfs: fix log recovery buffer allocation for the legacy h_size fixup
Commit a70f9fe52daa ("xfs: detect and handle invalid iclog size set by
mkfs") added a fixup for incorrect h_size values used for the initial
umount record in old xfsprogs versions. Later commit 0c771b99d6c9
("xfs: clean up calculation of LR header blocks") cleaned up the log
reover buffer calculation, but stoped using the fixed up h_size value
to size the log recovery buffer, which can lead to an out of bounds
access when the incorrect h_size does not come from the old mkfs
tool, but a fuzzer.
Fix this by open coding xlog_logrec_hblks and taking the fixed h_size
into account for this calculation. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
drm/amdgpu: add error handle to avoid out-of-bounds
if the sdma_v4_0_irq_id_to_seq return -EINVAL, the process should
be stop to avoid out-of-bounds read, so directly return -EINVAL. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
smb: client: fix deadlock in smb2_find_smb_tcon()
Unlock cifs_tcp_ses_lock before calling cifs_put_smb_ses() to avoid such
deadlock. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
f2fs: fix to do sanity check on i_xattr_nid in sanity_check_inode()
syzbot reports a kernel bug as below:
F2FS-fs (loop0): Mounted with checkpoint version = 48b305e4
==================================================================
BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in f2fs_test_bit fs/f2fs/f2fs.h:2933 [inline]
BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in current_nat_addr fs/f2fs/node.h:213 [inline]
BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in f2fs_get_node_info+0xece/0x1200 fs/f2fs/node.c:600
Read of size 1 at addr ffff88807a58c76c by task syz-executor280/5076
CPU: 1 PID: 5076 Comm: syz-executor280 Not tainted 6.9.0-rc5-syzkaller #0
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 03/27/2024
Call Trace:
<TASK>
__dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:88 [inline]
dump_stack_lvl+0x241/0x360 lib/dump_stack.c:114
print_address_description mm/kasan/report.c:377 [inline]
print_report+0x169/0x550 mm/kasan/report.c:488
kasan_report+0x143/0x180 mm/kasan/report.c:601
f2fs_test_bit fs/f2fs/f2fs.h:2933 [inline]
current_nat_addr fs/f2fs/node.h:213 [inline]
f2fs_get_node_info+0xece/0x1200 fs/f2fs/node.c:600
f2fs_xattr_fiemap fs/f2fs/data.c:1848 [inline]
f2fs_fiemap+0x55d/0x1ee0 fs/f2fs/data.c:1925
ioctl_fiemap fs/ioctl.c:220 [inline]
do_vfs_ioctl+0x1c07/0x2e50 fs/ioctl.c:838
__do_sys_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:902 [inline]
__se_sys_ioctl+0x81/0x170 fs/ioctl.c:890
do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:52 [inline]
do_syscall_64+0xf5/0x240 arch/x86/entry/common.c:83
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f
The root cause is we missed to do sanity check on i_xattr_nid during
f2fs_iget(), so that in fiemap() path, current_nat_addr() will access
nat_bitmap w/ offset from invalid i_xattr_nid, result in triggering
kasan bug report, fix it. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
Revert "xsk: Support redirect to any socket bound to the same umem"
This reverts commit 2863d665ea41282379f108e4da6c8a2366ba66db.
This patch introduced a potential kernel crash when multiple napi instances
redirect to the same AF_XDP socket. By removing the queue_index check, it is
possible for multiple napi instances to access the Rx ring at the same time,
which will result in a corrupted ring state which can lead to a crash when
flushing the rings in __xsk_flush(). This can happen when the linked list of
sockets to flush gets corrupted by concurrent accesses. A quick and small fix
is not possible, so let us revert this for now. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
um: Add winch to winch_handlers before registering winch IRQ
Registering a winch IRQ is racy, an interrupt may occur before the winch is
added to the winch_handlers list.
If that happens, register_winch_irq() adds to that list a winch that is
scheduled to be (or has already been) freed, causing a panic later in
winch_cleanup().
Avoid the race by adding the winch to the winch_handlers list before
registering the IRQ, and rolling back if um_request_irq() fails. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net: wwan: t7xx: Fix FSM command timeout issue
When driver processes the internal state change command, it use an
asynchronous thread to process the command operation. If the main
thread detects that the task has timed out, the asynchronous thread
will panic when executing the completion notification because the
main thread completion object has been released.
BUG: unable to handle page fault for address: fffffffffffffff8
PGD 1f283a067 P4D 1f283a067 PUD 1f283c067 PMD 0
Oops: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP NOPTI
RIP: 0010:complete_all+0x3e/0xa0
[...]
Call Trace:
<TASK>
? __die_body+0x68/0xb0
? page_fault_oops+0x379/0x3e0
? exc_page_fault+0x69/0xa0
? asm_exc_page_fault+0x22/0x30
? complete_all+0x3e/0xa0
fsm_main_thread+0xa3/0x9c0 [mtk_t7xx (HASH:1400 5)]
? __pfx_autoremove_wake_function+0x10/0x10
kthread+0xd8/0x110
? __pfx_fsm_main_thread+0x10/0x10 [mtk_t7xx (HASH:1400 5)]
? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10
ret_from_fork+0x38/0x50
? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10
ret_from_fork_asm+0x1b/0x30
</TASK>
[...]
CR2: fffffffffffffff8
---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]---
Use the reference counter to ensure safe release as Sergey suggests:
https://lore.kernel.org/all/[email protected]/ |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
blk-cgroup: fix list corruption from resetting io stat
Since commit 3b8cc6298724 ("blk-cgroup: Optimize blkcg_rstat_flush()"),
each iostat instance is added to blkcg percpu list, so blkcg_reset_stats()
can't reset the stat instance by memset(), otherwise the llist may be
corrupted.
Fix the issue by only resetting the counter part. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
enic: Validate length of nl attributes in enic_set_vf_port
enic_set_vf_port assumes that the nl attribute IFLA_PORT_PROFILE
is of length PORT_PROFILE_MAX and that the nl attributes
IFLA_PORT_INSTANCE_UUID, IFLA_PORT_HOST_UUID are of length PORT_UUID_MAX.
These attributes are validated (in the function do_setlink in rtnetlink.c)
using the nla_policy ifla_port_policy. The policy defines IFLA_PORT_PROFILE
as NLA_STRING, IFLA_PORT_INSTANCE_UUID as NLA_BINARY and
IFLA_PORT_HOST_UUID as NLA_STRING. That means that the length validation
using the policy is for the max size of the attributes and not on exact
size so the length of these attributes might be less than the sizes that
enic_set_vf_port expects. This might cause an out of bands
read access in the memcpys of the data of these
attributes in enic_set_vf_port. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
soundwire: cadence: fix invalid PDI offset
For some reason, we add an offset to the PDI, presumably to skip the
PDI0 and PDI1 which are reserved for BPT.
This code is however completely wrong and leads to an out-of-bounds
access. We were just lucky so far since we used only a couple of PDIs
and remained within the PDI array bounds.
A Fixes: tag is not provided since there are no known platforms where
the out-of-bounds would be accessed, and the initial code had problems
as well.
A follow-up patch completely removes this useless offset. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
usb: gadget: u_audio: Fix race condition use of controls after free during gadget unbind.
Hang on to the control IDs instead of pointers since those are correctly
handled with locks. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
fuse: clear FR_SENT when re-adding requests into pending list
The following warning was reported by lee bruce:
------------[ cut here ]------------
WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 8264 at fs/fuse/dev.c:300
fuse_request_end+0x685/0x7e0 fs/fuse/dev.c:300
Modules linked in:
CPU: 0 PID: 8264 Comm: ab2 Not tainted 6.9.0-rc7
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996)
RIP: 0010:fuse_request_end+0x685/0x7e0 fs/fuse/dev.c:300
......
Call Trace:
<TASK>
fuse_dev_do_read.constprop.0+0xd36/0x1dd0 fs/fuse/dev.c:1334
fuse_dev_read+0x166/0x200 fs/fuse/dev.c:1367
call_read_iter include/linux/fs.h:2104 [inline]
new_sync_read fs/read_write.c:395 [inline]
vfs_read+0x85b/0xba0 fs/read_write.c:476
ksys_read+0x12f/0x260 fs/read_write.c:619
do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:52 [inline]
do_syscall_64+0xce/0x260 arch/x86/entry/common.c:83
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f
......
</TASK>
The warning is due to the FUSE_NOTIFY_RESEND notify sent by the write()
syscall in the reproducer program and it happens as follows:
(1) calls fuse_dev_read() to read the INIT request
The read succeeds. During the read, bit FR_SENT will be set on the
request.
(2) calls fuse_dev_write() to send an USE_NOTIFY_RESEND notify
The resend notify will resend all processing requests, so the INIT
request is moved from processing list to pending list again.
(3) calls fuse_dev_read() with an invalid output address
fuse_dev_read() will try to copy the same INIT request to the output
address, but it will fail due to the invalid address, so the INIT
request is ended and triggers the warning in fuse_request_end().
Fix it by clearing FR_SENT when re-adding requests into pending list. |
