| CVE |
Vendors |
Products |
Updated |
CVSS v3.1 |
| NVIDIA TensorRT-LLM contains a vulnerability where an attacker could cause a write-what-where condition. A successful exploit of this vulnerability might lead to data tampering, denial of service, and information disclosure. |
| The urwid web display backend (urwid/display/web.py) generates web session identifiers (urwid_id) in Screen.start() by concatenating two random.randrange(10**9) calls that use Python's Mersenne Twister PRNG, which is not cryptographically secure. Each call consumes approximately 30 bits of PRNG state, and the Mersenne Twister internal state is approximately 19,937 bits, so an attacker who observes approximately 334 session IDs (for example via the X-Urwid-ID HTTP response header) can fully reconstruct the internal state and predict all past and future session IDs (Path B). The same identifier is also used as the filename of a FIFO created in the world-listable /tmp directory (for example /tmp/urwid375487765176907690.in), so any local user on the host can list /tmp to enumerate active session tokens directly (Path A). With a valid session ID, an attacker can read the victim's terminal screen via the polling endpoint, inject keystrokes into the victim's session (yielding OS-level code execution with the session owner's privileges if the session runs a shell), and inject exit sequences or flood the FIFO to terminate or crash the session. A prior Bandit S311 warning on this usage was suppressed with # noqa: S311 rather than fixed |
| Buffer Overflow vulnerability in libjxl v.0.11.2 and before allows a local attacker to obtain sensitive information via the DecodeImageAPNG function |
| A vulnerability was found in Shibby Tomato 1.28. This vulnerability affects the function sub_42537C of the component Scheduler Name Handler. The manipulation of the argument a1 results in stack-based buffer overflow. It is possible to launch the attack remotely. This project is superseded by FreshTomato. |
| A heap overflow in the evalcommand() function (shell/ash.c) of Busybox v1.38.0 allows attackers to cause a Denial of Service (DoS) via supplying a crafted input. |
| Windows Routing and Remote Access Service (RRAS) Remote Code Execution Vulnerability |
| Windows Routing and Remote Access Service (RRAS) Remote Code Execution Vulnerability |
| Win32k Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability |
| Windows OLE Remote Code Execution Vulnerability |
| Windows Link Layer Topology Discovery Protocol Remote Code Execution Vulnerability |
| Windows Link Layer Topology Discovery Protocol Remote Code Execution Vulnerability |
| A stack overflow in the evaluate() function (editors/awk.c) of BusyBox commit 371fe9 allows attackers to cause a Denial of Service (DoS) via supplying a crafted AWK script. |
| Wire provides gRPC and protocol buffers for Android, Kotlin, Swift, and Java. Prior to 6.3.0 and 7.0.0-alpha03, ByteArrayProtoReader32.skipGroup() and ProtoReader.skipGroup() in wire-runtime do not validate that a LENGTH_DELIMITED field length is non-negative before skip(), allowing a crafted protobuf varint encoding -128 as a signed Int to make skip(-128) move the internal position negative and make the next readByte() throw ArrayIndexOutOfBoundsException instead of the documented IOException or ProtocolException, which can crash services using ProtoAdapter.decode(byte[]) on untrusted payloads. This issue is fixed in versions 6.3.0 and 7.0.0-alpha03. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ALSA: asihpi: Fix potential OOB array access at reading cache
find_control() to retrieve a cached info accesses the array with the
given index blindly, which may lead to an OOB array access.
Add a sanity check for avoiding it. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net: devmem: reject dma-buf bind with non-page-aligned size or SG length
net_devmem_bind_dmabuf() trusts dmabuf->size and sg_dma_len() to be
PAGE_SIZE multiples without checking:
- tx_vec is sized dmabuf->size / PAGE_SIZE, and
net_devmem_get_niov_at() only bounds-checks virt_addr < dmabuf->size
before indexing tx_vec[virt_addr / PAGE_SIZE]. With size =
N*PAGE_SIZE + r (1 <= r < PAGE_SIZE), sendmsg() at iov_base =
N*PAGE_SIZE passes the bound check and reads tx_vec[N] -- one past.
- owner->area.num_niovs = len / PAGE_SIZE while gen_pool_add_owner()
covers the full byte len, so a non-page-multiple non-final sg
desyncs num_niovs from the gen_pool region for every later sg, on
both RX and TX.
dma-buf does not require page-aligned sizes, so the bind path has to
enforce what its own indexing assumes. Reject both with -EINVAL.
The size check is TX-only (only tx_vec is sized off dmabuf->size); the
SG-length check covers both directions. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
drm/amd/display: Validate GPIO pin LUT table size before iterating
[Why&How]
The GPIO pin table parsers in get_gpio_i2c_info() and
bios_parser_get_gpio_pin_info() derive an element count from the VBIOS
table_header.structuresize field, then iterate over gpio_pin[] entries.
However, GET_IMAGE() only validates that the table header itself fits
within the BIOS image. If the VBIOS reports a structuresize larger than
the actual mapped data, the loop reads past the end of the BIOS image,
causing an out-of-bounds read.
Fix this by calling bios_get_image() to validate that the full claimed
structuresize is accessible within the BIOS image before entering the
loop in both functions.
(cherry picked from commit ba5e95b43b773ae1bf1f66ee6b31eb774e65afe3) |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
hwmon: (pmbus/adm1266) cap PDIO scan in get_multiple at ADM1266_PDIO_NR
adm1266_gpio_get_multiple() iterates the PDIO portion of the
caller-supplied mask using
for_each_set_bit_from(gpio_nr, mask,
ADM1266_GPIO_NR + ADM1266_PDIO_STATUS) {
...
}
where ADM1266_PDIO_STATUS is the PMBus command code (0xE9, i.e. 233),
not the number of PDIO pins. The intended upper bound is
ADM1266_GPIO_NR + ADM1266_PDIO_NR = 25.
gpiolib hands in a mask sized for gc.ngpio (= 25 bits on this chip),
so the iteration walks find_next_bit() up to 242, reading up to 217
extra bits (a handful of unsigned-long words: four on 64-bit, seven
on 32-bit) of whatever lives past the end of the mask in the
caller's stack. Any incidental set bit in that range then drives a
set_bit(gpio_nr, bits) call that writes past the end of the
caller-supplied bits array too -- both out-of-bounds.
Substitute ADM1266_PDIO_NR for the constant so the scan stops at the
last real PDIO bit. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
vfio/pci: Check BAR resources before exporting a DMABUF
A DMABUF exports access to BAR resources and, although they are
requested at startup time, we need to ensure they really were reserved
before exporting. Otherwise, it's possible to access unreserved
resources through the export.
Add a check to the DMABUF-creation path. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ASoC: codecs: fs210x: fix possible buffer overflow
In fs210x_effect_scene_info(), a string was copied like this:
strscpy(DST, SRC, strlen(SRC) + 1);
A buffer overflow would happen if strlen(SRC) >= sizeof(DST).
Actually, strscpy() must be used this way:
strscpy(DST, SRC, sizeof(DST));
strscpy(DST, SRC); // defaults to sizeof(DST) |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
drm/amdgpu/vcn: set no_user_fence for VCN v2.5 enc/dec rings
VCN encoder and decoder rings do not support 64-bit user fence writes,
reject CS submissions with user fences.
(cherry picked from commit efc9dd5590894109bce9a0bfe1fa5592dd6b20b1) |
