| CVE |
Vendors |
Products |
Updated |
CVSS v3.1 |
| pam_usb provides hardware authentication for Linux using ordinary removable media. In versions prior to 0.9.2, when updating a one-time pad file, a temporary file is created using open() without the O_EXCL flag. Without O_EXCL, the create operation is not atomic: two concurrent processes racing to update the same pad may both succeed in opening the file, with the second write silently overwriting the first. The one-time pad is the core replay-prevention mechanism of pam_usb. A successful race could result in the stored pad value diverging from what either process expected, potentially causing authentication failures or, in a precisely timed attack, creating a window for pad reuse. This issue has been fixed in version 0.9.2. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
netfilter: ctnetlink: ensure safe access to master conntrack
Holding reference on the expectation is not sufficient, the master
conntrack object can just go away, making exp->master invalid.
To access exp->master safely:
- Grab the nf_conntrack_expect_lock, this gets serialized with
clean_from_lists() which also holds this lock when the master
conntrack goes away.
- Hold reference on master conntrack via nf_conntrack_find_get().
Not so easy since the master tuple to look up for the master conntrack
is not available in the existing problematic paths.
This patch goes for extending the nf_conntrack_expect_lock section
to address this issue for simplicity, in the cases that are described
below this is just slightly extending the lock section.
The add expectation command already holds a reference to the master
conntrack from ctnetlink_create_expect().
However, the delete expectation command needs to grab the spinlock
before looking up for the expectation. Expand the existing spinlock
section to address this to cover the expectation lookup. Note that,
the nf_ct_expect_iterate_net() calls already grabs the spinlock while
iterating over the expectation table, which is correct.
The get expectation command needs to grab the spinlock to ensure master
conntrack does not go away. This also expands the existing spinlock
section to cover the expectation lookup too. I needed to move the
netlink skb allocation out of the spinlock to keep it GFP_KERNEL.
For the expectation events, the IPEXP_DESTROY event is already delivered
under the spinlock, just move the delivery of IPEXP_NEW under the
spinlock too because the master conntrack event cache is reached through
exp->master.
While at it, add lockdep notations to help identify what codepaths need
to grab the spinlock. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net/packet: fix TOCTOU race on mmap'd vnet_hdr in tpacket_snd()
In tpacket_snd(), when PACKET_VNET_HDR is enabled, vnet_hdr points
directly into the mmap'd TX ring buffer shared with userspace. The
kernel validates the header via __packet_snd_vnet_parse() but then
re-reads all fields later in virtio_net_hdr_to_skb(). A concurrent
userspace thread can modify the vnet_hdr fields between validation
and use, bypassing all safety checks.
The non-TPACKET path (packet_snd()) already correctly copies vnet_hdr
to a stack-local variable. All other vnet_hdr consumers in the kernel
(tun.c, tap.c, virtio_net.c) also use stack copies. The TPACKET TX
path is the only caller of virtio_net_hdr_to_skb() that reads directly
from user-controlled shared memory.
Fix this by copying vnet_hdr from the mmap'd ring buffer to a
stack-local variable before validation and use, consistent with the
approach used in packet_snd() and all other callers. |
| Race in Updater in Google Chrome on Mac prior to 149.0.7827.155 allowed a remote attacker who had compromised the renderer process to potentially perform a sandbox escape via a crafted HTML page. (Chromium security severity: High) |
| In Nfc::eventCallback() of Nfc.h, there is a possible use after free due to a race condition. This could lead to local escalation of privilege with no additional execution privileges needed. User interaction is not needed for exploitation. |
| Open WebUI is a self-hosted artificial intelligence platform designed to operate entirely offline. Prior to 0.9.0, the LDAP and OAuth authentication flows use a TOCTOU (Time-of-Check-Time-of-Use) pattern for first-user admin role assignment. The regular signup handler (signup_handler in auths.py, line 663) was explicitly patched to prevent this race with the comment "Insert with default role first to avoid TOCTOU race", but the LDAP and OAuth code paths were never updated with the same fix. This vulnerability is fixed in 0.9.0. |
| HVM guest I/O port accesses are subject to either emulation or at least
translation. Translations are managed by the device model (via
XEN_DOMCTL_ioport_mapping), and hence the linked list used may changed
at any time. Traversal of those lists (while handling guest I/O port
accesses) therefore needs synchronizing with updates, which was missing
so far. |
| In createSessionInternal of PackageInstallerService.java, there is a possible method to remove a DPC app from a managed device without DO consent due to desync from persistence. This could lead to local escalation of privilege if a user can install a malicious app with no additional execution privileges needed. User interaction is needed for exploitation. |
| Race in Safe Browsing in Google Chrome on Mac prior to 149.0.7827.155 allowed a remote attacker who had compromised the renderer process to potentially perform a sandbox escape via a crafted HTML page. (Chromium security severity: High) |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
mm/pagewalk: fix race between concurrent split and refault
The splitting of a PUD entry in walk_pud_range() can race with a
concurrent thread refaulting the PUD leaf entry causing it to try walking
a PMD range that has disappeared.
An example and reproduction of this is to try reading numa_maps of a
process while VFIO-PCI is setting up DMA (specifically the
vfio_pin_pages_remote call) on a large BAR for that process.
This will trigger a kernel BUG:
vfio-pci 0000:03:00.0: enabling device (0000 -> 0002)
BUG: unable to handle page fault for address: ffffa23980000000
PGD 0 P4D 0
Oops: Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP NOPTI
...
RIP: 0010:walk_pgd_range+0x3b5/0x7a0
Code: 8d 43 ff 48 89 44 24 28 4d 89 ce 4d 8d a7 00 00 20 00 48 8b 4c 24
28 49 81 e4 00 00 e0 ff 49 8d 44 24 ff 48 39 c8 4c 0f 43 e3 <49> f7 06
9f ff ff ff 75 3b 48 8b 44 24 20 48 8b 40 28 48 85 c0 74
RSP: 0018:ffffac23e1ecf808 EFLAGS: 00010287
RAX: 00007f44c01fffff RBX: 00007f4500000000 RCX: 00007f44ffffffff
RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 000ffffffffff000 RDI: ffffffff93378fe0
RBP: ffffac23e1ecf918 R08: 0000000000000004 R09: ffffa23980000000
R10: 0000000000000020 R11: 0000000000000004 R12: 00007f44c0200000
R13: 00007f44c0000000 R14: ffffa23980000000 R15: 00007f44c0000000
FS: 00007fe884739580(0000) GS:ffff9b7d7a9c0000(0000)
knlGS:0000000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: ffffa23980000000 CR3: 000000c0650e2005 CR4: 0000000000770ef0
PKRU: 55555554
Call Trace:
<TASK>
__walk_page_range+0x195/0x1b0
walk_page_vma+0x62/0xc0
show_numa_map+0x12b/0x3b0
seq_read_iter+0x297/0x440
seq_read+0x11d/0x140
vfs_read+0xc2/0x340
ksys_read+0x5f/0xe0
do_syscall_64+0x68/0x130
? get_page_from_freelist+0x5c2/0x17e0
? mas_store_prealloc+0x17e/0x360
? vma_set_page_prot+0x4c/0xa0
? __alloc_pages_noprof+0x14e/0x2d0
? __mod_memcg_lruvec_state+0x8d/0x140
? __lruvec_stat_mod_folio+0x76/0xb0
? __folio_mod_stat+0x26/0x80
? do_anonymous_page+0x705/0x900
? __handle_mm_fault+0xa8d/0x1000
? __count_memcg_events+0x53/0xf0
? handle_mm_fault+0xa5/0x360
? do_user_addr_fault+0x342/0x640
? arch_exit_to_user_mode_prepare.constprop.0+0x16/0xa0
? irqentry_exit_to_user_mode+0x24/0x100
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e
RIP: 0033:0x7fe88464f47e
Code: c0 e9 b6 fe ff ff 50 48 8d 3d be 07 0b 00 e8 69 01 02 00 66 0f 1f
84 00 00 00 00 00 64 8b 04 25 18 00 00 00 85 c0 75 14 0f 05 <48> 3d 00
f0 ff ff 77 5a c3 66 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 48 83 ec 28
RSP: 002b:00007ffe6cd9a9b8 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000000
RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000020000 RCX: 00007fe88464f47e
RDX: 0000000000020000 RSI: 00007fe884543000 RDI: 0000000000000003
RBP: 00007fe884543000 R08: 00007fe884542010 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: fffffffffffffbc5 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000000000
R13: 0000000000000003 R14: 0000000000020000 R15: 0000000000020000
</TASK>
Fix this by validating the PUD entry in walk_pmd_range() using a stable
snapshot (pudp_get()). If the PUD is not present or is a leaf, retry the
walk via ACTION_AGAIN instead of descending further. This mirrors the
retry logic in walk_pte_range(), which lets walk_pmd_range() retry if the
PTE is not being got by pte_offset_map_lock(). |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
mm/damon/core: fix damon_call() vs kdamond_fn() exit race
Patch series "mm/damon/core: fix damon_call()/damos_walk() vs kdmond exit
race".
damon_call() and damos_walk() can leak memory and/or deadlock when they
race with kdamond terminations. Fix those.
This patch (of 2);
When kdamond_fn() main loop is finished, the function cancels all
remaining damon_call() requests and unset the damon_ctx->kdamond so that
API callers and API functions themselves can know the context is
terminated. damon_call() adds the caller's request to the queue first.
After that, it shows if the kdamond of the damon_ctx is still running
(damon_ctx->kdamond is set). Only if the kdamond is running, damon_call()
starts waiting for the kdamond's handling of the newly added request.
The damon_call() requests registration and damon_ctx->kdamond unset are
protected by different mutexes, though. Hence, damon_call() could race
with damon_ctx->kdamond unset, and result in deadlocks.
For example, let's suppose kdamond successfully finished the damon_call()
requests cancelling. Right after that, damon_call() is called for the
context. It registers the new request, and shows the context is still
running, because damon_ctx->kdamond unset is not yet done. Hence the
damon_call() caller starts waiting for the handling of the request.
However, the kdamond is already on the termination steps, so it never
handles the new request. As a result, the damon_call() caller threads
infinitely waits.
Fix this by introducing another damon_ctx field, namely
call_controls_obsolete. It is protected by the
damon_ctx->call_controls_lock, which protects damon_call() requests
registration. Initialize (unset) it in kdamond_fn() before letting
damon_start() returns and set it just before the cancelling of remaining
damon_call() requests is executed. damon_call() reads the obsolete field
under the lock and avoids adding a new request.
After this change, only requests that are guaranteed to be handled or
cancelled are registered. Hence the after-registration DAMON context
termination check is no longer needed. Remove it together.
Note that the deadlock will not happen when damon_call() is called for
repeat mode request. In tis case, damon_call() returns instead of waiting
for the handling when the request registration succeeds and it shows the
kdamond is running. However, if the request also has dealloc_on_cancel,
the request memory would be leaked.
The issue is found by sashiko [1]. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
mm/damon/core: fix damos_walk() vs kdamond_fn() exit race
When kdamond_fn() main loop is finished, the function cancels remaining
damos_walk() request and unset the damon_ctx->kdamond so that API callers
and API functions themselves can show the context is terminated.
damos_walk() adds the caller's request to the queue first. After that, it
shows if the kdamond of the damon_ctx is still running (damon_ctx->kdamond
is set). Only if the kdamond is running, damos_walk() starts waiting for
the kdamond's handling of the newly added request.
The damos_walk() requests registration and damon_ctx->kdamond unset are
protected by different mutexes, though. Hence, damos_walk() could race
with damon_ctx->kdamond unset, and result in deadlocks.
For example, let's suppose kdamond successfully finished the damow_walk()
request cancelling. Right after that, damos_walk() is called for the
context. It registers the new request, and shows the context is still
running, because damon_ctx->kdamond unset is not yet done. Hence the
damos_walk() caller starts waiting for the handling of the request.
However, the kdamond is already on the termination steps, so it never
handles the new request. As a result, the damos_walk() caller thread
infinitely waits.
Fix this by introducing another damon_ctx field, namely
walk_control_obsolete. It is protected by the
damon_ctx->walk_control_lock, which protects damos_walk() request
registration. Initialize (unset) it in kdamond_fn() before letting
damon_start() returns and set it just before the cancelling of the
remaining damos_walk() request is executed. damos_walk() reads the
obsolete field under the lock and avoids adding a new request.
After this change, only requests that are guaranteed to be handled or
cancelled are registered. Hence the after-registration DAMON context
termination check is no longer needed. Remove it together.
The issue is found by sashiko [1]. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
mm: fix deferred split queue races during migration
migrate_folio_move() records the deferred split queue state from src and
replays it on dst. Replaying it after remove_migration_ptes(src, dst, 0)
makes dst visible before it is requeued, so a concurrent rmap-removal path
can mark dst partially mapped and trip the WARN in deferred_split_folio().
Move the requeue before remove_migration_ptes() so dst is back on the
deferred split queue before it becomes visible again.
Because migration still holds dst locked at that point, teach
deferred_split_scan() to requeue a folio when folio_trylock() fails.
Otherwise a fully mapped underused folio can be dequeued by the shrinker
and silently lost from split_queue.
[[email protected]: move the comment] |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
media: amphion: Fix race between m2m job_abort and device_run
Fix kernel panic caused by race condition where v4l2_m2m_ctx_release()
frees m2m_ctx while v4l2_m2m_try_run() is about to call device_run
with the same context.
Race sequence:
v4l2_m2m_try_run(): v4l2_m2m_ctx_release():
lock/unlock v4l2_m2m_cancel_job()
job_abort()
v4l2_m2m_job_finish()
kfree(m2m_ctx) <- frees ctx
device_run() <- use-after-free crash at 0x538
Crash trace:
Unable to handle kernel read from unreadable memory at virtual address
0000000000000538
v4l2_m2m_try_run+0x78/0x138
v4l2_m2m_device_run_work+0x14/0x20
The amphion vpu driver does not rely on the m2m framework's device_run
callback to perform encode/decode operations.
Fix the race by preventing m2m framework job scheduling entirely:
- Add job_ready callback returning 0 (no jobs ready for m2m framework)
- Remove job_abort callback to avoid the race condition |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
hwrng: core - use RCU and work_struct to fix race condition
Currently, hwrng_fill is not cleared until the hwrng_fillfn() thread
exits. Since hwrng_unregister() reads hwrng_fill outside the rng_mutex
lock, a concurrent hwrng_unregister() may call kthread_stop() again on
the same task.
Additionally, if hwrng_unregister() is called immediately after
hwrng_register(), the stopped thread may have never been executed. Thus,
hwrng_fill remains dirty even after hwrng_unregister() returns. In this
case, subsequent calls to hwrng_register() will fail to start new
threads, and hwrng_unregister() will call kthread_stop() on the same
freed task. In both cases, a use-after-free occurs:
refcount_t: addition on 0; use-after-free.
WARNING: ... at lib/refcount.c:25 refcount_warn_saturate+0xec/0x1c0
Call Trace:
kthread_stop+0x181/0x360
hwrng_unregister+0x288/0x380
virtrng_remove+0xe3/0x200
This patch fixes the race by protecting the global hwrng_fill pointer
inside the rng_mutex lock, so that hwrng_fillfn() thread is stopped only
once, and calls to kthread_run() and kthread_stop() are serialized
with the lock held.
To avoid deadlock in hwrng_fillfn() while being stopped with the lock
held, we convert current_rng to RCU, so that get_current_rng() can read
current_rng without holding the lock. To remove the lock from put_rng(),
we also delay the actual cleanup into a work_struct.
Since get_current_rng() no longer returns ERR_PTR values, the IS_ERR()
checks are removed from its callers.
With hwrng_fill protected by the rng_mutex lock, hwrng_fillfn() can no
longer clear hwrng_fill itself. Therefore, if hwrng_fillfn() returns
directly after current_rng is dropped, kthread_stop() would be called on
a freed task_struct later. To fix this, hwrng_fillfn() calls schedule()
now to keep the task alive until being stopped. The kthread_stop() call
is also moved from hwrng_unregister() to drop_current_rng(), ensuring
kthread_stop() is called on all possible paths where current_rng becomes
NULL, so that the thread would not wait forever. |
| Race in Safe Browsing in Google Chrome on Mac prior to 149.0.7827.115 allowed a remote attacker who had compromised the renderer process to potentially perform a sandbox escape via a malicious file. (Chromium security severity: High) |
| Race in V8 in Google Chrome prior to 144.0.7559.99 allowed a remote attacker to potentially exploit type confusion via a crafted HTML page. (Chromium security severity: High) |
| A malicious application may cause unexpected changes in memory shared between processes. A memory corruption issue was addressed with improved state management. This issue is fixed in macOS Monterey 12.4. |
| Concurrent execution using shared resource with improper synchronization ('race condition') in Windows Telephony Service allows an authorized attacker to elevate privileges locally. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
mm: fix zswap writeback race condition
The zswap writeback mechanism can cause a race condition resulting in
memory corruption, where a swapped out page gets swapped in with data that
was written to a different page.
The race unfolds like this:
1. a page with data A and swap offset X is stored in zswap
2. page A is removed off the LRU by zpool driver for writeback in
zswap-shrink work, data for A is mapped by zpool driver
3. user space program faults and invalidates page entry A, offset X is
considered free
4. kswapd stores page B at offset X in zswap (zswap could also be
full, if so, page B would then be IOed to X, then skip step 5.)
5. entry A is replaced by B in tree->rbroot, this doesn't affect the
local reference held by zswap-shrink work
6. zswap-shrink work writes back A at X, and frees zswap entry A
7. swapin of slot X brings A in memory instead of B
The fix:
Once the swap page cache has been allocated (case ZSWAP_SWAPCACHE_NEW),
zswap-shrink work just checks that the local zswap_entry reference is
still the same as the one in the tree. If it's not the same it means that
it's either been invalidated or replaced, in both cases the writeback is
aborted because the local entry contains stale data.
Reproducer:
I originally found this by running `stress` overnight to validate my work
on the zswap writeback mechanism, it manifested after hours on my test
machine. The key to make it happen is having zswap writebacks, so
whatever setup pumps /sys/kernel/debug/zswap/written_back_pages should do
the trick.
In order to reproduce this faster on a vm, I setup a system with ~100M of
available memory and a 500M swap file, then running `stress --vm 1
--vm-bytes 300000000 --vm-stride 4000` makes it happen in matter of tens
of minutes. One can speed things up even more by swinging
/sys/module/zswap/parameters/max_pool_percent up and down between, say, 20
and 1; this makes it reproduce in tens of seconds. It's crucial to set
`--vm-stride` to something other than 4096 otherwise `stress` won't
realize that memory has been corrupted because all pages would have the
same data. |
