| CVE |
Vendors |
Products |
Updated |
CVSS v3.1 |
| Fledge's backup-restore upload handler, upload_backup() (python/fledge/services/core/api/backup_restore.py), takes the first extracted tar member's filename (tar_file_names[0]) and builds a shell command via string formatting: `cmd = "cp {} {}".format(source, backup_path); ret_code = os.system(cmd)`. The only pre-check on the filename is a prefix/suffix match (startswith(backup_prefix), endswith(valid_extensions)), which a name such as `fledge_backup_$(id>/tmp/pwn).db` satisfies while still injecting a shell command substitution. Because os.system() invokes a shell and no quoting (shlex.quote, list-form subprocess) is applied, an admin uploading a crafted backup archive achieves arbitrary OS command execution. |
| The plugin provides an Admin Search page that allows users with the `edit_posts` capability to run Relevanssi searches from the WordPress dashboard. The AJAX handler accepts a URL-encoded `args` parameter, parses it into a `WP_Query`, and then passes user-controlled taxonomy query data into Relevanssi's taxonomy restriction builder. The taxonomy value is sanitized as text but is not parameterized for SQL before being interpolated into a term taxonomy lookup query. This allows an authenticated contributor-level attacker to inject SQL through the Admin Search AJAX request and execute time-based blind SQL injection against the WordPress database. |
| Uptime Kuma's Matomo analytics integration (server/analytics/matomo-analytics.js) injects the admin-configurable Matomo `siteId` value as a bare, unquoted JavaScript expression inside a <script> block rendered on every public status page: `_paq.push(['setSiteId', ${escapedSiteIdHTMLAttribute}]);`. The escaping pipeline used (jsesc with isScriptContext:true, then html-escaper.escape()) does not escape the characters `]`, `)`, `;`, `(`, which are sufficient to break out of the array/push expression context. A siteId value such as `1]);alert(document.cookie)//`, once saved by an editor/admin, executes arbitrary JavaScript for every unauthenticated visitor of the public /status/<slug> page, enabling session-cookie theft and full page takeover. |
| Hugging Face peft's LoRA-GA and CorDA initialization modules (src/peft/tuners/lora/corda.py lines ~102 and ~163, and src/peft/tuners/lora/loraga.py line ~101) call torch.load() on config-specified cache/covariance files without weights_only=True, bypassing peft's own safe-loading wrapper used elsewhere in the codebase. Because torch.load() without weights_only=True performs full pickle deserialization, loading a malicious cache or covariance file (e.g. a shared/downloaded LoRA-GA or CorDA cache) results in arbitrary code execution. |
| go-shiori's DownloadBookmark() (internal/core/download.go) fetches a caller-supplied bookmark URL using a plain http.Client with no custom DialContext or destination-IP validation (no IsLoopback(), IsPrivate(), IsUnspecified(), or IsLinkLocalUnicast() checks). An authenticated user creating or updating a bookmark via POST /api/bookmark, PUT /api/v1/bookmarks/cache, or POST /api/bookmarks/ext can supply a loopback (127.0.0.1) or 0.0.0.0 (which Linux redirects to loopback) URL, causing the server to make outbound requests to internal-only services, cloud metadata endpoints, or other network-restricted resources. |
| The NASA-AMMOS Asynchronous Network Management System (ANMS) reference implementation's default docker-compose.yml publishes the amp-manager service's REST API directly to the host network interface (port 8089, e.g. "${ION_MGR_PORT:-8089}:8089/tcp") with cap_add: NET_ADMIN, NET_RAW, SYS_NICE, bypassing the CAM (Configuration and Access Manager) gateway that is otherwise the system's sole authentication boundary. The underlying REST server, implemented with CivetWeb in JHUAPL/dtnma-tools (src/refdm/nm_rest.c), is configured with enable_auth_domain_check set to "no" and registers every route, including the DTNMA agent command-dispatch endpoints (.../agents/{eid|idx}/send, which accept and forward EXECSET-encoded command sets to a registered DTNMA agent), with a null authentication callback. Any network-reachable client can therefore enumerate registered agents, submit arbitrary command sets to them, and clear stored reports, entirely without credentials. This affects NASA-AMMOS/anms and JHUAPL-DTNMA/dtnma-tools as published; both repositories present this as a reference/ground DTN network-management implementation and testbed, and the affected components communicate with DTNMA agents (which may represent simulated or real spacecraft/ground nodes depending on deployment) rather than being flight software running onboard a spacecraft. |
| Flarum before 1.8.16 contains an improper session invalidation vulnerability that allows attackers who hold a valid session token to retain full account access after a victim changes their password, because the access_tokens table is never cleared on password change events. The TokensClearer::clearPasswordTokens() function only removes rows from the password_tokens table while leaving all active session cookies and API bearer tokens intact, including long-lived RememberAccessToken entries, and administrator-forced password resets via the user update endpoint are equally ineffective at revoking attacker-held sessions. |
| Cacti's sanitize_sql_column() (lib/functions.php) sanitizes user-supplied ORDER BY column names using the regex `preg_replace('/[^a-zA-Z0-9_().]/', '', $column)`. Because this allowlist retains letters, digits, underscore, parentheses, and dot (intended to support expressions like COUNT(id) and table.column), a payload such as `SLEEP(5)` passes through completely unmodified. The sanitized value is concatenated directly into raw SQL ORDER BY clauses (which cannot be parameterized) driven by a `sort_column` GET parameter in at least user_log.php, utilities.php, user_domains.php, and user_group_admin.php, allowing any authenticated Cacti user, regardless of privilege level, to perform time-based blind SQL injection against the Cacti database. |
| Bolt CMS renders content field values through Twig's full application-level Environment with no SandboxExtension registered anywhere in the codebase. In src/Entity/Field.php, getTwigValue() calls shouldBeRenderedAsTwig(), which gates rendering only on the field definition's allow_twig flag and a regex checking for `{{`, `{%`, or `{#`; when true, the raw field value is compiled and rendered via `self::getTwig()->createTemplate($value)->render(['record' => $this->getContent()])` with no sandboxing. Bolt's own bundled config/bolt/contenttypes.yaml sets `allow_twig: true` on the default "pages" contenttype's content field out of the box. Any user with edit access to that content type (a standard editor role, not just an administrator) can inject a Twig payload such as `{{ ['id']|map('passthru')|join }}` that executes arbitrary OS commands when the content is saved and rendered, achieving remote code execution as the web server user. |
| Subrion CMS's admin grid sorting helper, _gridGetSorting() in includes/classes/ia.base.controller.admin.php, whitelists the `dir` (ASC/DESC) request parameter via in_array(), but falls back to the raw, attacker-supplied `sort` GET parameter whenever the requested key is not present in the per-controller $_gridSorting whitelist array: `$column = isset($this->_gridSorting[$params['sort']]) ? ... : $params['sort'];`, which is then placed into `sprintf(' ORDER BY %s`%s` %s', $tableAlias, $column, $direction)` with only backtick-quoting and no escaping. Because a backtick in the payload breaks out of the identifier context, an authenticated admin session can inject arbitrary SQL (error-based via EXTRACTVALUE, or time-based via SLEEP()) to extract database contents including administrator password hashes. Most of Subrion's ~29 admin grid controllers either define no $_gridSorting whitelist at all (e.g. pages.php, transactions.php, languages.php) or an incomplete one covering only some of their sortable columns (e.g. members.php whitelists only 1 of 7 sortable fields), making the vast majority of admin grid endpoints exploitable. |
| The render-template component of ember-dynamic-render-template (addon/components/render-template.js) passes its `templateString` property directly into Ember/Glimmer's compileTemplate() (from @ember/template-compilation) with no sanitization, allow-listing, or validation of the input. Because compileTemplate() dynamically compiles and renders the supplied string as a live Handlebars/Glimmer template, any application that renders attacker-influenced data through this component's templateString property is exposed to client-side template injection: an attacker-controlled Handlebars expression is compiled and executed in the context of the rendering component, which can be leveraged for cross-site scripting depending on what helpers/context are exposed to the compiled template. |
| Electron is a framework for writing cross-platform desktop applications using JavaScript, HTML and CSS. Prior to 39.8.9, 40.9.2, 41.2.2, and 42.0.0-beta.5, apps that expose Promise-returning functions to web content via contextBridge may be vulnerable to a context isolation bypass. Untrusted web content could obtain access to the isolated preload world and, through it, every capability the preload script has. In renderers without a sandbox, or with nodeIntegration enabled, this may escalate to Node.js access. Apps are affected if they expose Promise-returning functions via contextBridge, the standard pattern for wrapping ipcRenderer.invoke, in windows that load untrusted content. This issue is fixed in versions 39.8.9, 40.9.2, 41.2.2, and 42.0.0-beta.5. |
| open62541 1.5.5 contains a buffer-overflow in the high-level attribute reading logic in src/client/ua_client_highlevel.c. This allows a remote attacker to cause a denial of service. |
| An authenticated attacker can craft a disposition frame with large or illegal ranges causing excessive CPU usage due to naive range handling, leading to denial of service.
This issue affects Apache Qpid Proton-Dotnet: through 1.0.0.
Users are recommended to upgrade to version 1.1.0, which fixes the issue. |
| A flaw was found in Keycloak's Authorization Services. The component responsible for matching request paths to security policies (PathMatcher) does not properly normalize URIs before comparison. By adding extra characters like a trailing slash or matrix parameters to a URL, an attacker can trick the system into applying a less restrictive security policy than intended. This allows an authenticated user to access administrative or restricted areas they should not have permission to see. |
| Stirling-PDF's POST /api/v1/convert/url/pdf endpoint (ConvertWebsiteToPDF.java) was not updated with the CustomHtmlSanitizer/SsrfProtectionService SSRF protections that were added to three sibling conversion endpoints (html/pdf, file/pdf, markdown/pdf). The endpoint validates only that the initial requested URL resolves to a public IP, then fetches the page's HTML server-side and hands it, unsanitized, to a WeasyPrint subprocess. Embedded resource references in the fetched HTML (e.g. `<img src="http://169.254.169.254/...">`) are fetched by WeasyPrint with no per-resource SSRF filtering, allowing an attacker-controlled page to cause the server to retrieve cloud metadata endpoints or internal network resources and leak their contents back into the generated PDF. |
| Node-RED's local-filesystem library storage module (getLibraryEntry() and saveLibraryEntry() in packages/node_modules/@node-red/runtime/lib/storage/localfilesystem/library.js), reachable via GET/POST /library/:lib/:type/*path, joins the user-supplied path parameter directly into the filesystem path via fspath.join(libDir, type, path) with no traversal sanitization, containment check, or path normalization/prefix verification. An authenticated user (including read-only-scoped tokens for the read path) can supply a path containing `../` sequences to read arbitrary files outside the library directory; a user with write access can write arbitrary files, enabling remote code execution via SSH authorized_keys or cron injection. This is a distinct, separately unpatched traversal from the previously fixed CVE-2021-21298 (Projects API). |
| OpenPLC Runtime v3's compile_program() function (webserver/openplc.py) parses `(*FILE:path content*)` directives from uploaded Structured Text (.st) program files and writes the referenced content to `os.path.join('./core', file_path)` with no validation that file_path stays within the ./core directory. A crafted .st file containing a directive such as `(*FILE:../../../etc/cron.d/x * * * * root <command>*)` writes attacker-controlled content to an arbitrary filesystem path, enabling remote code execution (e.g. via cron or SSH authorized_keys). A path-validation function, validate_file_path(), exists elsewhere in the codebase (webserver/credentials.py) but is never invoked from compile_program(), leaving the sink unprotected. OpenPLC additionally ships with hardcoded default credentials (openplc:openplc), lowering the practical bar for exploitation. |
| Electron is a framework for writing cross-platform desktop applications using JavaScript, HTML and CSS. Prior to 39.8.8, 40.9.0, 41.2.1, and 42.0.0-beta.3, the native autofill popup could be positioned by a cross-origin iframe outside that iframe's bounds, over the embedding page's UI, enabling clickjacking or spoofing of trusted UI. Apps are only affected if they embed untrusted content in iframes within windows that also display trusted UI. Apps that do not embed untrusted third-party content are not affected. This issue is fixed in versions 39.8.8, 40.9.0, 41.2.1, and 42.0.0-beta.3. |
| WLED's GET /json/cfg endpoint (registered in wled00/wled_server.cpp) calls serveJson() with no settings-PIN check, unlike the /edit endpoint which explicitly checks correctPIN, disclosing the device's general configuration (network, hardware, LED setup) to any unauthenticated client on the network. Separately, the settings-PIN unlock state is tracked via a single global boolean `correctPIN` (wled00/wled.h), not per-session state: once any single client submits the correct 4-digit PIN via POST /json, correctPIN becomes true for every client, granting all subsequent unauthenticated clients full configuration-write access (OTA firmware updates, WiFi reconfiguration, factory reset) until the device reboots. |
