| CVE |
Vendors |
Products |
Updated |
CVSS v3.1 |
| OpenProject is open-source, web-based project management software. Prior to , the official openproject/openproject Docker image ships ENV SECRET_KEY_BASE=OVERWRITE_ME as the default Rails master key. Combined with cookies_serializer = :marshal, this gives any logged-in user a deterministic Marshal-deserialization path reachable via the /my/two_factor_devices cookie reader This vulnerability is fixed in . |
| Budibase is an open-source low-code platform. Prior to 3.39.9, `POST /api/pwa/process-zip` at packages/server/src/api/routes/static.ts:24 accepts a builder-uploaded .zip, extracts it with [email protected] into a temp directory, then for each entry listed in icons.json validates the icon path, opens it, and streams the bytes into MinIO. The resulting object is served back via GET /api/assets/{appId}/pwa/{uuid}.png. [email protected] preserves absolute symlink targets when restoring symlink entries. The icon-source validator at packages/server/src/api/controllers/static/index.ts:259-268 resolves the icon source string against baseDir (path.resolve), checks resolvedSrc.startsWith(baseDir + path.sep) against that string, and calls fs.existsSync(resolvedSrc) which follows symbolic links to confirm the target exists. None of the three calls reject symbolic-link entries. packages/backend-core/src/objectStore/objectStore.ts:302 then calls (await fsp.open(path)).createReadStream() on the resolved path. fsp.open follows the symlink, the target file's bytes stream into MinIO, and the response of the asset-fetch endpoint returns those bytes verbatim. Result: a workspace-level builder reads any file the server process can open. This vulnerability is fixed in 3.39.9. |
| Budibase is an open-source low-code platform. Prior to 3.39.0, `GET /api/chat-links/:instance/:token/handoff` is a public endpoint (no auth required) that performs a permanent, state-changing operation: it binds an external chat identity (Slack/Discord/MS Teams) to an authenticated Budibase user account, with no consent UI and no CSRF protection. The session token in the URL is created by the attacker (from their own /link slash command) and embeds the attacker's externalUserId. When an authenticated Budibase victim visits the URL, their account is silently and permanently linked to the attacker's Slack/Discord identity. The server responds with "Authentication succeeded." — no indication of what was linked. This vulnerability is fixed in 3.39.0. |
| Budibase is an open-source low-code platform. Prior to 3.39.3, the application server exposes an unauthenticated endpoint that generates S3 PutObject presigned URLs using credentials stored in a workspace datasource. The route is protected only by the recaptcha middleware and does not require authentication, table permission, datasource permission, or builder access. A public caller who knows a workspace ID and S3 datasource ID can request a signed upload URL for attacker-controlled bucket and key values. This vulnerability is fixed in 3.39.3. |
| Budibase is an open-source low-code platform. Prior to 3.39.0, an anonymous attacker who knows or can enumerate a workspace id (app_...) and an S3-source datasource id (ds_...) can call this endpoint with no auth and obtain a 15-minute pre-signed PUT URL minted on the victim's IAM identity. The endpoint also returns the publicUrl so the attacker knows exactly where their PUT lands. Because bucket is attacker-controlled, the attacker can write to any bucket those IAM credentials can write to, not only the bucket the datasource was configured for. The Budibase server route POST /api/attachments/:datasourceId/url (packages/server/src/api/routes/static.ts) is registered with only the recaptcha middleware. There is no authorized(...) middleware in the chain. The controller (packages/server/src/api/controllers/static/index.ts::getSignedUploadURL) looks the requested datasource up, instantiates an AWS S3 client with the datasource's stored accessKeyId / secretAccessKey, and returns an AWS Signature V4 pre-signed PutObjectCommand URL for the caller-supplied bucket and key. The bucket is not pinned to the datasource's configured bucket. The workspace context required by sdk.datasources.get is sourced by getWorkspaceIdFromCtx (packages/backend-core/src/utils/utils.ts) from any of: the x-budibase-app-id header, the JSON body appId, a path segment that begins with the workspace prefix, or ?appId=. auth.buildAuthMiddleware([], { publicAllowed: true }) runs before any of this and explicitly allows anonymous requests. The currentWorkspace middleware's "deny access to dev preview" branch only triggers under isBrowser(ctx) && !isApiKey(ctx); isBrowser checks the parsed User-Agent for a recognised browser, so any non-browser client (curl, the supplied PoC, any tool not setting a browser UA) is neither and reaches dev workspaces too. This vulnerability is fixed in 3.39.0. |
| Budibase is an open-source low-code platform. Prior to 3.39.12, an unauthenticated visitor of any published Budibase app reads every document of the backing MongoDB, CouchDB, Elasticsearch, DynamoDB-PartiQL, or REST-with-JSON-body collection and, where the builder has published a PUBLIC write query, modifies every document of that collection with one HTTP request. enrichContext at packages/server/src/sdk/workspace/queries/queries.ts:121-138 substitutes parameter values into the raw JSON body of a query, then JSON.parses the result. The validator validateQueryInputs at packages/server/src/api/controllers/query/index.ts:61-71 rejects only Handlebars markers ({{, }}) in user input and does not escape JSON metacharacters (", \, }). A parameter value containing a closing quote and additional keys lifts attacker-controlled fields into the parsed filter object. For Mongo find, the parsed filter passes directly to collection.find() (packages/server/src/integrations/mongodb.ts:506-510). Duplicate-key JSON parsing overrides the builder's {name: "..."} with {name: {$exists: true}} and returns every document. The same primitive against an updateMany query (mongodb.ts:577-585) widens the filter scope to the full collection while the builder-controlled $set body runs against every matched document. The authorized middleware at packages/server/src/middleware/authorized.ts:141-148 short-circuits when the query's role is PUBLIC. CSRF is not enforced on this path. POST /api/v2/queries/:queryId (packages/server/src/api/routes/query.ts:63) accepts the call with no session, only an x-budibase-app-id header that is public from the published-app URL. This vulnerability is fixed in 3.39.12. |
| Budibase is an open-source low-code platform. Prior to 3.39.9, the webhook trigger endpoint in Budibase is publicly accessible and passes the full HTTP request body into automation execution parameters. A mass assignment vulnerability in externalTrigger() allows an attacker to overwrite the internal appId property by including it in the webhook POST body. When the automation is processed asynchronously (the default path for webhooks without a collect step), the worker executes the attacker-defined automation in the context of the victim's workspace, granting full read/write access to the victim's database. This vulnerability is fixed in 3.39.9. |
| Kestra is an open-source, event-driven orchestration platform. Prior to 1.3.24, this vulnerability exists in the BasicAuth authentication component of the Kestra OSS workflow orchestration platform. An attacker who gains read access to the PostgreSQL database can exploit SHA-512's high computation speed to recover the administrator password offline. In Kubernetes deployments, a successful crack further enables reading of the cluster ServiceAccount Token and all K8s Secrets, achieving vertical privilege escalation. This vulnerability is fixed in 1.3.24. |
| Kestra is an open-source, event-driven orchestration platform. Prior to 1.0.45 and 1.3.21, the authentication filter for the REST API (@Filter("/api/v1/**")) treats any request whose path ends in /configs as the public instance-config endpoint and forwards it without a credential check. kestra addresses its resources by URL path segments that the caller chooses (/api/v1/{tenant}/flows/{namespace}, /api/v1/{tenant}/executions/{namespace}/{id}, /api/v1/{tenant}/namespaces/{namespace}/kv/{key}). An anonymous caller picks the literal configs as the final segment, and the request bypasses Basic-Auth entirely. Because the bypass reaches the flow-create and execution-trigger routes, an unauthenticated caller creates a flow containing a Shell or Process task and runs it. The task executes as root inside the kestra container. The official docker-compose.yml mounts /var/run/docker.sock, so root in the container reaches the host Docker daemon. This vulnerability is fixed in 1.0.45 and 1.3.21. |
| OpenProject is open-source, web-based project management software. Prior to 17.4.0, the GET /api/v3/relations endpoint allows any authenticated user to retrieve relations — and the subject (title) of work packages they have no permission to view — by supplying an arbitrary work package ID in the involved, fromId, or toId filter. This bypasses the Relation.visible scope due to a flawed performance optimization in RelationQuery. This vulnerability is fixed in 17.4.0. |
| OpenProject is open-source, web-based project management software. Prior to 17.4.0, OpenProject's rich text (markdown) rendering pipeline uses Sanitize::Config::RELAXED[:css] for inline style sanitization. This configuration permits essentially all CSS properties in style attributes on permitted HTML elements (figure, img, table, th, tr, td). This allows any authenticated user with write access to formattable text fields (work package descriptions, comments, project descriptions, news) to inject CSS This vulnerability is fixed in 17.4.0. |
| OpenProject is open-source, web-based project management software. Prior to 17.3.2 and 17.4.0, the GET /api/v3/shares endpoint returns share details for ALL work packages in a project to any user with the view_shared_work_packages permission. The authorization check operates at the project level only — it does not verify the requesting user can actually view each individual shared work package. This allows a regular project member to discover work package IDs and subjects (including confidential titles), which users have been granted shared access, what role level was assigned (Editor, Commenter, Viewer). This vulnerability is fixed in 17.3.2 and 17.4.0. |
| OpenProject is open-source, web-based project management software. Prior to 17.3.2 and 17.4.0, a Missing Authorization vulnerability exists in OpenProject's CostReportsController. The rename and update actions allow any authenticated user to modify the name, filters, and grouping of any Public cost report in the system without verifying ownership or permission level. An attacker who discovers or guesses a public report's numeric ID can rename or overwrite its filter configuration without any warning to the report's owner. This vulnerability is fixed in 17.3.2 and 17.4.0. |
| OpenProject is open-source, web-based project management software. Prior to 17.3.2 and 17.4.0, OpenProject exposes a document update endpoint used to modify existing documents. The target document is loaded with visibility checks and then updated. During update, attacker-controlled attributes are applied to the persisted record before authorization is enforced. As a result, a user without :manage_documents in the source project can move and modify foreign project documents by setting project_id in a single PATCH request. This vulnerability is fixed in 17.3.2 and 17.4.0. |
| OpenProject is open-source, web-based project management software. Prior to 17.3.2 and 17.4.0, the web application's meetings filter feature leaks whether a given user ID corresponds to a valid account and discloses the user's full name, allowing an attacker to enumerate all existing user accounts by probing user IDs and observing differences in the server response. This vulnerability is fixed in 17.3.2 and 17.4.0. |
| OpenProject is open-source, web-based project management software. Prior to 17.3.2 and 17.4.0, Business Logic Error on OpenProject through PATCH request to /api/v3/users/me permits to bypass password requirements. A password validation flaw in the change password behavior allows attackers to change a user's password only with an active session takeover. This vulnerability is fixed in 17.3.2 and 17.4.0. |
| RustFS is a distributed object storage system built in Rust. In 1.0.0-beta.4, authenticated users with only PutObject permission on their own bucket can exploit a path traversal vulnerability in the Snowball auto-extract feature to write arbitrary objects into other users' buckets, completely breaking multi-tenant isolation. The vulnerability chains three flaws: No ../ sanitization in tar entry key normalization; IAM wildcard matching uses raw (uncleaned) paths; and Filesystem path cleaning resolves ../ across bucket boundaries. |
| Kestra is an open-source, event-driven orchestration platform. Prior to 1.0.45 and 1.3.23, the local internal-storage backend validates user-supplied paths for .. traversal before it converts Windows-style backslashes to forward slashes. An attacker can therefore smuggle a traversal sequence past the guard using backslashes (..\..\..\); the guard sees a harmless string, and the path is only rewritten to ../../../ after validation, immediately before the file is opened. Any authenticated user who can view an execution (the lowest-privilege role) can call GET /api/v1/{tenant}/executions/{executionId}/file?path=… and read any file on the server filesystem readable by the Kestra process, outside the storage sandbox and across every tenant and namespace. This includes the embedded H2 database (all flows, all users, all stored secrets), internal storage of every other tenant/namespace, mounted secret files, and the process environment (/proc/self/environ) which contains configured database and secret-backend credentials. It is a complete breach of Kestra's storage isolation and multi-tenancy boundary. This vulnerability is fixed in 1.0.45 and 1.3.23. |
| Kestra is an open-source, event-driven orchestration platform. Prior to 1.0.43 and 1.3.19, several Kestra API endpoints accept a kestra:// URI from the client and pass it through StorageInterface.parentTraversalGuard before reading the underlying file from the local storage backend. The guard only inspects the literal URI.toString(), so a URL-encoded .. written as %2E%2E slips through. The downstream code then calls URI.getPath(), which decodes %2E%2E back to .., and the resulting path is handed to Paths.get(...) without normalization. The OS resolves the .. segments at open(2) time, so an authenticated user with a single execution can read any file the Kestra process has access to on the host filesystem (/etc/passwd, mounted secrets, other tenants' execution outputs, etc.). This vulnerability is fixed in 1.0.43 and 1.3.19. |
| Kestra is an open-source, event-driven orchestration platform. Prior to 1.0.45 and 1.3.21, AuthenticationFilter in Kestra OSS uses request.getPath().endsWith("/configs") to whitelist the public configuration endpoint from Basic Auth. Because the check is a suffix match rather than an exact path match, any API path whose last segment is configs bypasses authentication entirely. An unauthenticated remote attacker can exploit this to create and execute arbitrary workflows without credentials. Because Kestra ships with script execution plugins (plugin-script-shell, plugin-script-python, etc.) enabled by default, this directly results in unauthenticated Remote Code Execution as root inside the Kestra worker container. This vulnerability is fixed in 1.0.45 and 1.3.21. |
