| CVE |
Vendors |
Products |
Updated |
CVSS v3.1 |
| MacCMS10's admin template editor (application/admin/controller/Template.php) blocks dangerous PHP functions in template content via a blacklist regex, but the blacklist omitted exec, passthru, popen, show_source, create_function, register_shutdown_function, register_tick_function, and error_log. Combined with ThinkPHP's {if} template tag, which embeds the condition attribute directly into raw PHP (<?php if(condition): ?>), an authenticated administrator could inject a payload such as {if condition="exec('id > /tmp/pwned.txt')"}{/if} to achieve remote code execution. Fixed in commit 71ad3bb29570e110d8e973acff68040a3050ddf0 (2026-06-22), which added the missing functions to the filter. |
| Koha's reports/issues_stats.pl (the circulation statistics report) builds its calculation query in sub calculate by concatenating several user-controlled request parameters directly into the SQL string. The PeriodTypeSel, PeriodDaySel, and PeriodMonthSel parameters are interpolated raw into single-quoted equality and function-comparison fragments, and the Filter slots plus the Line and Column identifiers are likewise interpolated with no whitelist and no placeholder binding. An authenticated staff user holding the reports module permission can inject arbitrary SQL and read any table reachable by the Koha database user, including borrowers (password hashes, two-factor secrets, personal data), api_keys, and sessions. |
| Koha's reports/bor_issues_top.pl builds dynamic SQL in sub calculate by concatenating several user-controlled request parameters directly into the query string. The Criteria parameter is only normalized by a table-name prefix and is never whitelisted, landing verbatim in identifier positions (SELECT DISTINCTROW, GROUP BY, ORDER BY); Filter values are concatenated raw into single-quoted LIKE, BETWEEN, and comparison fragments, and the Limit parameter is appended raw to a LIMIT clause. An authenticated staff user holding the reports module permission can inject arbitrary SQL and read any table reachable by the Koha database user, including borrowers (password hashes, two-factor secrets, personal data), api_keys, and sessions. |
| Koha's reports/issues_avg_stats.pl builds dynamic SQL in sub calculate by concatenating several user-controlled request parameters directly into the query string. The Line and Column parameters are not validated against any whitelist and land verbatim in identifier positions (SELECT DISTINCTROW, GROUP BY, ORDER BY), and each Filter slot is concatenated raw into single-quoted LIKE, BETWEEN, and comparison fragments with no bound parameters. An authenticated staff user holding the reports module permission can inject arbitrary SQL and read any table reachable by the Koha database user, including borrowers (password hashes, two-factor secrets, personal data), api_keys, and sessions. |
| Koha's reports/catalogue_stats.pl builds dynamic SQL in sub calculate by interpolating the user-controlled Line and Column request parameters directly into identifier positions of the query (SELECT DISTINCTROW, GROUP BY, ORDER BY) with no whitelist validation. When Line contains itemcallnumber and the cotedigits parameter is truthy, cotedigits is additionally concatenated raw as the numeric argument of a LEFT() call. An authenticated staff user holding the reports module permission can inject arbitrary SQL and read any table reachable by the Koha database user, including borrowers (password hashes, two-factor secrets, personal data), api_keys, and sessions. |
| Koha's reports/acquisitions_stats.pl builds its per-cell statistics query in sub calculate by interpolating the user-controlled Filter request parameters directly into WHERE fragments covering aqbasket.closedate, aqorders.datereceived, aqbooksellers.name, items.homebranch, items.ccode, biblioitems.itemtype, aqbudgets.budget_code, aqorders.sort1, and aqorders.sort2. The statement is prepared and executed with no bound parameters. An authenticated staff user holding the reports module permission can inject arbitrary SQL and read any table reachable by the Koha database user, including borrowers (password hashes, two-factor secrets, personal data), borrower_password_recovery, api_keys, and sessions. |
| Paperless-ngx's MailAccountViewSet.test() action, when called with an existing account's ID and a masked password field, reuses the stored password, account_type, refresh_token, and expiration from that existing account while allowing the caller to supply a different imap_server, imap_port, and imap_security in the same request. The test connection then authenticates to the caller-specified server using the real stored credentials. A user holding only object-level change_mailaccount permission on the target account (not full admin) can redirect the test connection to an attacker-controlled IMAP host, causing the real stored IMAP password or OAuth token to be sent to that host. |
| Grocy's API request-body parser (controllers/Api/BaseApiController.php, GetParsedAndFilteredRequestBody) purifies incoming field values with HTMLPurifier, then manually reverses HTML-entity encoding of the resulting output by replacing &lt;, &gt;, and &amp; back to <, >, and & immediately after purification. This double-decode reconstructs live HTML/script tags from the entity-encoded form that HTMLPurifier produced to neutralize them, re-introducing stored XSS across API-writable fields (products, recipes, stock, users, chores, and others) that are rendered elsewhere without re-sanitization. |
| Miantang/IoT-PHP's index.php implements a POST /userlogin route that reads the password directly from $_POST['pwd'] with no sanitization and concatenates it into a raw SQL string: mysql_query("select * from userlists where username='$username' and password='$password' limit 1"). The username value is passed through htmlspecialchars(), which does not encode single quotes by default and therefore does not prevent SQL injection through the password field. An unauthenticated attacker can submit a payload such as pwd=' OR '1'='1 to bypass authentication and, via UNION-based injection, extract arbitrary data from the database. |
| DjangoCRM ships with its Django SECRET_KEY hardcoded directly in the committed webcrm/settings.py rather than read from an environment variable. Since this key is used for session signing, CSRF token generation, and password reset tokens, anyone who reads the public repository can forge valid session cookies (including for the superadmin account), forge CSRF tokens, and forge password reset tokens, achieving full account takeover. The repository also ships with DEBUG=True as the default, causing error pages to leak database credentials, email credentials, OAuth data, and internal file paths. |
| Firefly III's webhook URL validator (IsValidWebhookUrl.php) filters most private/reserved IPv4 ranges but contains an explicit early-return that allows any resolved address in 127.0.0.0/8, permitting an authenticated user (with webhooks enabled, which is off by default) to configure a webhook targeting loopback services on the server. Additionally, the validator resolves the target hostname once via gethostbyname() at validation time, but the actual outbound request (StandardWebhookSender.php, via Guzzle) re-resolves the hostname independently at send time, allowing a DNS-rebinding attacker to pass validation against a public IP and have the real request delivered to a private or internal address. The webhook response body is only written to a server-side debug log, not returned to the triggering user, so this is a blind SSRF primitive rather than one with direct response read-back. |
| toner-management's admin state-changing handlers (add.php, edit.php, delete.php under admin/toners, admin/toner-brands, admin/printers, and related admin subdirectories) executed INSERT/UPDATE/DELETE database operations with no authentication or authorization check, while access control was enforced only in listing views. An unauthenticated remote attacker could invoke these handlers directly to create, modify, or destroy application data. The vendor has since merged a fix requiring an authenticated admin session before any such handler proceeds. |
| Mautic's getLeadIdsByFieldValueAction (LeadBundle/Controller/AjaxController.php) reads a field parameter from the request, sanitizes it only with InputHelper::clean() (which HTML-entity-encodes quotes and angle brackets but does not restrict other characters), and passes it into LeadRepository::buildQueryForGetLeadsByFieldValue() where it is concatenated directly as a raw SQL column identifier ($col = 'l.'.$field) rather than being validated against a whitelist of real column names or passed as a bound parameter. Since Doctrine cannot parameterize identifiers, and the sanitizer does not block spaces, parentheses, or other SQL-relevant characters, an attacker can inject SQL via the field name itself. The action requires only a valid session (any authenticated user), unlike sibling actions in the same controller that carry additional permission checks. |
| Documenso's sign-field-with-token.ts, used by the live document-signing UI, allows a recipient with the ASSISTANT role to fetch and complete fields belonging to any later-or-equal-order, not-yet-signed recipient in the same envelope, with no restriction on field type. The handler upserts a Signature record tied to the target field's recipientId with no check that field.type is SIGNATURE and the acting recipient owns it. A newer V2 signing path (sign-envelope-field.ts) explicitly blocks assistants from completing SIGNATURE fields, and the project's own test suite comments confirm this guard is absent from the V1 path used here. In a sequential-signing document, an assistant recipient can therefore forge another signer's signature field. |
| The wp-downloadmanager WordPress plugin, in version 1.68.11 (also affecting the 6.9.4 release line), allows an admin-privileged user (current_user_can('manage_downloads')) to upload arbitrary files via download-add.php with no extension or MIME-type validation of any kind - no wp_check_filetype_and_ext(), no validate_file(), and no extension blocklist exist anywhere in the upload handler. The destination path is additionally built by concatenating the raw, unsanitized $_POST['file_upload_to'] value with no traversal check (no ../ filtering, no basename()/realpath() applied). Since the base download path is required to live under WP_CONTENT_DIR (a web-accessible location), an uploaded PHP file lands in a web-servable path and can be directly executed, resulting in remote code execution. The plugin's own later changelog confirms these protections were absent in this version: v1.69 added file-type validation via wp_check_filetype_and_ext(), and v1.69.1 added directory-traversal protection - neither existed in 1.68.11. |
| In nr modem, there is a possible improper input validation. This could lead to remote denial of service with System execution privileges needed. |
| In modem, there is a possible improper input validation. This could lead to remote denial of service with no additional execution privileges needed |
| In modem, there is a possible improper input validation. This could lead to remote denial of service with no additional execution privileges needed |
| In modem, there is a possible improper input validation. This could lead to remote denial of service with no additional execution privileges needed |
| In modem, there is a possible improper input validation. This could lead to remote denial of service with no additional execution privileges needed |
