| CVE |
Vendors |
Products |
Updated |
CVSS v3.1 |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net: usb: catc: enable basic endpoint checking
catc_probe() fills three URBs with hardcoded endpoint pipes without
verifying the endpoint descriptors:
- usb_sndbulkpipe(usbdev, 1) and usb_rcvbulkpipe(usbdev, 1) for TX/RX
- usb_rcvintpipe(usbdev, 2) for interrupt status
A malformed USB device can present these endpoints with transfer types
that differ from what the driver assumes.
Add a catc_usb_ep enum for endpoint numbers, replacing magic constants
throughout. Add usb_check_bulk_endpoints() and usb_check_int_endpoints()
calls after usb_set_interface() to verify endpoint types before use,
rejecting devices with mismatched descriptors at probe time.
Similar to
- commit 90b7f2961798 ("net: usb: rtl8150: enable basic endpoint checking")
which fixed the issue in rtl8150. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
fscrypt: Avoid dynamic allocation in fscrypt_get_devices()
When a blk_crypto_key starts being used or is evicted, fs/crypto/ calls
fscrypt_get_devices() to get the filesystem's list of block devices,
then iterates over them and calls blk_crypto_config_supported(),
blk_crypto_start_using_key(), or blk_crypto_evict_key() on each one.
Currently, the block device pointers are placed in a dynamically
allocated array. This dynamic allocation is problematic because:
- It can fail, especially at the fscrypt_destroy_inline_crypt_key() call
site when it's invoked for inode eviction under direct reclaim.
- fscrypt_destroy_inline_crypt_key() doesn't handle the failure. It
just zeroizes and frees the blk_crypto_key without calling
blk_crypto_evict_key(). That causes a use-after-free.
For now, let's fix this in the straightforward and easily-backportable
way by switching to an on-stack array. Currently the fscrypt
multi-device functionality is used only by f2fs, which has a hardcoded
limit of 8 block devices. An on-stack array works fine for that.
(Of course, this solution won't scale up to large number of block
devices. For that we'd need a different solution, like moving the block
device iteration into the filesystem. Or in the case of btrfs, which
will only support blk-crypto-fallback, we should make it just call
blk-crypto-fallback directly, so the block devices won't be needed.) |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ALSA: timer: don't re-enter an instance callback that is still running
The userspace-driven timer (utimer) TRIGGER ioctl calls
snd_timer_interrupt() directly with no serialization, so two threads
triggering the same utimer can run snd_timer_interrupt() on one
snd_timer concurrently.
snd_timer_process_callbacks() drops timer->lock around each instance
callback and marks the in-flight callback with the single
SNDRV_TIMER_IFLG_CALLBACK bit; snd_timer_close_locked() waits on that
bit to drain an in-flight callback before freeing the instance. The bit
cannot represent two concurrent callbacks: when a second interrupt
re-queues an instance whose callback is still running, both run at once,
the first to finish clears the bit, and the close-path drain then frees
the instance (and its callback_data) while the other callback is still
live - a use-after-free reachable by any user able to open
/dev/snd/timer, both via a user timer instance and via a sequencer queue
timer bound to the utimer.
snd_timer_interrupt() sets IFLG_CALLBACK before dropping timer->lock, so
a concurrent interrupt already observes it under the lock. Skip
re-queuing an instance (and its slaves) to the ack/sack list while its
callback is in flight; the accumulated pticks are delivered on the next
tick, so no event is lost. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ALSA: seq: close a re-opened queue timer in the destructor
queue_delete() closes the queue timer, then frees it. snd_seq_timer_close()
clears q->timer->timeri. snd_use_lock_sync() then drains borrowers, and
snd_seq_timer_delete() frees q->timer.
A borrower can re-open the timer inside that window. A SET_QUEUE_CLIENT
that took a queueptr() use_lock reference before the queue was unlinked
runs snd_seq_timer_open() after the close. Open refuses re-open only while
timeri is set, and the close just cleared it, so it re-opens timeri.
snd_seq_timer_delete() does not close that instance. Its snd_seq_timer_stop()
is a no-op, because running was cleared first. So it frees q->timer with the
instance still live. The queue is freed next.
The instance stays on the global timer with callback_data pointing at the
freed queue. A non-owner START on the unlocked queue arms it. The next tick
derefs the freed queue in snd_seq_timer_interrupt().
Reachable by an unprivileged user with access to /dev/snd/seq. No CAP and
no queue ownership required.
Close any lingering instance in the destructor. There, ->timeri can no
longer change: the queue is unlinked and all use_lock borrowers have
drained, so no snd_seq_queue_use() can re-open it. Close it before clearing
q->timer. snd_timer_close() waits for any in-flight snd_seq_timer_interrupt()
to finish, and that callback still reads q->timer (via snd_seq_check_queue()),
so q->timer must stay valid until it drains. |
| streama contains an insecure direct object reference vulnerability in ViewingStatusController that allows authenticated users to read and delete other users' viewing status records. Attackers can enumerate all users' watch progress, delete arbitrary viewing history, and manipulate other users' Continue Watching dashboards by supplying arbitrary primary keys without ownership verification. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
openvswitch: fix GSO userspace truncation underflow
OVS_ACTION_ATTR_TRUNC currently stores a delta from the original skb
length in OVS_CB(skb)->cutlen. When a later userspace action segments a
GSO skb, queue_gso_packets() reuses that delta for each smaller segment.
A segment can then reach queue_userspace_packet() with cutlen greater
than skb->len, underflowing the length passed to skb_zerocopy().
Store the maximum preserved length instead and bound each consumer
against the current skb length. Use U32_MAX as the no-truncation
sentinel so the value remains valid if skb geometry changes before a
consumer handles it. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
mctp: serial: handle zero-length frames to prevent rx buffer overflow
The MCTP serial receive state machine reads a frame length byte in
mctp_serial_push_header() case 2 and validates it upper-bound-only:
if (c > MCTP_SERIAL_FRAME_MTU) {
dev->rxstate = STATE_ERR;
} else {
dev->rxlen = c;
dev->rxpos = 0;
dev->rxstate = STATE_DATA;
...
}
A length of zero passes this check, so rxlen is set to 0 and the state
machine advances to STATE_DATA. In mctp_serial_push() STATE_DATA, the
incoming byte is stored and rxpos incremented before the terminator is
dev->rxbuf[dev->rxpos] = c;
dev->rxpos++;
dev->rxstate = STATE_DATA;
if (dev->rxpos == dev->rxlen) {
dev->rxpos = 0;
dev->rxstate = STATE_TRAILER;
}
With rxlen == 0 the "rxpos == rxlen" terminator can never fire (rxpos is
already 1 on the first data byte), so subsequent bytes are written past
the end of the fixed 74-byte rxbuf, which is the last member of the
netdev private area. Every following data byte is an attacker-controlled
1-byte out-of-bounds heap write, and the overflow continues until a
frame (0x7e) or escape byte resets the parser -- effectively unbounded.
Reaching this requires CAP_NET_ADMIN to attach the N_MCTP line
discipline and bring the resulting mctpserialN netdev up, after which
the bytes arrive via the tty receive path.
Route a zero-length frame straight to STATE_TRAILER instead of
STATE_DATA. The trailer/framing bytes are still consumed, and the frame
resolves to a zero-length skb that the MCTP core rejects; the parser
never enters STATE_DATA with rxlen == 0, so the out-of-bounds write can
no longer occur.
KASAN, on a frame of 0x7e 0x01 0x00 followed by data bytes (before this
change):
UBSAN: array-index-out-of-bounds in drivers/net/mctp/mctp-serial.c:370
index 74 is out of range for type 'u8 [74]'
BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in mctp_serial_tty_receive_buf
Write of size 1 at addr ... by task kworker/u16:0
mctp_serial_tty_receive_buf
tty_ldisc_receive_buf
flush_to_ldisc
Allocated by task 152:
alloc_netdev_mqs
mctp_serial_open
v2: route zero-length frames to STATE_TRAILER instead of STATE_ERR so
the trailer/framing bytes are still consumed (Jeremy Kerr).
Found by 0sec automated security-research tooling (https://0sec.ai). |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
mac802154: llsec: reject frames shorter than the authentication tag
llsec_do_decrypt_auth() computes the associated-data length for the
AEAD request as
assoclen += datalen - authlen;
where datalen is the number of bytes after the MAC header and authlen
(4, 8 or 16) is the length of the authentication tag. Nothing verifies
that the frame actually carries at least authlen payload bytes. A
secured frame whose payload is shorter than the tag makes
datalen - authlen negative; assoclen is then passed to
aead_request_set_ad() as an unsigned value close to 4 GiB, so
crypto_aead_decrypt() walks far off the end of the scatterlist that
only spans the real frame.
The frame is fully attacker-controlled and reaches this path from any
IEEE 802.15.4 peer in radio range. Reject frames whose payload is
shorter than the authentication tag before the subtraction.
Dynamically reproduced on a KASAN kernel as a general-protection-fault
in the AEAD scatterwalk, and the fix confirmed. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
rbd: Reset positive result codes to zero in object map update path
In a reply message to an RBD request, a positive result code indicates
a data payload, which is not allowed for writes. While
rbd_osd_req_callback() already resets a positive result code for writes
to zero, rbd_object_map_callback() does not. This allows a corrupted
reply to an object map update to trigger the rbd_assert(*result < 0) in
__rbd_obj_handle_request(). This happens, because
rbd_object_map_callback() calls rbd_obj_handle_request() ->
__rbd_obj_handle_request() and passes this positive result code. From
__rbd_obj_handle_request(), rbd_obj_advance_write() is called, which
leaves the positive result code unchanged and returns true. Therefore,
the if(done && *result) branch is executed in __rbd_obj_handle_request()
and the assertion triggers.
This patch fixes the issue by adjusting the logic in the
rbd_object_map_callback() path. A positive result code for an object map
update is now reset to zero (similar to rbd_osd_req_callback()), and the
message is subsequently handled the same way as if the result code was
zero from the beginning. Additionally, a WARN_ON_ONCE() is added for
this case. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
drm/amdgpu: fix lifetime issue of amdgpu_vm_get_task_info_pasid()
The vm pointer returned from amdgpu_vm_get_vm_from_pasid() is only
valid while the lock is still being held. Once xa_unlock_irqrestore is
called and returned, the pointer is no longer under lock and is subject
to modification. Since, the caller still dereferences vm->task_info in
amdgpu_vm_get_task_info_vm() after the lock is removed, this causes a
use after unlock problem.
Remove the lifetime issue present in amdgpu_vm_get_task_info_pasid()
through removing the amdgpu_vm_get_vm_from_pasid() function from
amdgpu_vm.c and making the relevant code inline to hold the lock while
it is still in use.
(cherry picked from commit 9d01579f3f868b333acc901815972685989092c7) |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
wifi: ath6kl: fix OOB read from firmware IE lengths in connect event
The firmware-controlled beacon_ie_len, assoc_req_len, and assoc_resp_len
fields in ath6kl_wmi_connect_event_rx() are not validated against the
buffer length. Their sum (up to 765) can exceed the actual WMI event
data, causing out-of-bounds reads during IE parsing and state corruption
of wmi->is_wmm_enabled.
Add a check that the total IE length fits within the buffer. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
wifi: mac80211: defer link RX stats percpu free to RCU
sta_remove_link() frees a removed MLO link's RX stats percpu buffer right
away, but defers only the link container to RCU:
sta_info_free_link(&alloc->info);
kfree_rcu(alloc, rcu_head);
The RX fast path reads link_sta under rcu_read_lock and writes the percpu
stats. A reader that resolved link_sta before the removal keeps the
pointer. The container stays alive from the kfree_rcu, so the read still
works. But the percpu block it points to is already freed. This needs
uses_rss. That is when pcpu_rx_stats exists.
The full STA teardown frees the deflink stats only after
synchronize_net(). The link removal path had no such barrier. The race is
hard to win in practice, but the free should still wait for RCU.
Free the link together with its data from a single RCU callback, so the
percpu block is reclaimed only after readers drain. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
libceph: refresh auth->authorizer_buf{,_len} after authorizer update
ceph_x_create_authorizer() caches au->buf->vec.iov_base and
au->buf->vec.iov_len in struct ceph_auth_handshake. These
cached values are then used by the messenger connect code when
sending the authorizer.
ceph_x_update_authorizer() can rebuild the authorizer when a newer
service ticket is available. If the rebuilt authorizer no longer
fits in the existing buffer, ceph_x_build_authorizer() drops its
reference to au->buf and allocates a new one. If this is the final
reference, ceph_buffer_put() frees the old ceph_buffer and its
vec.iov_base, but auth->authorizer_buf still points at that freed
memory.
A subsequent msgr1 reconnect can therefore queue the stale pointer
and trigger a KASAN slab-use-after-free in _copy_from_iter() while
tcp_sendmsg() copies the authorizer.
Refresh auth->authorizer_buf and auth->authorizer_buf_len after a
successful authorizer rebuild so the messenger sends the current
buffer. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
sctp: close UDP tunnel sockets during netns teardown
proc_sctp_do_udp_port() starts per-net SCTP UDP tunneling sockets when
net.sctp.udp_port is set, and stops/restarts them when the sysctl value
changes. The netns exit path does not stop these sockets, so a namespace
can be torn down while its SCTP UDP tunnel sockets are still installed.
Close the UDP tunnel sockets from sctp_ctrlsock_exit() after unregistering
the per-net sysctl table. This prevents new sysctl writes from racing in
while the sockets are being released, and closes the sockets before the
control socket is destroyed. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
s390/checksum: Fix csum_partial() without vector facility
Currently csum_partial() calls csum_copy() with copy=false and dst=NULL.
On machines without the vector facility, csum_copy() falls back to
cksm(dst, ...), causing the checksum to be calculated from address zero
instead of the source buffer.
The VX implementation already checksums data loaded from src. Make the
fallback do the same by passing src to cksm(). |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
Bluetooth: hci_sync: extend conn_hash lookup critical sections
Using RCU-protected pointers outside the critical sections without
refcount is incorrect and may result to UAF.
Extend critical section to cover both hci_conn_hash lookup and use of
the returned conn.
Add surrounding rcu_read_lock() also when return value is not used, in
preparation for RCU lockdep requirement to hci_lookup_le_connect().
This avoids concurrent deletion of the conn before we are done
dereferencing it.
Also, make sure to hold hdev->lock when accessing hdev->accept_list. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
wifi: cfg80211: bound element ID read when checking non-inheritance
cfg80211_is_element_inherited() reads the first data octet of the
candidate element (id = elem->data[0]) to look it up in an extension
non-inheritance list. It does so after testing elem->id, but without
verifying that the element actually has a data octet. A zero-length
extension element (WLAN_EID_EXTENSION with length 0) therefore makes it
read one octet past the end of the element.
_ieee802_11_parse_elems_full() runs this check for every element of a
frame once a non-inheritance context exists -- e.g. while parsing a
per-STA profile of a Multi-Link element in a (re)association response,
or a non-transmitted BSS profile -- so a crafted frame from an AP can
trigger a one-octet slab-out-of-bounds read during element parsing:
BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in cfg80211_is_element_inherited
Read of size 1 ... in net/wireless/scan.c
Return early (treat the element as inherited) when an extension element
carries no data, mirroring the existing handling of empty ID lists.
The bug was found by fuzzing ieee802_11_parse_elems_full() under KASAN. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
s390/zcrypt: Validate length for CCA ECC private key requests
cca_ecc2protkey() derives the copy length for the CPRB parameter
block directly from the length field in the key token. Reject the
request early if the token length exceeds the available space in the
parameter block. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
s390/zcrypt: Fix buffer over-read in cca_cipher2protkey
Add validation of both the actual key buffer size and token length
fields in all the cca_check_sec*token() functions. Additionally check
in cca_gencipherkey() for possible underflow with returned key size.
The CCA token structures contain user-controlled len fields that
were used in operations without proper validation against both the
actual buffer size and minimum token structure size. An attacker
could set this field larger than the actual buffer size, leading to
reading beyond buffer boundaries. This may result in a kernel crash or
exposure of memory via sending this as part of a request down to the
crypto card. Also an attacker could have used a very small len value
and thus enforce a buffer under-run which may produce similar effects
as a over-read.
So now a key must
- key buf length must be at least sizeof the token struct
- the key len field inside the token must fit into the range of
sizeof key token struct ... key buf length |
| A vulnerability was identified in Baicells EG3661M BaiCE_BQ6_2.0.5.3_NA. This impacts an unknown function of the file /cgi-bin/luci of the component LuCI Web Interface. Such manipulation of the argument MaxHops/Timeout/Size leads to os command injection. The attack may be launched remotely. The exploit is publicly available and might be used. The vendor was contacted early about this disclosure but did not respond in any way. |
